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PREFACE
Many literary historians and critics recognize a 
change in attitude toward the arts during the course of the 
eighteenth-century in Britain. The change is reflected in 
four major areas: the development of a school of aesthetic
philosophy, of an influence upon it from traditional criti­
cism, and in turn, of its influence upon criticism, and a 
faction of rejection of both traditional interpretations and 
the new aesthetic principles. The new ideas in criticism 
which arose from the emergence of aesthetics and from other 
forces led to three distinct critical attitudes in the cen­
tury. These have been identified as rather general trends 
in literary theory and taste. Calling attention to these 
critical attitudes in the period, Walter Jackson Bate refers 
to neo-classicism, associations of ideas, and the premise
of feeling.^ Ernst Cassirer recognizes the same three
2trends in all of European critical thought. Referring to th< 
work of the Restoration and the eighteenth century in England 
as a distinct and coherent school, R. S. Crane notes that 
the emphasis of interpretation varied according to the frame
3
of reference of the writer. His "f rame of reference," as 
we si)all see, is the key to identifying and clarifying the
vii
three critical trends which characterize the period.
Frame of reference, critical perspective, point of 
view, or orientation all refer to the critic's reference 
point in his analysis of art. He may. for example, look 
at art as a mirror or reflection of nature; he may look at 
art from the perspective of the viewer, as a stimulus to 
his imagination; he may be concerned only with the creative 
processes of the artist's imagination; or he may consider
4the art object in itself with no reference to other criteria. 
Indeed, an eclectic may form his critical opinion using 
several of these orientations. Usually, however, one point 
of view is predominant.
The intent of the present study is to demonstrate that 
there were three dominant critical orientations in eighteenth- 
century British thought, that these attitudes were a deter­
mining factor in definitions and values--for example, how a 
critic defined beauty— and furthermore, that the orienta­
tions were responsible for the change which is evident in 
British critical ideas throughout the century. The orienta­
tion method which I have proposed is designed to organize 
the many materials produced in the period, and to demon­
strate the relationship between the point of view and 
critical definitions and values.
Three perspectives are to be defined: (I) object
orientation, (2) subject orientation, and (3) creator 
orientation. These three refer to analysis based on art as
viii
a reflection of nature, art as a stimulus to ideas in 
the subject, or viewer, and art as an expression of the 
creative power of the artist. In order to understand 
critical attitudes in the century, however, we need to look 
at the conditions which generated them. Therefore I will 
devote the first chapter to a survey of the arts and 
general trends in criticism. Next I will turn to a gen­
eral definition of the three orientations. Finally, a 
chapter will be devoted to each orientation to demonstrate 
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A SURVEY OF THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN CRITICISM 
AND THE ARTS
Any generalization about the arts in a period as 
broad as the eighteenth century is diffcult and dangerous. 
Yet, in order to put the criticism of the period in its 
proper context, we need to look at the artistic products—  
literature, plastic arts, and rausic--produced during the 
century, and also at the predominant attitudes they generated 
among critics and general audiences. On the part of critics 
the attitudes consist of critical statements, and on the part 
of audiences attitudes were expressed in the form of pat­
ronage, i.e., economic encouragement and support. For the 
purpose of a survey of eighteenth-century British art and 
criticism these two features— art and criticism--can be 
further divided into four major categories: (1) trends in
critical theory, (2) the effect of criticism of the arts.
and of Che arts on criticism, (3) the system of values—  
hierarchy, or genre theory--in the arts, and (A) the genres 
and styles in the arts. Each of these four points will be 
considered in turn.
1
The general change which took place in critical 
theory can be summarized as a shift from a classical-rational­
istic criticism, toward a subjective-associacionalistic 
analysis, and a subjective-emotiona1istic response to art. 
These three trends amount to three distinct ways to talk 
about art. Let us look at each in terms of method.
In the early part of the century the predominant 
method was to criticize objects of art as individual works 
and as representations of genres, with special attention 
to the method of producing specific generic forms. Criticism 
in this sense means discussing the object as a special form 
with characteristic elements. In poetry, for example, we 
can talk about the form of ode or epic, and about the 
elements of meter and rhyme; in painting we can talk about 
the form of portraiture, and about the fundamentals of 
line, color, and figure; in music we can talk about the 
form of sonata or fugue, and about the elements of counter­
point, tone, and melody. This can be called a formalist 
interpretation of art.
Toward the middle part of the century the tendency 
in aesthetic statement was to analyze response to art as a
physical stimulus. Analysis was directed Coward the 
viewer-audience; it was characterized by a break-down of 
human nature to its most elementary principles. Thus, we 
can talk about pain and pleasure, morality and virtue, 
as well as about fundamental aesthetic modes which cause 
these responses--the beautiful, the sublime, and the 
picturesque, among others. This can be called an empirical 
interpretation of art.
In the later years of the century aesthetic state­
ments often called for an emotional response to the arts in 
an intuitive fashion on the level of feeling. This last 
approach to art involved the intuitive process of the crea­
tion of art, as well as a correspondent sympathy on the 
part of the viewer.
The shift in emphasis was a gradual process which 
proceeded in almost imperceptionab1e steps from a primary 
concern for the formal principles of art, to a theory of 
habitual response founded ultimately on judgment as an ele­
ment of sensitive experience, to a total lack of rational 
basis for artistic prejudice--an intuition. All three views 
can be detected to some degree in the opening years of our 
period. The formalist position had a long history, which can 
be seen not only in English works of the preceding century 
and translations of foreign literature, but which was also 
the predominant view at the beginning of the century. It 
was expressed by Pope, Dennis, Robert Morris, Jonathan
Richardson and others in the early years, and later by 
Johnson, Reynolds and Hogarth.
One of the earliest appearances of the analytical 
method was Addison's papers on "The Pleasures of the 
Imagination" which appeared in The Spectator in 1712;while 
his method was not systematic, it pointed in that direction. 
This type of interpretation became increasingly popular 
throughout the century, and its influence can be detected 
in the writings of some of the later formalists, notably 
Reynolds. The most well known writers after Addison in 
this analytical mode were Hutcheson, Burke, Hume, Gerard, 
and Karnes.
Very early in the century Shaftesbury produced a 
sophisticated rejection of some of the traditional values 
in art as well as some of the principles of the new analytical 
method. These principles, we shall see, are Lockean associ­
ation alism and empiricism. While he did not clearly and 
totally discard rationalism as an approach to art, Shaftes­
bury did provide some justification for its eventual 
demise. His rather disguised rejection of the two other 
modes of criticism— the neo-classic formalism and association- 
alistic empiricism--became an important attitude by the end 
of the century. We can see similar ideas in Young, Duff, 
Blake, and Coleridge and elements of the ideas in Reynolds, 
Gerard, Ogilvie, and others.
There were four veins of criticism and aesthetics in
the century, three of which can be identified with the 
orientations and the methods defined above. The fourth is 
an independent development which is reflected in each of 
the orientations, but which is not itself a definable inter­
pretative mode. These four trends are: (1) the traditional
poetic criticism which found its basis in Plato, Aristotle, 
and Roman sources (which can be generally identified with 
the object orientation and the critical method), (2) a 
growing systematic asethetics which can be said to have 
started with Francis Hutcheson (which gave rise to the 
subject orientation and can be identified with the analytical 
method), (3) a vein of enthusiastic intuitionalism which was 
apparent in only a few critics as a main attitude but which 
influenced several critics to some degree (identifiable with 
the creator orientation and the questioning of formalism 
and analysis), (4) an interpretation of the arts characterized 
as a literary historigraphy which did not foster an orienta­
tion, but which instead can be found as an element within 
each of the orientations.
Each of these four veins of criticism covers a broad 
range of topics, including the literary arts, painting, 
music, and architecture and gardening. Let us look at each 
of the trends and some of the represcnative works. Tradi­
tional texts and interpretations included the Greek and 
Roman classics; Aristotle's Poetics, Horace’s Ars poetica, 
Longinus's peri llupsous (On the Sublime), Alberti's
Renaissance works, On Paintins and On Architecture which 
were translated into English by James Leoni in 1755; 
Boileau's Art poétique, John Dryden's translation of du 
Fresnoy's de Arte graphica, with his introductory essay 
"The Parallel Between Poetry and Painting"; a number of 
eighteenth-century materials which followed traditional 
patterns, such as Alexander Pope's Essay on Criticism,
Sir Joshua Reynolds's Discourses on A r t , William Hogarth's 
Analysis of Beauty, Jonathan Richardson's Essay on the 
Theory of Painting, John Dennis's The Grounds of Criticism 
in Poetry ; and some late eighteenth-century works such as 
Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Lord 
Kames^second volume of Elements of Criticism (the first 
volume was written in the vein of aesthetics), Samuel 
Johnson's Preface to Shakespeare, and John Gunn's trans­
lation of Borghese's New and Critical System of Music. The 
traditional vein of criticism was characterized by an 
emphasis on methodo1ogy--rhetoric and style in the case of 
the literary arts, technique and style in the plastic arts, 
and theory in music.
Joseph Addison first introduced aesthetics as a 
discipline separate from critical theory. (Criticism focuses 
on the art object, and aesthetics focuses on processes of 
response and creation.) While his interpretation was written 
in the context of tradition a], values, his analysis of 
appreciation in the viewer called attention to the possi­
bilities of a whole new approach to art. Francis Hutcheson 
was the first to oresent a theorv of aesthetics which oro- 
vided a system based on principles of response.^ His 
Inquiry Concerning Beauty, Order, Harmony, Design (17 2 5) 
combined some of the philosophic system of both Shaftesbury 
an'd Locke into a method of systematic response based on 
principles of association and on an innate sense of beauty. 
Aesthetic treatises and near-aesthetic systems were con­
tributed by David Hume (Four Dissertations, 1757), Edmund 
Burke (Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas 
of the Sublime and Beautiful with "Essay on Taste," 1757), 
Henry Home, Lord Karnes (vol. 1 of Elements of Criticism, 
1762), Alexander Gerard (An Essay on Taste, 1759), James 
Beattie (Essay on Poetry and Music, 1 7 79 ) , and Archibald 
Alison (Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste,
1790), among a host of others. Each of these philosophers 
attempted to explain reactions to beauty (or to other 
aesthetic modes) in terms of associationalistic psychology.
Criticism basically founded on an intuitionalistic 
aesthetics includes Anthony Ashley Cooper, third Earl of 
Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions,
Times (1711) , Edward Young's Conjectures on Original
Criticism (1759), William Duff's An Essay on Original
Genius (1767), several of William Blake's poems, letters, 
and annotations —  the most important of which was the Anno tâ­
tions to Reynolds s "Discourses" (circa 1808) —  and William
8
Wordsworth's Preface to Lyrica], Ballads (1800).
There was a fourth vein of criticism in the 
eighteenth century which was characterized by a concern 
for the conditions which gave rise to specific types of 
literature. Various factors were pointed to as conducive 
to poetic genius--climatic, geographic, and political con­
ditions, and particularly a concept which has been called 
2"primitivism." This relativistic evaluation of poetry was 
a complex trend which was reflected in each of the orienta­
tions of criticism. Pope, for instance, referred to liberty
3as a condition for periods of productivity; Johnson said
that we must look at the conditions of the age in order
4to properly judge genius; Duff believed that original 
poetic genius was likely to flourish in uncultivated periods 
of society.^ Included among those who were developing this 
new historical approach were Robert Wood, John Brown, Adam 
Ferguson, Richard Hurd, and the War tons, Joseph and Thomas.
As a generalization it can be said that there were 
two kinds of comments about the arts in this period (ex­
cluding technical works on music, architecture, furniture 
design, e tc.)--criticism and aesthetics. Until the middle 
of the eighteenth century when they separated and went 
different though similar directions, criticism and 
aesthetics were one endeavour. The works of Burke, Addison, 
Shaftesbury, Hume, Alison, Beatie, Karnes, and many others 
combined features of both criticism and aesthetics. Hutch­
eson's and Gerard's treatises come closer to what is now 
considered scientific asethetics than any other works in 
the century. The work of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, along 
with the Scottish school of "common sense" eventually 
influenced German aesthetics of the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries. The tradition of literary 
criticism which was represented in the opening years of the 
period by Dennis, Pope, and Thomas Blackwell (An Inquiry 
into the Life and writings of Homer), and by Johnson, Hurde, 
the Wartons, and Blake later in the century, was followed 
by William Hazlitt, Samuel Coleridge and Wordsworth in 
the nineteenth century.
II
There was a close relationship between criticism and 
art in this period. On occasion criticism affected artistic 
expression, and on occasion artistic expression affected 
criticism.^ Examples of both directions of influence can 
be given. This connection between practices and theory was 
due, in part, to the theory which bound the arts together 
for critical purposes. We will look at some obvious 
instances of influence of art on criticism and of criticism 
on art, and then at the theory of the "sister arts" which 
had a somewhat general impact on practice.
Reynolds's pronouncements about historical portraiture 
appeared after he had been pointing in the genre for several 
years. Hogarth's Analysis of Beauty, based on the principle 
of line, was published toward the end of his career. These
10
two examples are instances of theory following practice and 
are a kind of justification of art already in existence. On 
the other hand, Benjamin West's Death of Wolfe was prompted 
by Reynolds's high regard for the historical-mythological genre 
of painting, and the plan for Burlington House was adopted 
because of Lord Burlington's admiration of the Palladian 
style of architecture, which had come into vogue in the 
seventeenth century in England. One historian points to 
at least two cases of Reynolds's impact on contemporary art, 
attributing the artistic failure of John Bacon's statue of 
Johnson to Reynolds's influence on the Memorial Committee 
which chose a classical pose and costume for the fiture,^ 
as well as to his influence on the whole school of English 
sculpture by his condemnation of the moderns and the school
g
of Bernini in particular.
Here, in other words, existing art is explained by 
theory. In all of these particular instances the critical 
comments were very specific in nature, addressing themselves 
to style and method. It is much more difficult to establish 
specific relationships between more general statements and 
particular artistic works; but criticism affected the arts 
of the century, and the arts affected criticism. We shall 
see that there was a general influence in one direction of 
the other between theory and practice.
The term "arts" applied to a much broader spectrum 
of things in the eighteenth century than it does today.
11
for there was no strict theoretical division between the
technical and the fine arts; the technology on which the
"useful arts" were based was not a separate endeavour from
9
"natural philosophy." Thus, one might justify a study of 
scientific advancements along with the fine arts as Penfield 
Roberts has done in his survey. In one instance there is 
an obvious connection between the course of the fine arts 
and the "useful arts," that is, the development and refine­
ments of Wedgwood's superior pottery.
During and preceding the eighteenth century there 
were efforts on the part of critics to expand theories of 
art to embrace architecture and g a r d e n i n g . B o t h  in theory 
and practice sculpture had been considered an extension of 
architecture for several hundred years. The minor arts-- 
pottery, interior design, furniture making, silversmithing, 
glasswork--received little attention from most critics, 
although several technical pattern books appeared in these 
fields. Critical theory was generally reserved for the 
"sister arts" of poerty, painting, and music. The minor arts 
were excluded from consideration on the basis of the theory 
itself, which was largely dependent on a hierarchy of values 
placing poetry, painting, and music at the top. As a general 
rule, then, the critical statements of the period were 
addressed to the merits or faults, and taste in poetry and 
drama, painting, music, architecture, and gardening. This 
theory which bound the arts together had some impact on art
12
forms. We shall look at the theory of the "sister arts."
Literary theory was one of three interdependent
assumptions about the arts which was characteristic of the
eighteenth century. R. S. Crane has pointed out that the
aesthetic writings of eigtheenth-century England constitute
a single school of t h o u g h t b y  this he means that all of
the critics assumed certain precepts. Walter Hippie agrees:
"The aesthetic theories of the eighteenth century in Britain
comprised a clearly defined school, the leading members of
which are easily identified by their references to one
12another's work." Three of these common premises are of 
specific interest; that all of the arts are related to one 
another and to nature, that all of the arts fall into 
genres, and that art has an ultimate purpose.
These attitudes about the arts were part of the 
cultural climate of the period. Sir Joshua Reynolds re­
cognized the impact of assumptions about art on his con­
temporaries .
Opinions generally received and floating in the world, 
whether true or false, we naturally adopt and make our 
own; they may be considered a type of inheritance to 
which we succeed and are tenant for life, and which 
we leave to our posterity very nearly in the condition 
which we received it; it not being much in any one man's 
power either to impair or to improve it. The greatest 
part of these opinions, like current coin in its cir­
culation, we a e  used to take without examining or 
weighing . . . .  ̂̂
Reynolds wrote that the "collector of popular opinion" must
examine these beliefs when he attempts to systemize his
knowledge, and discard those which do not hold up to reason.
13
However, Reynolds himself was typical of his era and 
readily adopted the three premises central to the aesthetic 
writings of his period: (1) that there is a close relation­
ship among the arts and between the arts and nature, (2) that 
there is a natural hierarchy of values (genre theory),
(3) that art has purpose. The purposes were closely re­
lated to the hierarchy of values. The close kinship of 
the three "sister arts" is a central feature of eighteenth- 
century theory, as are the genre theory and purpose of the 
arts; the latter two, however, will be considered below 
as the third major aspect of this survey of the arts. Let 
us look at the relationship between the "sister arts" as an 
immediate aspect of the connection between theory and prac­
tice.
Before the opening of the century, Dryden clearly 
restated the relationship between the sister arts of 
poetry and painting in his introduction to his translation 
of du Fresnoy's de Arte graphica. In the introductory essay, 
"Parallel of Poetry and Painting." (1695), Dryden wrote,
"On a serious consideration of this matter, it will be 
found that the art of painting has a wonderful affinity 
with that of poetry; and that there is between them a cer­
tain common imagination."^^ He stated that he had set 
aside two months from the business of the translation of 
Virgil because lie considered the commonality of poetry and 
painting of major importance. The poet and the painter are 
to proceed in the same manner by forming an idea of perfect
14
nature in the mind and following that model. Dryden made 
three methodological parallels between the two arts which 
were broadly accepted by critics in the eighteenth century:
(1) invention, which is necessary to both of the arts,
(2) design in painting, which is similar to description in 
poetry, and (3) coloring which is similar to the use of 
words —  expression--in poetry. Invention according to Dryden 
is the disposition of the work by which it has unity, har­
mony, and order. Design and description refer to the 
symbols of action and passion: in painting this consists
of the posture and expression of the figure; in poetry it
consists of description, disposition of the action, and
proper motivation of the passions. Coloring and expression
refer to lights and shadows in painting, and to tropes,
versifications, and "all the other elegancies of sound"
15in poetry.
The theme of relating the three sister arts is 
woven throughout the texture of eighteenth-century British 
criticism and aesthetics. It became a truism that needed
16defense only when it began to lose its general acceptance. 
The frontpiecc of James Harris’s Three Treatises graphically 
illustrates the closeness of the arts and their mutual 
dependence upon nature. The plate (plate 1) depicts a 
statue of Diana of Ephesus, representing nature and her 
capacity to nourish several children; the several arts, her 
offspring, surround her. He assumed, in other words, that
15
a poem and a painting are identical twins. Many essays 
almost treat the three arts as one, with specific attention 
only to the various senses through which they affect the 
imagination (especially sight). These aesthetic works deal
specifically with the reaction of the audience to stimuli
17which may be either manmade, as of the arts, or natural.
For critics who were searching for a formal principle of 
beauty in nature, only ambiguous qualities such as harmony, 
goodness, or truth seemed to be adequately general to tie 
the arts together. The unity which eluded the formalists 
was "discovered" by the associ ationa1 ists to be founded in
the mind of the subject-viewer upon psychological principles
18of association of ideas and the pain-pleasure dichotomy.
The sister arts were further bound together by their 
special relationship to nature, for each was committed to 
observing and copying the model before her. The medium
might differ, but the model, and the end effect, were
common to all the arts. Pope wrote, "First follow 
Nature . . . Unerring Nature . . . One clear, unchang 'd
and Universal L i g h t . T h i s  attitude was echoed in 
countless essays upon the various arts throughout the
period. Nature^^ for the musician was sound and motion,
for the poet it was the passions, i.e., the activities of
2 2 2 3man, and for the painter it was visual, phenomena.
All of this concern for the interdependence of the
arts generated a general attitude which can be detected
16
in some specific examples. The most obvious is the large
number of Anacreontic poetry at the end of the seventeenth
24and at the beginning of the eighteenth centuries. Jean
Hagstrum's study demonstrates various levels of influence 
of the imagery of the pictoral arts upon poetry, and in 
turn of poetry upon the pictoral arts. A particularly 
striking example of painterly imagery in poetry is John 
Dyer's "Gongar Hill." Reynolds's Garrick between Tragedy 
and Comedy (plate 2) demonstrates an example of an 
influence of a literary idea upon painting. The idea 
source of this conception is Reynolds' conviction that the 
passions should be depicted in a general fashion; the 
pictoral source is a tradition of representations of 
Hercules between vice and virtue. Thus, we can see 
general and sometimes specific relationships between 
theory and practice.
Ill
We will now consider the purpose of art as an 
element of the hierarchial value system, or genre theory, 
and the status of both the art and of the artist as a 
reflection of that hierarchy. The hierarchy of arts in 
the eighteenth century was integrally related to the pur­
pose of art which was generally held to be two-fold--to 
instruct and to please. Historically the concern for 
the moral aim of instruction can be traced to Plato; the 
interest in the mimetic quality, or principle of pleasure
17
can be traced to Aristotle. We will look at these two 
ideas of purpose before examining the hierarchy, since the 
genre theory was ultimately dependent upon purpose.
The potential for instruction and improvement had 
been considered one of the primary values of art since 
the time of the Greeks. Art was an obvious method of 
instruction in Christian tradition, from visual stories 
to fables and allegories. By the opening of our period 
it had become quite sophisticated in theory, especially 
with Dennis's considerations about the connection between 
moral purpose and the expression of religious ideas. The 
element of pleasure was almost as old as instruction. From 
the time of Addison's Spec tor papers in which we first see 
the associationalistic method applied to aesthetic pro­
blems, the idea of pleasure took on new importance and 
was developed into some intricate forms. What exactly 
constituted pleasure and how it was to be attained was a 
ma tter of extreme importance to the moralists as well as 
to the empiricists. (Moralists like Shaftesbury and Karnes 
considered a moral sense to be a fundamental human principle; 
empiricists like Addison and Burke found only pain and 
pleasure to be basic human principles. Some moralists were 
also empiricists: Kamos and Gerard incorporated both an 
inner sense and the principle of pain and pleasure into 
their theories.) Thus, by the early years of the century 
both instruction and pleasure were major aspects of critical 
theory.
18
The idea of instruction was generally linked with 
pleasure, and instruction was founded on imitation. The 
conviction that certain of the arts could elevate humanity 
gave greater value to those classes of art in which could 
be discovered some philosophical justification for causing 
elevation. The principle of imitation was reversible in the 
sense that the arts were nature imitated, and in the sense 
that man was thought to imitate what he observed in the 
arts. Thus a heroic theme was believed to be responsible 
for motivating heroic and patriotic action in the audience. 
The "higher" genres such as tragedy,and Biblical and 
historic themes were therefore more valued for their 
capacity to improve their audiences.
In 1704 Dennis published The Grounds of Criticism in
Poetry in which he stated that the subordinate end of
poetry is to please, and the final end is to improve the 
2 5manners. According to Dennis it is the subject matter
of poetry which improves the manners. Thus, religious 
themes serve ends of poetry by exciting the passions.
Karnes echoed the moral purpose of arts in his 
Elements, published a half a century after Dennis's treatise. 
While Dennis simply stated that the ends of art are achieved 
by the excitement of the passions, Karnes went much further 
and developed a complicated system which proposed a sense 
of virtue which causes the spectator to imitate. The 
operation of this virtue leads to a habit of virtuous
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response in imitation. The virtuous sense is stimulated
?by examples which can either be observed or read about.
(The sophistication of Karnes's theory was derived ultimately
from Locke's pain-pleasure dichotomy and Shaftesbury's
inner sense. The immediate source of Kames'sidea was
probably Hutcheson and his followers.) Art is of central
importance to this operation of the responses: following the
lead of Aristotle, Kames developed the theory that fable
is equal to history for the purpose of stimulating 
2 9virtue, and as real examples are rare, the fable is even
preferable to history to stimulate the young to exercise
2 8their virtuous sense. Thus, in Dennis we see a critical
theory of the didactic potential of poetry which is based 
on the theme of religious subject matter. In Kames we 
see a complex system of stimulus-res ponse, with the added 
factor of an internal sense of virtue. One theory focuses 
on the subject matter, the other on the processes of 
imi tat ion.
Both Dennis's and Karnes's statements of the moral 
purpose of the arts are clear and characteristic of the 
attitude of many writers of the eighteenth century. The 
other goal, tliat of pleasure, received as much, if not 
more critical attention. Addision's series of eleven 
essays which appeared in 1712, called collectively "The 
Pleasures of the Imagination," addressed only this end of 
art. Addison obviously reflected Lockean psychology in
20
his analysis of pleasure; we receive our impressions 
through the senses, and the pleasures gained by the obser­
vation of nature are of a primary character; the pleasures 
gained through the reflection on these impressions are
secondary. Both the primary and the secondary are the
29pleasures of the imagination. Because the pleasures of 
direct experience are greater than those of reflection, 
the arts cause the more pleasure the more they imitate 
m a t u r e . A d d i s o n ' s  concern for the pleasurable proper­
ties of the arts is seen again in Reynolds, Johnson, Burke. 
And finally, although the importance of pleasure is of 
primary concern in the critical and analytical modes of 
interpretation, it is not completely lacking in the intuitive 
vein of Shaftesbury, Young, and Blake.
These two purposes of art are closely tied to the 
interrelationship of the arts as well as to the hierarchial 
value system. The psychology involved in the explanation 
of the process of pleasure was applied to all of the arts,, 
and to nature as well. Because the aesthetic concern was 
for a quality--beauty--which was thought to affect men in 
a predictable manner, the tendency was to ask how the 
mind responded to that quality. While some critics attempt­
ed to define the quality which caused pleasure, for example, 
Reynolds and Hogarth, others turned to the definition of 
processes of emotional reaction to it as a physical 
(sensitive) stimulus.
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Whether the appeal of the arts was sought after in 
general principles in external nature, such as harmony, 
or in an ideal form, or whether it was to be found in a 
universal principle in human nature, such as the "feeling" 
of the sublime, a moral sense, a sense of beauty, or the 
association of ideas, the basic principle was believed to 
govern all of the arts. The search for a universal 
principle which would unify and explain a multitude of 
particular phenomena was characteristic of the eighteenth 
century, a period in which men were endeavouring to discover 
that elusive law which would prove a reasonable order in 
the universe. Newton had reduced the physical universe to 
one principle; it was left to others to discover the unity 
of the arts and their appeal to human nature. Concentration 
on unity tended to amplify and reinforce the traditional 
sisterhood of the arts. Because attention came to be 
directed to processes rather than quali ties in nature, the 
search for unity in critical theory shifted from a mimetic 
principle in which art reflects the external world of
nature, to a moral and an empirical internal world of human
nature.
The natural hierarchy of value in the arts is re­
flected in the phrase "minor arts" used above. This assump­
tion of value, related to purpose (instruction and pleasure) 
and other factors, was characteristic of the eighteenth
century. It is generally referred to as the genre theory.
A genre, or category of representation is not to be
confused with style which is a characteristic manner of
execution. The two may coincide, however, particularly
because the traditional concept was that there was a
proper mode of execution for each genre. The three media
of words, pigment, and tone each encompass several types
of representation— genres. For instance, for pigment there
are history painting, face painting (portraiture), landscape,
genre (domestic themes), and still life. These are listed
in a descending hierarchial order that was generally accepted
by Reynolds’ contemporaries.^^
Poetry had a long tradition of a value system, in
which the epic and the tragedy headed the list. (The medium
which we refer to today as literature was called poetry, or
poetry and oratory; in the evaluation of eighteenth-century
arts it must be remembered that we consider many writings in
this category which would not have been acknowledged by
eighteenth-century critics. Much of what is now included
in literary surveys of the period such as the Tale of a Tub ,
Robinson Crusoe, Pepy’s Diary, and articles from The
Spectator, The Tatler, and The Rambler was not considered
as part of the poetic art.) Finally, music had its value
scale: Charles Avison named church, theater, and chamber 
32music; Dr. Charles Burney included opera in the theater,
33or dramatic music category.
As there was a generally accepted hierarchy of genres 
within the arts, there was also a hierarchy among the arts
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themselves. James Harris's Three Treatises is a typical and 
explicit example of this understanding, and it is used here 
as an illustration because of its influence upon his con­
temporaries, a fact which is attested to by the large
number of references the work and the attention given to
3 4his work in reviews. There were five edditions of
Harris's Trea tises during the eighteenth century; it was
35first published in 1744. His second treatise was de­
voted almost entirely to the hierarchial relationship of 
the three sister arts. For a multitude of reasons he found
3 6painting superior to music, and poetry superior to painting.
Harris, however, made an interesting statement concerning
the co-joining of poetry and music (as in opera, oratory,
etc.): "It is evident that these two arts can never be so
37powerful singely as when they are properly united.
With the' exception of his comment of the union of 
3 8poetry and music Harris was in agreement with the majority 
of his contemporaries. His argument was based on the Lockean 
sensationalism: the mind is made aware of the natural world
and its own affections by means of the senses. Whereas the 
world is made known through all the senses, the arts are 
communicated through only two--seeing and hearing. The means 
whereby the arts affect the mind is their imitation of the 
natural world, and the only things that can be understood
39by seeing and hearing are sound, motion, color, and figure. 
Thus, painting is superior to music because it is capable of
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more accurate imitation: "Musical imitation is greatly
below that of p a i n t i n g . A n d  poetry is inferior to
4 1painting on the basis of imitation. Poetry compared with
42music on the basis of imitation is an equal. The factor
which proves to be the most important in the comparison of
music and poetry is not "sound significant," but "sound
symbolic," to use Harris's terms.
Harris points out here that there are two views of
imitation: the first is a mechanical imitation through the
reproduction of sound, figure, color, and motion; the second
is imitation through the use of symbolism. When only the
mechanical means of imitation are considered, the art of
poetry is inferior to the other two arts because it is
limited to sound and motion, both of which can be as well,
if not better, imitated by music. Sound and motion also
have less impact on the imagination than figure and color.
However, upon the examination of the subjects that can be
imitated by the arts through symbolism, it is found that
poetry is far more flexible than the other arts because
music and painting are incapable of conveying meaning
through symbolic sounds. Through the use of symbols,poetry
can quite adequately imitate that which is most affecting--
4 3men and human actions. Language, it was argued, is the
only means through the sentiments, manners, and passions can 
44be imitated.
Generally the hierarchial system in the arts was reflected
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in the social status of its producers. Several forces 
influenced a change in the status quo of the beginning of 
the century: (1) theoretical and practical efforts on the
part of men like Reynolds, Chambers, Burney, and Wedgwood,
(2) a change in artistic taste of the public, and (3) a 
growth of the art consuming public. The condition of the 
hierarchy which existed in the opening years of the century 
and the effotts to change it were immediately related to 
values in the arts; change in taste and the art public will 
be considered later.
The two traditional criteria for the value of the 
various arts (improvement and pleasure) had been discussed 
and developed for centuries, with the result that the art 
of poetry received the highest regard. Poetry as a medium 
of words held a distinct advantage for its own defense, 
for its defenders were those who produced it, providing its 
justification in its own medium. Not until the sympathizers 
of the other arts took up the pen to proclaim the virtues of 
those arts did they receive their proper airing on the 
basis of the criteria established for poetry. Burney and 
Sir John Hawkins served as spokesmen for music in this 
respect, and Reynolds for painting.
Although a rationale had been established for moral 
value and hierarchial status among the arts based on in­
struction and pleasure, in actual practice it was derived 
from other sources as well. Additional bases for status
were, talents necessary for the execution of the art 
(especially the distinction between technical training and 
literary schooling), the social position of the artist 
of the genre as a whole, the theoretical origin of the art 
in history, and the necessity or luxury of the end product.
The traditional hierarchy was bolstered by various 
theories concerning the origins of the arts. A search for 
the hypothetical beginnings of civilization, prompted by an 
interest in governmental forms and the question of a golden 
age versus social and artistic progress, was of interest 
to those involved in the quarrel of the ancients and moderns, 
as well as to political theorists like Locke and Hobbes. The 
issue also brought into focus some aspects of man's nature 
and of the relationship between civilization and the advance­
ment of the arts. Anselm Bayly argued that music was the 
"first and immediate daughter of nature, while poetry and 
oratory are only near relations of m u s i c . P o e t r y  and
oratory, he wrote, are dependent upon music and must be
46judged by her standard. Bayly did not consider painting a
sister art to poetry and music. His particular evaluation 
of the relative status of the arts was based, in part, on 
the honorable antiquity of that art.
Several artists made special efforts to improve the
4 7status of their particular art in the eighteenth century. 
Reynolds worked very hard to improve the social standing of 
painters and to bring the art up to the intellectual level
c i
of poetry. He admonished the artist to give himself a
literary education in order that he might attain a higher
quality of art than the mere mechanical reproduction of 
4 8visual nature; this advice was addressed, in part, to the
differences in status between the classically educated
gentleman of letters and the artisan. To improve his own
education he took the grand tour, an excursion undertaken
by gentlemen and scholars to various places on the continent,
the sources for classical art. Reynolds was concerned that
the artist be a person of quality, able to converse with
others of the same standing. Besides an emphasis on a
liberal education, Reynolds's efforts to raise the relative
value of painting included the creation of a new genre,
historical portraiture, which fell immediately below the
historical-mythological genre and above face painting in the 
49hierarchy. His evental elevation to knighthood and the 
presidency of the Royal Academy under the auspices of the 
crown also helped the social position of painters and repaid 
his own efforts.
A colleague of Reynolds, Sir William Chambers, greatly 
improved the prestige of architects and established architecture 
as a respectable p r o f e s s i o n . A s  a member of the East India 
Company, he had the opportunity to study the Chinese archi­
tecture first hand. He became interested in the profession 
and attended le Brun's lectures in Paris and also studied in 
Rome. In mid-century he began his career as architect in
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London to royalty and aristocracy. He was appointed an 
architectural and drawing tutor to the Princeof Wales, who 
as George III appointed him to several important posts, and 
knighted him. His major publication was printed at royal 
expense. He was a friend of Reynolds and served as the 
first treasurer of the Royal Academy.
Another artist whose efforts led to an improvement in 
both the economic and artistic value of a genre was Josiah 
Wedgwood. His methods differed greatly from those of 
Reynolds and Chambers. Wedgwood's purpose was to make 
English pottery beautiful, useful, and easily obtainable to 
a large public. To achieve these ends he improved the body, 
design, and glaze of the product, and refined its distri­
bution. This was all accomplished through a variety of 
means: experiment, research, the hiring of competent artists
and artisans, training of workmen, division of labor, social 
and political involvement in order to make the workmen com­
fortable and happy, and involvement in the construction of
52canals to move materials and finsihed products. The
result was a product which could compete with china ware 
on the basis of artistic merit, and excel it on the basis 
of availability.
The position of a musician as a mere performer was 
altered by the efforts of two major musical historians 
who joined the ranks of the literatti. Burney and Hawkins 
each contributed large scholarly histories of the art in the
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latter half of the century. Burney became a member of
London's most fashionable literary society and formed
friendships with Johnson and Burke. Although his aspirations
exceeded his social revards--he wished royal recognition
of knighthood--he was eventually rewarded on a smaller scale
by the king for his monumental historical and critical work--
5 3his daughter was appointed to the royal household.
Hierarchy in the arts in practice and in theory was the 
result of several factors, the most important of which was 
the genre theory. The relative position of various genres 
and among the arts themselves underwent a subtle change in 
this period. That change came about through deliberate 
efforts of critics to elevate certain genres and arts in 
theory as well as efforts of artists to improve the quality 
of art products.
IV
The eighteenth century saw the development of new
genres in all the arts, stimulated by support from a new
54patron of the arts, the bourgeoisie. We will look first
at the character and general effect of this class upon the 
arts, then at the new forms themselves. After the decline 
of royal and aristocratic patronage^^ early in the century, 
most writers and painters worked Cor a socially broader 
audience. Johnson’s scornful letter to Lord Chesterfield 
for his lack of financial support for the Dictionary is often 
given as an example of the tendency to look for a wider
30
market. Some social historians point to the growth of the 
reading public and its bourgeois character as a cause of 
increased demand for literature in volume as well as for 
new f o r m s . T h e  increase in publishing also opened a 
new market for artists--illustrations for books. Another 
factor in the changing status of art was the economic 
power of the new class which had more money to spend on the 
arts .
The literary and the plastic arts were not the only
ones to benefit from changing social conditions: music and
the lesser arts were also affected. The public had a larger
exposure to music through the construction of public parks,
theaters, and availability of public performances. Special
occasions such as the rehearsal for Handel's Alexander's
Feast, his open air performance of the Water Music and Royal
Firework Music, and his charity performances of the Messiah
also provided opportunities for public entertainment.
Several factors led to innovations in the minor arts.
The new moneyed class demanded china ware for its newly
5 8acquired habit of tea drinking. Collections of china had
to be housed, as did collections of books; the need for
special types of furniture was soon filled by Chippendale
59and other cabinet makers. Wedgwood and others provided 
for a large public good English versions of products which 
had been imported from around the world.
Not only did the character of the art consuming
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public change during the eighteenth century, but the 
character of the artist changed as well. In the preceeding 
century Dryden, Rochester, and Milton, for example, had been 
highly respectable gentlemen or aristocrats, writing for a 
gentlemanly and aristrocratic audience. The artists of 
the new century were solidly middle class for the most part, 
and some were of lower social origins. Summarizing the 
increasing middle class leadership, J. H. Plumb has 
written, "In the seventeenth century literary culture was 
largely dominated by the Court. Swift, Addison, Steele, 
Pope, and the other Augustans [eighteenth-century writers] 
made the middle class the arbiters of taste.
The development of new genres in all of the arts 
which satisfied the needs and tastes of this new and larger 
public went hand in hand with the change in status of the 
arts and the artists of this period. In painting the new 
form was historical portraiture; music had the oratorio and 
comic opera; literature had the domestic drama. Besides 
these genres, was a reemergence of some old ones.
Reynolds’snew genre of historical portraiture was not only 
popular with the consuming public, it was profitable to the 
artist himself. He also justified it on traditional critical 
grounds which placed it high within the hierarchial system; 
It ranked above "face painting" and below the historical- 
mythological genre. Whereas the higher genre could elevate 
the imagination of the viewer to the general through form
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(beautiful figures) and idea (general passions), the 
lower status of portraiture was limited to the particular 
individual (who may be both ugly and deficient of char­
acter). Reynold's new type of portraiture raised the 
level of individualistic representation by pacing the 
sitter (the particular) in an historical or mythological 
context (the general) and idealizing his characteristics 
(a generalizing process). This form-style called upon 
the artist to employ his "poetic imagination" as well 
as an accurate observation of nature. Not all of Reynolds's 
portraits in this genre, to be sure, were successful, 
but one of the most pleasing is Garrick between Tragedy 
and Comedy (plate 3). The validity and success of his 
work can be demonstrated by a comparison of Reynolds's 
Carrick with a more traditional portrait (plate 4). The 
mythological setting in which Garrick is forced to make 
the choice between tragedy and comedy brings to mind the 
theme of Hercules's choice between virtue and pleasure, and 
has at the same time provided an opportunity for the 
artist to reveal an important aspect of Garrick's per­
sonality. Another illustration of the difference between 
Reynolds's method and traditional portraiture is the difference 
between his Mrs. Siddons as the Tragic Muse, and 
Gainsborough's portrait of her (plates 5 and 6). Reynolds's
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portrait is another good example of his historical portrait 
genre; it displays something of Siddon's dramatic ability; 
Gainsborough's portrait shows a highly fashionable woman 
of the eighteenth century whose apparent demeanor is so 
cold that little visual rapport is established with the 
viewer.
Portraiture was by far the most popular form of 
painting in the eighteenth century. Englishmen had some 
taste for landscape and still life as long as they were 
painted by foreigners. Chardin and the Dutch genre painters 
were preferred by collectors in these areas. Reynolds 
recognized the superiority of these artists in the minor 
genres. Landscape increased in popularity throughout the 
century, but was most successful as a backdrop to portraiture; 
Gainsborough executed many portraits in a rural setting. 
Reynolds recognized Gainsborough's skill in landscape in 
his fourteenth Discourse; yet the genre was not popular 
with the public— they didn't buy landscapes—  and many 
remained in Gainsborough's estate when he died.^^ Historical 
painting was so unusual in the century that Richard West's 
historical subject completed in 1776 caused great interest; 
but it remained unsold.
Both the novel and the domestic drama were highly 
successful literary forms developed in the eighteenth 
century. Hauser, among others, writes that these genres 
were the result of the dissolution of court art (the high 
Baroque) and the influence of a new educated class, the
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6 2bourgeoisie. The eighteenth century was not a period of 
great epics and heroic dramas. The Greek and Roman 
Classics were indeed being translated, but there were few 
epics being written in the English language in this period. 
Although tragedy retained its popularity with the theater­
going public, its quality declined. The "genteel" taste 
of the time demanded revisions of older plays, Shakespeare's 
Included, to clean up "bawdy" language and behavior. (John­
son and a few others deplored such alteration of Shakespeare.)
Two new forms, the social drama and the comic opera became
6 3increasingly popular stage genres.
The new novel and the social drama were much more
successful forms than the older epic and tragedy. Richardson's
Pamela and Defoe's Robinson Crusoe were in the hands of a
rapidly growing reading public. The social message of such
works as these had much in common with the message of the
domestic dramas. Crusoe, a non-tragic, middle class
character was able to impose order on the chaotic world
6 4into which he was thrust by accident. Pamela was also
able to conquer her circumstances through determination and 
the application of her convictions. In the domestic story 
characters were not pitted against single invincible foes, 
as had been the rule in tragedy and epic, but rather against 
social institutions and situations--anonymous forces which 
called upon them to use reason, force of moral character, 
and insight.
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Two new musical forms were introduced into England 
in the early part of the century, one a modification and 
perfection of an older form, the other a purely English 
innovation— the oratorio and the ballad opera. One music 
historian maintains that the oratorio was more than an 
adaptation of the European oratorio, that it was a purely 
new genre created to meet the special demands of English 
taste —  Englishmen did not care for the Italianate opera.
Of the twenty-four oratorios written by Handel, many are 
still performed t o d a y , t h e  most popular of which is the 
Messiah. Handel's use of the formula of the oratorio may 
have been an accident of fate,^^ but its popularity ultimately 
exceeded that of the opera.
The state of musical taste fluctuated considerably
during the century; opera enjoyed a couple of periods of
mild popularity, but ballad opera had become a major
musical genre by the third quarter of the century. John
Gay's and Peupsch's ballad opera. The Beggar's Opera (17 32)
introduced the form to a delighted public, and it enjoyed
tremendous popularity for several reasons. Its use of
popular musical themes and its astringent political satire
6 8are the reasons most often cited for this public acclaim.
The vogue for the ballad opera increased after 1762 with 
the introduction of a new ballad opera. Love in a Village, 
by Arne. The public had again grown weary of the Italian 
opera, by that time in its second decline. Several writers
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followed Arne's and Gay's examples in the popular genre,
but until Gilbert aad Sullivan in the nineteenth century,
69most of their names are familiar only to historians.
A third musical genre, the sonata-allegro was also intro­
duced into England in the latter part of the century. The 
major innovators in the sonata form were C. P. E. Bach,
Haydn, and Mozart, all of whom performed in London at one 
time or another. Like the oratorio, the sonata was an old 
form that underwent major changes in the eighteenth century. 
Originally it had been a form similar to the cantata; where­
as the cantata was a composition for voice, the sonata was 
a composition for instrument. Like the oratorio also, it 
succeeded in pleasing the musical public. The preference 
for the sonata and the ballad opera over the Italian opera 
was related to the lighter style of the rococo, as we shall 
see later.
As was the case in literary and plastic arts, the 
public was the rising middleclass. The crown was the 
only major private source of patronage for musicians in 
England outside of the Church, and it had proven to be a 
very insecure source. The popularity of public performance 
is attested to by the presentations of Handel's music.
For the rehearsal of the fireworks music twelve thousand 
people paid for adi.ission. Operas and oratorios were 
presented in theaters, and other musical entertainments 
in various public parks. Two music societies were established
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in the century. Tn summery there seems to have been an 
increase in public and private performances, and in the 
amount of music produced in eighteenth-century Eng­
land.
The changes in the types of arts produced in the 
century appears to have been directly related to the rise 
of a new middleclass public whose taste was different from 
the courtly art consuming public of the preceeding century. 
This new rich class created demand in terms of new forms-- 
china, pottery, furniture, novels, domestic dramas, musical 
performances--and in terms of volume. The middle class gave 
rise to a new taste, a new artist, and a new audience.
V
We have seen that taste in genres in all of the arts 
changed; taste in styles also changed. The eighteenth 
century has been characterized as the Age of Reason, the 
Augustan Age (in part), the Enlightenment, the Age of the 
Industrial Revolution, the beginning of the Romantic,and 
others. Each term seems to be partially fitting, for it 
was a time of rapidly fluctuating ideas, tides of taste, 
and revolution of beliefs as well as of social orders. The 
ecclecticism in taste can be demonstrated by pointing to 
the wide variety of styles and temporary trends in archi­
tecture alone, from the neo-Classical and Palladian Bur­
lington House, to the Baroque Blenheim Palace, to the 
neo-Gothic Strawberrv Hi],], and the chinoiserie of Kev/
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Gardens. All of these monuments were undertaken within the 
first two-thirds of the century.
There was a considerable change in style as well as 
genre during the eighteenth century in all of the arts.
Styles (or technique, manner of execution) characterized 
as Baroque, Rococo, neo-Classic, Palladian, neo-Gothic and 
chinoiserie are well known and recognized in their appli­
cation to the visual arts; the terms were originated to 
describe differences in form of v i s i o n . S t y l e s  are also 
apparent in literature and music even though they are more 
difficult to determine using the well established visual 
criteria. Sypher defines literary styles in terms analogous 
to visual criteria with considerable success. He writes, 
"there are analogies between types of formal organization in
different arts, though the arts themselves differ in medium 
72and content." Edward Lowinsky defines music in equally
73successful terms. Style at the beginning of the eighteenth
century in literature can be characterized broadly as neo­
classic (Sypher finds elements of Baroque and Rococo), and 
as Baroque in music. At the end of the century it can be
characterized as "pre-Romantic in literature and Rococo 
in music." ("Pre-Romantic" is a very misleading term 
and is only used here for lack of any other.) As a gen­
eralization it can be said that the courtly, highly 
formalistic Baroque was replaced by the more intimate and
39
l i g h t e r  R o c o c o  o n d  " p r e - r o m n n t i c . "
Style and form, as well as attitudes toward them, 
reflect changes in man's conception of himself and the 
universe. Bate writes:
Conceptions of the nature and purpose of art closely 
parallel man's conceptions of himself and of his 
destiny. For art, in one of its primary functions, 
is the interpreter of values, and aesthetic criticism, 
when it rises above mere technical analysis, attempts 
to grasp and estimate these values in order to judge
the worth of the interpretation.74
In the same vein Sypher writes that the formal organization 
of the arts reflect the internal changes in society. He 
says further,
A style is only an aspect of the course of a larger 
history, and the critic must try to relate the 
emergence of different styles with the emergence of 
the human attitudes which represent themselves, 
in one direction, by the arts . . . .  There are, 
in short, relations between styles and history.75
In these terms let us summarize eighteenth-century style 
and form in the arts.
The early eighteenth century reflected a classical 
mode of thought in style, form, and content; the late 
century reflected a refutation of these classical concepts.
In literature, philosophy, music, architecture, gardening, 
and painting, a faith in the ultimate reasonable order of 
the universe is apparent in the opening years of the century. 
Harmony, order, rule, and man's reasoning capacity character­
ize Dryden's,^^ Pope's, and Dennis's criticism and poetry. 
Dryden's and Pope's perfectly balanced heroic couplets are 
called "nature methodized" by Pope himself— the poet who
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believed that the artist's charge was to lay bare what most
men could understand but not verbalize. His famous
couplet on New ton demonstrates this faith in the ultimate
unity and order of the universe:
Nature and Nature's Laws lay hid in Night: ^g
God said, Le t Newton : And all was light.
Translations of Greek and Roman classics, imitations
of Anacreon Virgil, Cicero, poems in the form of odes,
pastorals, elegies, and satires, and prose in such forms
as dialogues and epistles all hark back to classical models,
order, and regularity. The form, or genre, of a poem,
prose work, musical composition, or painting was of extreme
79importance to the artist of a classical mind who wished to
make his audience aware of the tone and subject of his work.
Each kind of form had a traditionally established set of 
rules to guide the tone and content —  the effect was called 
decorum. If these standards were obviously ignored, the 
end product was humor or satire. Thomas Gray's "Ode to the 
Death of a Favorite Cat, Drowned in a Tubof Gold Fishes" 
and Pope's Rape of the Lock and the Dunciad are examples of 
playing with an established generic form. Form and style 
were integrally related for the classicist; each was an 
expression of the regularity and order--the reasonableness—  
of the universe.
About the middle of the century there was a shift 
in literary taste which was stimulated by several factors: 
the rise of a new affluent class; influence of gothic, folk
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art forms, antiquaries, oriental arts; and, most partic­
ularly, a new attitude toward man himself. The new orien­
tation was brought about by speculation on as sociationalistic 
behavior, on ideas of origins of governments, religions, 
society, the arts--on theories, in short, which concentrated 
on the character of man in nature rather than on nature as 
a reflection of God's intent. The concentration on man 
generated the idea that one is aesthetically pleased with 
irregularity rather than with regularity. Taste for the 
irregular in art was apparent at the beginning of the cen­
tury in gardening. Beginning with Addison theories for 
such preferences were gradually developed. In 1745 Samuel
Say, a minor critic, was the first to state that variety
8 0rather than regularity was delightful in poetry.
Interest in man and in the new discoveries of 
non-European societies, archeological discoveries, the 
non-classical past (Gothic and Druid, for example), all 
reinforced the taste and the justification for irregularity. 
This taste was answered by MacPherson's Ossian, Collins's 
An Ode on the Popular Superstitions of the Highlands of 
Scotland, Considered as the Subject of Poetry, and Blake's 
and Burns's poetry. A prodigious amount of serious prose 
work was addressed to the sources of man's motivation, 
passions, behavior, and the origins of his institutions. 
Examples of these are, Burke's Philosophical Inquiry into 
the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful , his
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Inquiry, Reflections of the French Revolution, and his 
An Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs; Hume's Essay on 
Human Understanding and Moral Essays; Gibbon's History of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire ; Smith's Wealth of 
Nations ; Biackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England ; 
Burney's General History of Music, and many others.
The same shift in taste during the century can be
demonstrated in music styles. The Italianate Baroque
exemplified by Opera, and the German Baroque style of Handel, 
with its complex fugal forms and dense texture, was replaced 
by the less rigidly formalistic sonata which stressed a 
simple melodic line supplemented by harmonic voices. The 
lighter comic opera which replaced the opera and, to a 
lesser extent, the oratorio also reflected the same change 
in style.
Painting styles also changed during the course of the
century, but to a lesser extreme than the literary arts and
music. A real revolution in style is not apparent until
well into the nineteenth century, probably because of the
dominant position of the Royal Academy. The early eighteenth
century was dominated by James Thornhill, who painted in the
Italianate Baroque in the historical-mythological genre, and
81in the traditional English portrait style. This imported
Baroque style was succeeded by traditional and historical 
portraits which dominated English painting. Hogarth, Reynolds, 
and Gainsborough held the field in painting throughout the
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middle and late years of the century, and with the ex­
ception of Gainsborough's landscapes (which did not sell), 
style and content changed very little. Under the influence 
of Reynoldsh formalistic-classicistic dicta, historical
and allegorical subjects and settings in painting and
8 2sculpture emerged in the later years.
Architecture under the influence of Wren, Kent, 
Vanbrugh, Palladio (via Lord Burlington) and Chambers 
reflected the same sense of harmony and unity as the heroic 
couplet. The facades and floor plans of Greenwich Hospital, 
Burlington House, and Blenheim Palace reflect the balance 
and unity of an ordered universe. The intrusion into the 
classicizing elements in architecture came through the 
"lesser branches of architectural design," that is, interior 
decorating, gardening, furniture, and through the lesser 
arts such as pottery, and silver work. All of these arts 
were less influenced by traditional formal rules, and 
therefore were much more receptive to new styles. The 
effect of the chinoiserie, for example, is apparent in 
Chippendale furniture and in pottery. The influence of the 
Gothic is also seen in furniture and in ornaments. The 
garden form reflects an English taste for the natural as 
opposed to the formal French garden. By the middle of the 
century landscape gardening had become a popular hobby.
This was an a r e a  where the amateur could express his 
individual preferences. At the same time it was a serious
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form of artistic expression— one which engaged such figures 
as Burlington, Pope, Kent Lancelot Brown, and Chambers.
The English garden of this period absorbed all of the exotic 
and non-classical influences which were, for the most part, 
very slow to enter the major genres. Thus, the gothic, 
the oriental, the naturalistic, and the rustic became 
popular styles in the minor genres.
The state of flux in eighteenth-century England 
extended to the realms of aesthetic ideas, artistic styles, 
popularity of certain genres over others, a rapidly growing 
art consuming public, and a new type of artist. The trends 
were many. The primary materials are prodigious. Eighteenth- 
century Britain was a prolific and complex era as we can 
see by the evidence of documents, monuments, and artifacts.
In the following chapters I will turn to the task of ordering 
aesthetic and critical ideas of the period using the 
orientation method previously described.
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THE THREE ORIENTATIONS OF ANALYSIS
In order to appreciate the continuity of eighteenth- 
century British aesthetic thought and to understand the 
Zeitgeis t of this delightfully complex and productive era 
we need a system of organization which will incorporate 
a very broad range of materials into a manageable form. The 
orientation method of analysis I shall outline in this 
chapter is flexible enough to include all of the critical 
material of this period, and at the same time it is specific 
enough to provide for a variety of ideas within each of the 
three major modes as modifications of those modes.
Several topics will be taken up in this chapter in 
order to clarify the application of an orientation approach 
to the organization of eighteenth-century British aesthetic 
ideas: (1) a brief survey of studies which have been done
in this area, (2) an overview of the three major modes and 
their sub-modes in an outline form, (3) some historical and 
philosophical factors concerning these attitudes, (4) three 
areas which can be affected by a critic’s orientation, and
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finally (5) an examination of each of the three modes and 
their sub-modes with specific attention to representative 
critics.
1
Some extant histories of eighteenth-century British
aesthetic and critical materials have dealt with a number
of specific problems. The classical study of the history
of aesthetics by Bernard Bosanquet^ covers the period only
very briefly and is structured on a review of individual
writers. Most literary historians cover the eighteenth
century in terms of styles, genres, or individual authors.
Some historians have approached the period from the per-
2spective of the history of ideas: A. 0. Lovejoy has 
traced some major trends in the evolution of the meaning 
of the word nature (among many other contributions in this
3field); Milton C. Nahm has studied the ideas of genius and
4creativity; Walter J . Hippie has looked at the modes of 
aesthetic qualities in the century; and Samuel Holt Monk^ 
has written an invaluable history of the idea of the sub­
lime. R. S. Crane, an historian of criticism, has done a 
study in which he classifies writings according to problems 
undertaken by the critic, common principles of art and rules, 
for example.^ Apart from Reynolds, however, his method 
does not include music and the plastic arts. His inclusion 
of ReynoJds can probably be attributed to that artits's 
use of a literary tradition in criticism, as distinguished
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from a more visually oriented work like Hogarth's. The 
most comprehensive study of eighteenth-century British 
aesthetic thought in terms of an integration of trends and 
an overview of the development of aesthetic and critical 
problems is a section of Rene Wellek's four volume work. 
History of Criticism.^ Wellek traces the development of 
criticism as It was influenced by the emerging disciplines 
of aesthetics and literary historiography. All of these 
studies focus on specific aspects of criticism and litera­
ture, such as terms, critical problems individual critics, 
and in Wellek's case, on the formation of schools of 
criticism.
An analysis on the basis of the attitudes of the writer 
is structurally different from these approaches; for the 
purpose of inclusiveness it offers an advantage over them 
because the attitude of the critic, rather than his subject 
matter is focused upon. This type of study will provide a 
system of organization for methodological trends which, as 
we shall see, reflect world views. It will also emphasize 
areas of transition in critical thought and show the relation­
ship between critical changes, methodology, and world views. 
Thus, we can consider much more material than traditional 
literary and artistic criticism as evidence of aesthetic 
attitudes. Aesthetic opinions are evident in a wide range 
of material; narratives (The Vicar of Wakefield); histories 
(The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire); psychologies.
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(Observations on Man); letters (Walpole's four-thousand 
plus); critical reviews (Monthly Review and Critical 
Rev1ew) ; and other forms (poems, physiologies). Many 
critical studies of the period consider these forms where 
they apply to particular problems (Monk, for example, 
considers the role of Hartley's Observations in the develop­
ment of the sublime). However, if we look at the writer's 
attitude toward art, and hence toward the universe and 
his place in it, all of these sundry works can be inte­
grated to show a coherent pattern of thought.
In his classic study of literary tradition and romantic 
theory, M. H. Abrams uses an orientation approach to order 
critical ideas and the influences upon them in nineteenth- 
century theory. His theory is relevant here because of 
its similarity to my scheme. He writes that there are four 
co-ordinates of art criticism; these he calls the work 
(the art object), the universe (that which art represents 
either directly or indirectly), the artist, and the viewer-
g
audience. One can discuss art only in terms of these per­
spectives, and all theories which attempt to be comprehensive 
will take each into account. Yet, each writer will show a 
decided orientation to only one. "A critic," he writes, 
"tends to derive from one of these terms his principle 
categories of defining, classifying, and analyzing a work
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of art as well as the major criteria by which he judges 
its value.
According to Abram's scheme, the critical theory
which considers art as an imitation of the universe
co-ordinate is " m i m e t i c " t h a t  which looks at art in
terms of its utile quality--to instruct through delight (the
audience co-ordinate)--is "pragmatic"; criticism which is
oriented toward the artist co-ordinate, in terms of the over-
1 2flow of feelings is "expressive"; and theory directed
13toward the art itself (the work co-ordinate) is "objective."
There is similarity between my approach and Abrams's.
(I will use the terms object to refer to art as a representa­
tion of the universe, subject to refer to the audience, and 
creator to refer to the artist.) The object orientation 
corresponds to the "mimetic" theory which Abrams uses to 
Indicate an Aristotelian copying of nature. Object-oriented 
criticisms are those directed toward the art object as a 
representation, or copy nature in its apparent or in its 
ideal form. Discussions about nature itself, are entered 
into because of its relevance as a model for art. The 
definitions of nature which correspond to the three sub­
modes in this orientation do not strictly correspond to 
the Platonic levels discussed by Abrams in mimetic theories. 
According to Abrams these Platonic levels are: (1) eternal
unchanging ideas, (2) the world of sense which reflects 
ideas, and (3) the copy of level two--art.^^ The three
58
major definitions of nature, as represented by sub-modes 
of the object orientation represent empirical nature (as it 
is experienced by the senses), the ideal pattern of nature, 
and the abstract (or composite) of empirical nature (see 
the outline in section two).
The subject orientation is similar to Abrams's 
"pragmatic theory" in the sense that it concerns criticisms 
which are directed toward the viewer-audience, or subject. 
Eighteenth-century theorists, however, were concerned with 
more than the pragmatic effects of teaching and delighting: 
they were interested in the specific operations by which art 
caused this effect. Thus, subject-oriented criticism is 
much more specifically a category which reflects a par­
ticularly eighteenth-century turn-of-mind than Abrams's 
general "instruction through delight."
Finally, the creator orientation is directed toward 
the artist, as is Abrams's "expressive theory." His
emphasis is on poetry as an overflowing of the feelings of
the artist; my emphasis, however, is on the original forming
power which characterizes intuitive genius.
The "subjective criticism" mentioned by Abrams in­
dicated an orientation toward the art object itself with no 
reference to anything outside of it— what might be called 
"art for art's sake." It was not an attitude of any 
significance in our period, and it will not be considered 
in the structure of this paper. Abram traces the origins
59
of the "objective" criticism (what I would call "art 
orientation") in the eighteenth century to the emerging 
concept of the poet as a creator. The important factor 
in this context is the poet's creation of a microcosm-- 
a world apart from the world of nature as we know it. In 
this world of art, the poem (or other form) has no relation­
ship to anything apart from itself. Thus, it is neither 
a reflection of nature, nor an insight into man's reaction 
to art. I have classed these elementary expressions of the 
art orientation as examples of other orientations because 
in their contexts they have references to the world of nature 
and to the world of man.
Let us look briefly at two examples of what might
be called an emerging art-oriented attitude. Shaftesbury's
artist-creator is a maker of smaller worlds; yet these
worlds are a reflection of the larger universe, and they
are restricted by the same laws that govern the larger
universe (by implication these laws also restrict God's
action). Thus, Shaftesbury was particularly critical of
15Shakespeare's use of supernatural creatures. Johnson, 
on the other hand, approved of Shakespeare's use of the 
supernatural, because he made his characters so true to 
life (a reflection of man's passions) that they behave as 
we think they should in such imaginary s i t u a t i o n s . B o t h  
Shaftesbury and Johnson, then, believe that poetry has 
reference to something outside of its own world-form.
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The first three orientations, object, subject, and 
creators were of such major importance in the eighteenth 
century that several sub-modes can be identified within 
them. The major orientation, as we shall see, can be 
identified as critical points of view by system (the methods 
of criticism and analysis), mentioned in chapter one, by 
values,and by definitions of terms. This type of analysis 
of eighteenth-century critical theory is designed to show the 
diversity and complexity of the ideas of the period, to 
demonstrate the continuity of critical attitudes, and to 
establish some historical and philosophical order among them.
II
Each of the three perspectives, or orientations, 
object, subject, and creator oriented, along with their 
sub-modes, is presented here in an outline form to provide 
the reader with the total system at a glance. A representative
writer is indicated in parenthesis beside each sub-mode,
A. Object orientation:
1. Beauty is to be found directly in nature (Hogarth)
2. Beauty is to be found in an abstraction of
nature (Reynolds).
3. Beauty is to be found in an ideal pattern (Pope),
B. Subject orientation:
1, Aesthetic analysis is directed to the subject who 
has no special aesthetic faculties (Burke).
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2. Aesthetic analysis is directed to the subject 
who has special aesthetic faculties (Gerard).
C. Creator orientation:
1. Aesthetic attention is directed to the artist, 
who possesses creative ability which is shared 
to some extent by all men (Shaftesbury).
2. Aesthetic attention is directed to the artist, 
who possesses unique creative abilities 
(Blake).
We will look at these critics in terms of sub-modes later 
in this chapter.
An orientation is not always easily identified, for 
sometimes a critic may write from a mixture of several 
perspectives. At other times there simply may not be enough 
evidence to determine the orientation. Some clues to an 
author's attitude, however, may be gleaned from the organi­
zation of his materials and the elements he found important 
in the arts. As we shall see, the quality of beauty in 
art objects, or in natural objects, was important to those 
who wrote in the object-oriented mode. The object-oriented 
work usually concentrated on defining beauty in terms of 
principles which could be deduced from the observation of 
nature. The critic usually advocated adherence to a set of 
rules in order to imitate beauty. Thus, Hogarth analyzed 
the physical qualities of line, and John Dennis promised to 
show how to "re-establish" poetry through the application of 
long-accepted, but neglected rules.
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To the critic-aesthetician with a subject orientation
the reaction of the audience (subject) was often more
important than beauty. His critical vocabulary reflected
this concern with an increased dependence on aesthetic
modes other than beauty. His concern for the feeling of the
audience was generally reflected in his use of such terms
1 Ras awe, feelings of beauty and sublimity,~~ as t onishment,
pain, and pieasure. The subject-oriented work often opened
with an investigation of human nature. The entire first
volume of Karnes' Elements was devoted to a study of
associâtionalist psychology; thus, it was subject oriented.
The second volume was reserved for rhetoric and style; thus,
it was object oriented.
The author whose perspective was creator-oriented was
interested in the process of the creation of art— what happens
in the mind of the artist— and the formative power of the
artist-genius. Metholological organization is not obvious
in the few works in this perspective in this period.
Shaftesbury's Characteristics, for example, was a mixture of
essay and dialogue which considered art in several contexts;
and Blake's annotations to Reynolds were totally disorganized
critical comments written in the margins of his own copy of
19the Discourses. These critics were more interested in 
refuting the conclusions of the other two perspectives than 
in devising a critical method.
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III
Historically, aesthetic systems can be divided into 
objective and subjective modes. Lis towel uses this dis­
tinction to categorize all systems which concentrate on 
the thing or idea which is imitated or copied by the artist 
as objective. All systems which center on the reaction of the 
viewer and audience to the art object (or natural object),
or on the process of creation by the artist are categorized 
20as subjective. According to this scheme, Plato wrote in
the objective mode. In the Republic he said that there are
three "couches": (1) the Ideal, or essence of couch, (2) the
one made by the craftsman which is a copy of the Ideal,
and (3) the one painted by the artist which is a copy of the
21craftsman's copy. The artist's imitation is a copy thrice
removed from the Truth— the Ideal and the Original. According
to Plato, the artist is a copier whose role is to imitate
that which is an imitation of the essence.
Aristotle's attitude was objective as well. In The 
2 2Poetics he indicated that the artist (or poet) is to 
imitate action (his system had no dualistic-other world of 
ideas or essence). The fact that there are actions and 
passions which can be directly observed and imitated by the 
artist, even if they are in a combined form, makes Aristotle's 
point of view an objective one.
Kant's aesthetic system, on the other hand, was largely 
subjective because his emphasis was on a special capacity of
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2 3the human mind to interpret beauty. Hutcheson's
aesthetic theory was also subjective because the central 
issue is the reaction of association of ideas in art 
appreciation. Blake's attitude was subjective because he 
was interested in the intuitive power of the artist's mind.
Listowel's method of dividing all aesthetic systems 
into two large modes, the objective and the subjective, is 
not specific enough for an organization of eighteenth- 
century British theory because some very important subtleties 
were developed during this period which seem to serve as a 
transition between the classicism of the past and the roman­
ticism of the nineteenth century. A more complex orientation 
approach will help clarify the transitional ideas and it will 
emphasize the dramatic change in critical method from a 
focus on the general, to a focus on the particular and the 
individual art. At the same time it will point out the major 
differences within some systems which led to the dissolution 
of a classical attitude and the formulation of a romantic 
one .
With the help of Listowel's study we can see that the 
object orientation was the traditional perspective of. 
aesethetic attitudes from the time of Plato and Aristotle 
to the beginning of the eighteenth c e n t u r y . T h r o u g h  the 
centuries following these two Greek philosophers little 
change was made in the idea of the source of beauty. Its 
causes were attributed by one critic after another to either
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a physical thing in nature, or the idea of the perfection of 
nature. It is this attitude which is commonly referred to 
as a classical interpretation. This is the point of view 
we see expressed by Boileau and, to some extent by Addison. 
Addison, however, added the effect of the mind upon the 
stimulus of nature to critical theory; this response process 
was to be elaborated upon by his later contemporaries. The 
associationalist psychology which was ultimately linked with 
the subject orientation was introduced by Locke and developed 
by his fellow countrymen. Even the classicists Reynolds 
and Johnson, as we shall see, were influenced by the trend of 
subject-oriented interpretations.
Gradually another type of subjective criticism cap­
tured the imagination of some British critics. The idea of 
the artist as a special individual and the unique creative 
powers of his mind were discussed early in the century by 
Shaftesbury. Abrams writes that this interpretation of 
genius was a "development toward an organic aesthetic"
2 5because it had a direct influence upon German romanticism. 
Abrams does not call Shaftesbury!s genius organic in itself 
on the basis of its role in his system. However, as we 
shall see later in chapter five, there were organic elements 
in his idea of "plastic creativity," for Shaftesbury saw 
the artist as a "Divine Maker" who models his work with a 
plastic forming power which is similar to God's method of 
creation.
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Shaftesbury's influence on his British followers in 
the middle and late years of the century was muted, par­
ticularly because his Platonism was reinterpreted in Lockean 
associationalist terms (an aspect to be further developed
in chapter four), and to some extent because his system
* 2 6 was difficult to understand in depth. John Brown, a
critic of Shaftebury, said in this context, "the formalist
is under a double Difficulty; not only to conquer his Enemy,
2 7but to find him." Thus, Shaftebury's modification of the
creator orientation was not further developed in England in
the eighteenth century.
Edward Young's Conjectures on Original Composition, a
work of the mid century, reached a wide audience, and was
2 8generally well received. This subjective criticism was 
very similar to Shaftesbury's, but lacked a critical 
system. Young's idea of creative genius was similar to 
Shaftesbury's, in that it was a plastic forming power which 
worked by mysterious methods. His perspective was creator- 
oriented because he placed his critical emphasis on the 
capacities of the artist rather than on a quality of beauty 
in nature and a set of rules to represent it, or on the 
reaction of the audience to that art.
The shift from the object, to the subject, to the 
creator in critical analysis reflected a change in the basic 
temperament of the eighteenth-century attitude regarding the 
character of the universe and man's place in it. The object
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orientation reflected a faith in the rational orde% of 
9 on a t u r e , a s  well as faith in a method by which it could 
be learned. The classicist confidence of a world order 
which could be discovered a priori through the reasoning 
faculties, an attitude which dominated the European 
consciousness from the Renaissance to the beginning of the 
eighteenth century, eventually gave way to a new persepctive.
A confidence in the predictable universe, regulated by 
general rules, and available to the understanding through 
a system of deduction was a prerequisite for an acceptance 
of the object-oriented aesthetic attitude. If the artist 
or poet was to be able to find beauty, it must exist as 
an universal principle, and he must be able to determine it 
through reason. As the universe is guided on the principle 
of regular laws, so the artist is guided by the application of 
general and regular laws. Reynolds's criticism is solidly 
based on this feeling; even though the artist must look at 
the particular in order to determine the general, it is the 
general to which he must look for aesthetic truth.
Newton's laws which clearly reinforced the classical 
attitude about an ordered and reasonable universe actually 
marked a turn-around in frame of reference. The Cartesian 
method of proof (the ductive), so well suited to the 
classical attitude, assumed that one must begin with the 
highest, therefore most general truth, and from this know­
ledge bring all inferior, or particular knowledge into 
accordance. The Newtonian method, on the other hand, placed
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the burden of philosophical and scientific proof on the 
particular— the data of experience--rather than on the 
general to which the particular must conform. Reynolds, 
Hogarth, and Pope had indeed conformed to a Newtonian faith 
in regularity, but they were still captivated by the older 
faith in the general as a proof of the particular. Their 
attempts to define a Newtonian heavenly harmony in terms 
of rules were not a conformation of a Newtonian spirit, 
as Battestin attests, but of an older faith.
Eighteenth-century man's attention gradually shifted 
from the nature of the universe to his own nature; Pope 
reflected the new feeling when he said, "The proper study 
of Mankind is Man." The change in interest from the dis­
covery of God's rational order of the universe to man's 
inward motivations and passions is attributed by Bate,
for one, to a new empirical perspective characteristic of
31eighteenth-century British thought. With the new method 
of analysis demonstrated by Newton and Locke, man became 
truly the measure of all things, for his knowledge hinged
32on his interpretation of the particular data of the senses. 
The theoretical foundation of the subject-oriented aesthetic 
attitude was an assumed similarity in all men to response to 
particular sense data. A similarity in physical structure 
served as a proof to the similarity of responses through the
senses.
The creator-orientation is a reflection of the growing
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importance of feeling and expression on the part of the
individual. Bate stated that it is ironic that such a
frame of mind should have been fostered by the "mechanistic
33psychology" of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
The empirical basis of knowledge through experience forced 
an increasing dependence on the validity of feeling, which, 
as Hume had pointed out was indisputable because all that is 
experienced comes through the senses and is registered in
O /
terms of feelings.
By no means did the object-oriented attitude disappear 
during the eighteenth century in British critical theory, 
but more and more it became a perspective to be defended 
against the encroachments of the subject and creator per- 
spetives. At the first of the century the object orientation 
was expressed by Dennis and Pope, in the middle of the century 
by Hogarth, Reynolds, and Johnson. By the end of our period 
Reynolds was out of step with his colleagues in his 
subject-oriented critical interpretation. His Discourses 
received wide acclaim, however, and they exercised a strong 
influence on the practice of the plastic arts for the latter 
part of the century and on into the nineteenth century. Yet, 
innovation in the area of aesthetics was coming from a new 
sector, the philosophers of the associationalist school,
Burke, Gerard, and Karnes, among others.
By the middle of the century the dominant mode of 
aesthetic criticism was subject oriented. It was expressed 
in the early years by Addison and Hutcheson, and later by
70
Hume, Burke, Gerard, Karnes, Smith, Alison, and many others. 
The creator orientation which was vaguely suggested in the 
first quarter of the century by Shaftesbury, was reiterated 
by Young in the middle years, and carried to an extreme by 
Blake at the close of this period. Only faint hints of this 
third interpretative attitude can be seen at the opening of 
the century, and only weak defense is made of the object 
orientation its last years. Thus, there was a dramatic 
change during the century in the way critics talked about 
art--from its reflection of nature, to its creation.
IV
In addition to method, which was discussed in 
chapter one, there were three other important areas of a 
critic's system of thought which were affected by his 
orientation: (1) his choice of specific terms, such as
beauty, nature, sublimity, originality or association of 
ideas, (2) his definitions of those terms, and (3) the
relative importance he assigned to them in his criticism.
Let us consider these three aspects.
Certain words were more important in one orientation 
than they were in another; other terms were given little 
attention in some modes of thought, or were dropped al­
together. At the beginning of the century, for example, 
when the dominant mode of interpretation was object 
oriented, the idea of beauty was central. The idea 
associated with sublimity assumed increasing importance
71
during the course of the century as the subject-oriented 
attitude became the dominant mode of interpretation in 
British aesthetics. There is a demonstrable relationship 
between the object orientation, and the idea of beauty, 
and between the subject orientation and the idea of sub­
limity .
In the traditionally object-oriented mode of criticism, 
beauty was generally understood to indicate certain character­
istics actually inherent in natural objects, such as harmony, 
regularity, unity; and the attainment of that quality in 
the reproduction of those objects by the artist was accepted 
as the application of recognized rules laid down by genera­
tions of poets and artists. Beauty, in other words, was to 
be stated in a formula, and works which did not generally 
follow that formula were not beautiful. Pope, for example, 
advised deviation from rule only for the purpose of adding 
to the complete statement of it (.see section five). Yet to 
the English critics of the eighteenth century, this 
aesthetic standard could not explain the great appeal of 
Shakespeare who was notorious for not having followed the 
rules. Thus, the suggestion by Longinus which was repeated 
by Boileau and emphasized by Addison and Pope, that great 
art is sometimes found in great faults,became an influential 
idea in the development of the purported qualities of the 
sublime.
Monk has shown that the idea of the sublime as a
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quality separate from beauty, and often even antithetical
to it, was fully developed during the eighteenth century,
3 6The sublime was discussed by Longinus around 300 A ,D ,,
and others before and after him, as a rhetorical style which
could evoke certain emotions. However, the full potential
of the sublime as a distinct style and quality was not
realized until the eighteenth century when the term was
used by British critics and aestheticians to identify objects
and emot ions, as well as the rhetorical style.
At the. same time that the sublime was assuming
aesthetic importance, attention was shifting from the object
in nature and its representation in art, to the reaction of
the subject to that representation and the natural object.
Addison made a major contribution to this shift with his
emphasis in his papers "On the Pleasures of the Imagination"
which appeared in The Spectator from 21 June to 3 July 
3 71712. He wrote that the pleasures of the imagination "arise
from the actual View and Survey of Outward Objects; And
these, I think all proceed from the Sight of what is Great,
3 8Uncommon, or Beautiful." He thus distinguished three
categories of visual objects or scenes. He wrote further that
the "Horror or Loathsomness" of some sights may be disgusting
in themselves, yet give rise to a delight or pleasure in the
39"very Disgust that it gives us." The great in nature would 
so fill the imagination that even mountains, which generally 
had to that time been considered a blemish, or "wen" on the
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AOface of nature. were considered by Addision to give rise 
to aesthetic pleasure by their impact on the imagination 
through the emotions.
I have pointed out that there was a relationship 
between the terms used by a critic and his orientation.
This relationship extended to nuances of meaning of these 
terms. The definition of the sublime, for example, changed 
as attention was shifted to the emotions aroused in the 
subject. Other definitions also changed: nature, genius, 
imagination, imitation, and art varied according to the 
orientation of the critic. Let us look at the definition 
of genius in ve^y general terms.
The object-oriented critic generally defined genius 
by a standard of its ability to express beauty. Beauty 
is the quality in nature which the artist must represent 
in his work. Since beauty is independent of its physical 
manifestation in nature, and can only be understood by the 
mind, it is likely that it will never be displayed in nature 
in the physical sense, not excluding the artist's representa­
tion of it. He can only approximate beauty as he understands 
it, and attempt to convey his idea to others; the genius is 
one who can find beauty and express it. To find beauty, and 
to express it two basic tools are needed, taste and 
mechanics. Both can be acquired by the artist because both 
are dependent upon reason, a universal quality. The genius, 
then, can be made. His development depends upon education
74
and training. Education consists of an observation of 
nature and a study of good art; training consists of the 
mechanics of art--grammar and versification in the case of 
the poet, and drawing and composition in the case of the 
painter.
For the typical subject-oriented writer, genius was 
identified with the associative powers of the mind. Beauty 
and sublimity are qualities which are understood in terms 
of pain and pleasure; the genius is one who is able to 
elicit certain reactions in the minds of his audience with 
his art. The psychological principles responsible for an 
associative imagination are universal in nature; the degrees 
of these powers may vary somewhat, depending on the balance 
of attention, sensitivity, and other factors in the artist 
and in the connoisseur. Thus, although the quality is 
universal, the degree of it varies. The genius, then is 
one with a "larger share" of these characteristics.
Genius for the creator-oriented critic implied a 
creative originality. Neither the powers of association, 
nor the patient observation of nature is adequate to 
explain the powers of the artist. The artist may be 
identified with the Creator; he may be controlled by a 
demoniac power; or he may have an unnamed mysterious power. 
Ills power of creativity is limited, however, by the very 
medium in which it must be conveyed; the power of his mind 
is greater than the material world, which only limits its 
expression.
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Let us look at the implications of these three kinds of 
genius in terms of creative responsibility, Because the 
object-oriented mode centered on the thing , or idea of nature 
which was to be imitated, the genius must be trained to 
recognize those elements in nature which are considered to 
be beautiful. He must also be trained in a technical sense 
in order to be able to execute his observations in an artistic 
medium. The emphasis here is on the external quality of 
beauty which exists independent of the artist-observer.
Thus, the genius makes his contribution to art by seeking 
out this quality and reproducing it; in this act he can 
add nothing to beauty from his own mind--that is, nothing 
truly original--for beauty exists independently of his recog­
nition of it. This leaves the genius in a position of a 
technician, or copier of nature when the implications of 
the meaning of beauty are carried to their extreme. Hogarth 
probably came closer to this idea of the artist than any of 
his contemporaries, for he was able to specifically indicate 
what beauty was, and in a sense, give a set of directions 
for its proper imitation. Even in the imitation of the ideal, 
the abstract, and "la belle nature,” the artist is to copy 
the external, for in this sense nature and beauty are external 
of his recognition of it; beauty exists in his imagination only 
to the extent tliut he has gone to the trouble to seek it 
out from the evidences he can observe. Other ideas of genius 
in the object-oriented perspective were modulated by partial
76
acceptances of a subject orientation. Pope and Reynolds 
are both exemplary of this situation.
When critical analysis was focused on the reaction 
of the subject to art, as it was in the subject orientation,
the definition of artist-genius tended to center on certain
processes that take place in the mind of the subject, and
in the mind of the artist in the sense of a representative
of all subjects. Following the lead of Locke, who postulated
that associâtional thought processes which are the result of
effects of stimuli on the senses were responsible for the 
variety of ideas in the human imagination, some eighteenth- 
century critics placed a greater theoretical responsibility 
on the artist for the creation of art than had been the case 
for the genius defined in the object-oriented mode. In this 
type of analysis the artist was thought to be representing 
the ideas he had combined by his associational processes, 
rather than imitating some aspect of external nature. The
artist in this case may be unique in the sense that no other
human is capable of contriving the very same combination of 
thoughts. The major difference between this attitude and the 
object-oriented attitude is that the pattern of nature of­
fered to the artist in the latter mode is available to all 
who are properly trained to observe it, whereas In the subject- 
oriented mode the artist alone 1s privy to his own peculiar 
thoughts which have been caused by external stimuli.
The third mode, the creator orientation, placed even
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more responsibility on the artist for the creation of art.
In this system the genius was defined as a unique individual 
with certain powers of creation which are basically dif­
ferent from the capabilities of the rest of the race. When 
the emphasis was placed on the creator of art the definition 
of genius tended to take on the connotation of an aberration 
from the intention of nature in the sense that there was 
thought to be a basic difference between the genius and his 
fellow man. The demoniac creator genius is a definition which 
is too broad to cover all the critics who wrote in the 
creator-oriented mode, but the implication of a god-like 
quality lies at the core of the creator-defined genius. The 
three distinct attitudes about the meaning of genius will 
be discussed in the context of each of these perspectives 
in the following three chapters.
It is clear that the products of these three different 
kinds of genius, which are offspring of the three orienta­
tions, can be accordingly assigned different values if 
the implications of each point of view is followed to its 
logical extreme. The product of the first artist, whether 
it is a poem or a statue, is something that can be produced 
by any properly trained observer of nature. The product 
of the second kind of artist can be made by anyone who has 
similar associational processes, a chance that is likely as 
all men are subject to similar experiences and react to them 
in a predictable, or regular manner. The product of the third
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artist, however, is a totally unique thing in that it- can 
be approximated by no one, or for that matter, by the same 
artist in different circumstances and times. Therefore, 
the product of the last as compared with the first artist 
should be regarded as a much more valuable piece of art.
This is certainly true when the attitude of Plato is com­
pared with that of William Blake who saw the artist as a 
demoniac creator. Plato's opinion of that artist's role in 
a society was very reserved, and the idea that the product 
was so far removed from truth further reduced the value
assigned to it. Blake considered the artist as almost a 
41god. The idea of the role of the artist in eighteenth-
century society and of his products was more subtle than
the extreme differences pointed out between Plato and Blake.
The actual role played by the artist in society was under-
4 2going many changes at this time.
The third area which affected by critical orientation 
was the value assigned to various aspects of the arts. We 
have just mentioned values in connection with artistic pro­
ducts of different kinds of genius. Let us look at 
another example of value in each of the three orientations. 
Since the object-oriented attitude was based on beauty in 
nature, and the reflection of it in art, and since the 
definition of beauty was closely related to the values re­
vealed in the genre system, the arts of the higher genres 
were considered more important and more pleasing than those
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of the lower genres. Reynolds, for example, placed a greater 
value on historical painting than on landscape; the Discourses 
are organized upon the genre system which emphasized the 
value of general nature— a truth.
In a subject oriented system, value was generally 
placed on the capacity of art or ideas to elicit strong 
emotions in the viewer. Addison, for example, did not 
talk about the genres. Instead he talked about the pleasurable 
qualities of art and of nature. Burke was interested in 
the great emotions caused by fear as they indirectly affected 
the imagination through association of ideas.
For the creator-oriented Blake, artistic value was in 
the creative process. He wrote time and again that his art 
was unique, and that it was a product of his individual 
creative power. The feelings aroused in the viewer were not 
as important as the feeling aroused in the artist in the 
process of making art. That process itself was almost a 
religious expression--and a very individualistic one at that.
Each of the three areas described above which were 
greatly influenced by the orientation of the critic, that 
is, use of key terms (sublimity, beauty), definitions of 
terms (genius), and values within the systems was also 
influenced by the degree to which another orientation attracted 
the writer. There are many instances of mixed orientations 
in this period of great change of aesthetic attitudes. Rey­
nolds, for instance, generally wrote from the object-ori­
ented point of view, and his definitions clearly reflected
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that attitude. Toward the end of his career, however, his 
Discourses exhibited a strong influence of the subject 
orientation. Consequently the nuances of his definitions 
and ideas became somewhat obscure because he failed to 
fully recognize the change in his attitude and to come to 
grips with the effect of that change on his aesthetic 
theory. The shift in Reynolds's attitude is reflected in 
his appraisal of the two giants Raphael and Michelangelo,
The former had been traditionally praised as a superior genius 
who more closely followed the rules, and therefore more 
closely approached perfect beauty in his paintings. 
Michelangelo, on the other hand, was regarded with qualifi­
cations, for although his work had great appeal, it did not
44as closely adhere to the rules. Reynolds praised Raphael
45in his early discourses. During the twenty-three year
span of his addresses his attitude toward the two artists
changed, because the value he placed on sublimity and beauty,
4 6among other things, changed. In his last Discourse he
praised Michelangelo as the greatest artist of all time.
Reynolds's Discourses (and the three Idler papers) 
offer an insight into the impact of the two new attitudes 
upon a classical interpretation. Reynolds absorbed new 
critical ideas and carefully adjusted his object-oriented 
theory to accommodate them. Let us now look at these three 
critical perspectives, and particularly at their sub-modes, 
as they were expressed by various
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The object-oriented perspective was concerned with 
the source of beauty which could be found in one of three 
ways depending on the modification of the attitude: (1) it
may be in a physical object which appears in nature and can 
be pointed out by the artist as that which is beautiful in
itself, as Hogarth's "S" curve, (2) it can be found in an
abstract of all the forms of nature, as Reynolds's "central 
form," or (3) it may be only an idea, which, though never 
presenting itself in visible nature, serves as a pattern to 
be imitated by the artist. We shall see that Pope's Essay on
Criticism offers an example of this last modification. A
fourth modification of the object orientation was suggested 
by Addison. He wrote in The Spectator that art pleases more 
the closer it approaches nature. This would suggest a 
direct, photographic imitation, an idea which was rejected 
as "mere Dutch realism" by his contemporaries.^^
Hogarth is unique among British critics for his pro­
mise to "shew what the principles are in nature, by which we 
are directed to call the form of some bodies beautiful, 
some ugly."^^ Hogarth revealed to the reader that this
principle is a line like an "S" curve, and that things which
closely conform to it are beautiful; things that do not 
conform to it are ugly. The "line of beauty" pleases 
because of something in its own nature which is independent 
of the viewer; the principle does not call upon the viewer 
to recognize it. Although man is so constructed that he
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naturally recognizes beauty, the critical emphasis is on
the quality in the object rather than on a principle which
causes man's recognition of it.
Since beauty is a property of certain lines, Hogarth
promised to show that things are more or less beautiful
depending on how closely they conform to the line of beauty.
He found four classes of objects ranging from those composed
of straight lines to those composed of serpentine lines.
First, object composed of straight lines, only, as 
the cube,- or of circular lines, as the sphere, or 
of both toether, as of cylinders and cones, etc.
Secondly, those composed of lines partly straight, 
and partly circular, as the capitals or columns, 
and vases, etc.
Thirdly, those composed of all of the former to­
gether with the addition of the waving line, which 
is a line more productive of beauty than any of the 
former, as in flowers and other forms of the orna­
mental kind; for which reason we shall call it the 
line of beauty.
Fourthly, those composed of all the former together 
with the serpentine line, as the human form, which 
line hath the power of super adding grace to beauty. 
Note, forms of grace hath the least of the straight 
line in them,49
Furthermore, beauty is not only found in those figures
composed of the line of beauty, it is totally lacking in
those figures composed of straight and angular lines.
We may not only lineally account for the ugliness 
of the toad, the hog, the bear and the spider, but 
also for the different degrees of beauty belonging 
to these objects that possess it.50
Hogarth said nothing about the feeling which
possess his audience by the mere mention, not just the
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representation, of these objects. Response, association 
of ideas leading to fear, love, and ambivalence had no 
part in his analysis. Nor did Hogarth indicate that one 
spider may be more perfect, uglier (or more beautiful), 
than another. For him there was no standard for spiders as 
a class apart from the lines used to represent them. In 
other words, he did not recognize a generic beauty.
To assure that the reader fully understands that 
beauty is a property of line, Hogarth accompanied his essay 
with a set of illustrations in two plates to which he re­
peatedly referred. These consist of a series of line 
drawings of various things to demonstrate that beauty is to 
be found by degrees in progressive stages from the straight 
line to the line which turns on itself— the serpentine line. 
(Hogarth's first plate is reproduced here a s plate 2.) Thus, 
his point of view centered on the object in nature with the 
added specification that individual things actually exist 
in physical nature which can be lineally represented by the 
method he outlines.
Reynolds's object orientation is substantially different 
from Hogarth's. Unlike Hogarth, he did not find beauty to 
exist in any one form in nature. Beauty, wrote Reynolds, is 
to be found in an abstraction, the "central form," which 
is arrived at by the artist through the reasoning powers in 
a direct observation of nature's variety of particular 
specimens. Each class of objects has its own central
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form, or perfect example, which is only an imaginary 
potential. No one thing in any class, such as humans (and 
spiders), can be found in nature in its perfect form, 
though many individuals can be found to possess some of the 
qualities of beauty. If the artist can sum up all of the 
characteristics of a particular form-class of things and 
convey them in an artistic medium, he has found beauty,
The composite idea which exists in the artist’s imagina­
tion is the ideal form. It is not a Platonic ideal because 
the particular elements are direc tly observable by the artist 
who brings them together to form a new figure. Beauty, as 
for Hogarth, is out there in the physical world.
This great ideal perfection and beauty are not to
be sought for in the heavens, but upon the e a r t h . 51
Reynolds's main concern was for the application of theory to 
the specific problems of portraiture--a representation of the 
particular. Thus, his ideal, which would seem to suggest 
the most perfect form, seems to mean an average form when 
it is applied to the practical problems of painting 
individuals
Individual examples presented to the artist by 
particular forms, that is, nature, are to be studied for 
the most characteristic features of their class, and a 
composite of these, the central form, must bo used to express 
the idea of that specific class of beauty. The central form 
is beauty, and as Hogarth's deviation from the line of beauty 
results in the ugly, failure to find the perfect form
8 5
results in deformity.
Thus it is from a reiterated experience, and a 
close comparison of the objects in nature, that 
an artist becomes possessed of the idea of that 
central form, if I may so express it, from which 
every deviation is a deformity.52
Several beauties exist, each of which is fit for
a specific class of things and ideas. For examples, the
form of Hercules is a central form for a certain class of
humans, Apollo and Gladiator for others. Yet, the central
form for the total class of humans would consist of elements
of all of these and other examples as well.
And there is one general from, which . . . belongs
to the human kind at large, so in each of these 
classes [Hercules, Apollo, the Gladiator] there is 
one common idea and central form, which is the 
abstract of the various individual forms belonging 
to that class. Thus, though the forms of childhood 
and age différé exceedingly, there is a common form 
in childhood, and a common form in age, which is the 
more perfect, as it is more remote from all pecu- 
larities.53
To use Reynolds's formula in a hypothetical situation,
if one were to depict a blind man, he would study all of
the exaraplesof the class of blind men to arrive at the
central form for that class. But this blind man, though
a central form for his class, would be a deviation from the
representative human form, for most men are not blind and
do not have the posture and expression of blind men. Of
deviations Reynolds writes:
There is likewise, a kind of symmetry, or pro­
portion, which may properly be said to belong to 
deformity. A figure lean or corpulent, tall or 
short, though deviating from beauty, may still 
have a union of the various parts, which may con­
tribute to make them on the whole not p l e a s i n g . 5 4
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The reason that the artist must resort to deviations from 
the central form of humankind is related to the purposes 
of art and the means the artist uses to express his ideas-- 
in Reynolds's case it is the demands of the portrait genre 
which necessitates the representation of pecularities, and 
hence, deformities.
Reynolds indicated that while it is nature that is to
be imitated by the artist, it is not nature as it presents
herself to the eye, but nature "corrected by herself."
I will now add that nature herself is not to be too 
closely copied . . .  he [the artist] corrects nature
by herself.55
Although Reynolds spoke in terras of form, his idea 
extended implicitly to the realm of situations because 
of his dependence on the hierarchy of genres. Thus, beauty 
exists not only in the proper representation of form, such 
as that of Hercules or a tree. It also exists in a decorous 
representation of these forms: the context must be fitting.
In other words, propriety is the rule in the historical and 
mythological themes of Raphael and Michelangelo as well as 
in the still lifes of Chardin.
Reynolds upheld the models of the ancients, as did 
Hogarth and Pope, but for reasons different from theirs. 
Hogarth believed that the ancients had recognized the 
principle of the "S" curve, and thus merited imitation.
Pope, as we shall see, advised the artist (poet) to imitate 
the ancients because they had copied the patterns of beauty.
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Reynolds, however, indicated that the ancients had dis­
covered the central form; they had not perfected their 
discovery, however, thus leaving room for further improve­
ment in the arts.
There are several major differences between Reynolds 
and Hogarth, Reynolds wrote of an abstraction of visual 
experience which is the central form; Hogarth pointed to 
an actual material realization of the principle of the "S" 
curve. Deviations from the central form constitute Reynolds's 
implicit theory of the ugly, while Hogarth stated explicitly 
that ugliness is inherent in straight and angular lines. 
Reynolds recognized a generic beauty represented by the 
generic type which has its own central form, giving the 
artist several abstrar . ns of nature for the various form.' 
he must represent. Hogarth could find only one beauty, the 
curved line; for him there was no special kind of beauty for 
various classes of forms, thus beauty is evaluated solely 
on the basis of lines needed to represent objects,
Reynolds and Hogarth were both clearly writing about 
a beauty which is directly observed by the artist who is 
trained to know what to look for. Since both of these 
critics were writing about the plastic arts their inter­
pretations can be expected to be a little more visually 
oriented than Pope's; indeed, one might expect all painter's 
theories to be visually oriented because of the demands of 
the medium. However, these two artists' object-oriented
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attitudes are much closer to Pope's than to that of another 
painter later in the century, Blake, whose attitude was 
creator oriented.
Pope is somewhat representative of the "pattern” 
type of object orientation indicated in the outline above, 
for while his theory had some of the characteristics of 
this sub-mode, his aesthetic attitude show some features 
of other modifications as well. Let us first look at the 
use of pattern in criticism, then at Pope's particular 
adaptation of it.
The French classicists' strict admonitions to follow 
the pattern of the ideal tragedy with its unities of time, 
place, and action, the form of the epic, and the classes 
of painting established by Le Brun are excellent examples 
of this third modification of the object orientation. While 
these forms are not to be seen in the actions of men as they 
actually occur, the patterns are representative of perfect 
possibilities which are to be represented by art. Nowhere 
does one observe man at the height of passion speaking in 
perfect heroic couplets, but because this form has been 
established as the perfect pattern for heroic drama, it 
exists as a law of art and governs it much as the behavior 
of physical bodies are governed by the laws of nature. The 
poet is to follow this law in iiis representations.
There is a close relationship between the pattern used 
by the poet and the theory of harmony which many eighteenth- 
century writers thought was a reflection of the harmony of the
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u n i v e r s e . B o r g h e s e  wrote, for example, that the musical
instruments are tuned to the natural harmonic sounds, for
"nature wants no correction of her p r i n c i p l e s . T h e
octaves and the ratios of harmony are natural because they
5 8exist as musical laws. The harmonic system exists as a
pattern which is followed by composers and musicians whose 
instruments' specifications meet their technical needs.
The materials needed to bring the pattern into physical 
representation are the musician's tools— chords--and the 
poet's tools— words. As is typical of the object orienta­
tion, the existence of the law is totally independent of 
an audience, and of an artist. In other words, the law 
of harmony exists in spite of m a n ’s recognition of it. 
Although man is so constructed that he recognizes harmony 
(beauty), he needs his taste refined by the study of good 
examples of art and an understanding that it is good because 
of its conformity to the rules. Although no English critic 
after Thomas Rymer in the late seventeenth century was so 
strict as the French classicists with regard to this 
pattern. Pope and Dennis both express a freer version of 
this feeling in their critical writings. Pope's attitude 
was quite liberal in the sense that the artist has a greater 
license to go beyond the rules; yet, he may do so only to 
establish new ones. Pope's version of the ideal pattern is 
somewhat clouded by the introduction of other ideas; he said 
in his Prefa ce to Shakespeare that nature speaks through the
90
5 9poet, yet we know that this dictation is not like Blake's, 
but merely a pattern of underlying form coming out through 
the medium of the poet. The Preface of the Iliad and An 
Essay on Criticism both provide evidence of Pope's belief 
in a poetic pattern of expression which reveals nature's 
pattern and harmony.
Pope wrote in the Preface of the Iliad that Homer 
had invented the form of the fable, of which there are 
three types, probable, allegorical, and marvelous. The 
Iliad , he wrote, makes use of all these possibilities.
One of the most striking things about this critique 
is Pope's consistent use of the word invention with 
reference to Homer's genius. His reiteration of "invention," 
which seems to have several meanings, directs one's attention 
away from an important paragraph which quietly restates the 
demands of the poetic fable so insisted upon by the French 
classicists--the unities of action, time, and place. Pope 
wrote :
[The main story] of the Iliad is the Anger of Achilles, 
the most short and single Subject that ever was chosen 
by any poet. Yet this he has supplied with a Vaster 
Variety of Incidents and Events, and crowded with a 
greater Number of Councils, Speeches, Battles, and 
Episodes of all kinds, than are to be found in even 
those Poems whose Schemes are of the utmost Latitude 
and Irregularity. The Action is hurried on with the 
most vhement Spirit, and its whole Duration employs 
not so much as fifty days. Virgil, for want of so 
warm a Genius, aided himself by taking in a more 
extensive Subject, as well as a greater Length of 
Time, and contracting the Design of both Homer's 
Poems into one, which is yet but a fourth part as 
large as his. The other Epic Poets have us'd the
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59poet, yet we know that this dictation is not like Blake's, 
but merely a paccern of underlying torm coming out through 
the medium of the poet. The Preface of the Iliad and An 
Essay on Criticism both provide evidence of Pope's belief 
in a poetic pattern of expression which reveals nature's 
pattern and harmony.
Pope wrote in the Preface of the Iliad that Homer 
had invented the form of the fable, of which there are 
three types, probable, allegorical,and marvelous. The 
Iliad , he wrote, makes use of all these possibilities.
One of the most striking things about this critique 
is Pope's consistent use of the word invention with 
reference to Homer's genius. His reiteration of "invention," 
which seems to have several meanings, directs one's attention 
away from an important paragraph which quietly restates the 
demands of the poetic fable so insisted upon by the French 
classicists--the unities of action, time, and place. Pope 
wrote :
[The main story] of the Iliad is the Anger of Achilles, 
the most short and single Subject that ever was chosen 
by any poet. Yet this he has supplied with a Vaster 
Variety of Incidents and Events, and crowded with a 
greater Number of Councils, Speeches, Battles, and 
Episodes of all kinds, than are to be found in even 
those Poems whose Schemes are of the utmost Latitude 
and Irregularity. The Action is hurried on with the 
most vhement Spirit, and its whole Duration employs 
not so much as fifty days. Virgil , for want of so 
warm a Genius, aided himself by taking in a more 
extensive Subject, as well as a greater Length of 
Time, and contracting the Design of both Homer's 
Poems into one, which is yet but a fourth part as 
large as his. The other Epic Poets have us'd the
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same Practice, but generally carry'd it so far as 
to superinduce a Multiplicity of Fables, destroy 
the Unity of Action, and lose their Readers in an 
unreasonable Length of Time.^O
Homer's fable revolves around the anger of Achilles, each
episode stemming from this one source. The simplicity of
Homer's achievement is the main reason the Greek, poet
excels over Virgil, Homer's invention, as it turns out,
is carried out within these bounds.
Now, as for invention, it is so loosely defined as 
to be a catch-all term for artistic productivity. We must 
be careful not to read "romanticism" into Pope's enthusiasm 
for poetic invention. His use of the word does not mislead 
the reader about the main character of the Preface--an 
examination of the elements of the poem in terms of estab­
lished criteria, and a justification for deviations from 
them. Thus, Pope discusses the unities first, and then 
allegory, machinery, character, speeches, description, images, 
similies, versification, all within the context of in­
vention.^^ Among the many meanings of invention are 
variety, which means good, and overdone, or wild, which 
means bad. Invention also takes in imagination, a term 
which in Pope's time carried the meaning connotation of 
"imagry," not demoniac creation. (We will consider Pope's
use of invention in the next chapter.)
Pope's Essay on Criticism also displays some features 
of this third modification of the object orientation. He
, 64
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advised the poet to follow nature.
First follow NATURE, and your Judgment frame 
By her Just Standard, which is still the same:
Unerring Nature, still divinely bright.
One clear, unchang'd and Universal Light,
Life, Force, and Beauty, must to all impart, ^
At once the Source, the End, and Test of A r t .
When we read further to see what is meant by "nature
it becomes increasing clear that nature is reflected by a
set of rules which aid the artist in his representation
of her. The rules are nature still; the rules in this
respect indicate the pattern, the ideal of nature, and the
poet is admonished to follow them closely:
Those RULES of old dis cover *d , not devis * d ,
Are Nature still, but Nature Methodiz’d ;
Nature, like Liberty, is but restrain'd 
By the same Laws which first herself ordain'd.
We note that the laws are discovered by the poet, and not
made up, or invented, in a more modern sense of the word.
Pope used the word nature to mean a multitude of 
things; he continually changed the implicit and explicit 
definition throughout the Essay on Criticism, and the Essay 
on M a n . In the passage just quoted, however, he clearly 
equated nature with the rules established by the ancients. 
Thus, nature can be represented by a pattern, the ideal 
expression, and that pattern is what the poet is to imitate.
Ee surely must not imitate the specific works of the ancients: 
Pope was highly critical of such attempts to follow Homer 
in the Preface of the I l i a d . His reluctance to advocate 
an extremely strict application of the rules, as did the
9 J
French classicists, can probably be attributed to his 
admiration of those English poets who were either not 
aware of the conventions or who chose to ignore them if they 
were. The example of Shakespeare was always before critics 
who tried to apply a system of rules.
The rules to which Pope refers again and again 
(.lines 135ff, 161-162) in this essay tell the poet that though 
there are sanctioned methods, these are not totally un­
alterable— there is some room for improvement by the modern 
poets who may enlarge the number of rules (or negate others) 
by making improvements on those already practiced.
If, where the Rules, not far enough extend,
(Since Rules were made but to promote their End)
Some LUCKY LICENSE answer to the full ^^
The Intent propos'd the License is a Rule.
Thus, in this essay he demonstrated his reluctance to give
the poet over completely to thé rules; the poet's license
extends beyond the rules in order to make new ones for
others to follow in due course. The license to make new
rules is extended with utmost caution as it is equated with
breaking some of those in operation, and furthermore, must
be sanctioned by some example of the ancients--it must have
" their Precedent to plead."
(He) May boldly deviate from the common Track:
From V ulgar Bonds with b rave Disorder part, 
and snatch a Grace beyond the reach of Art.
But tho the Ancients thus their Rules invade,
(As Kings dispense with Laws themselves have made)
Let it be seldom, and compell'd by Need, ^g
And have, at least, their Preceden t to plead.
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Pope's ministrations to the poet consist of an 
admonition to follow the pattern discovered by the ancients, 
for these rules are the physical expression of beauty. In 
most cases, to deviate from the pattern is to deviate from 
nature. When the poet choses to deviate from rule, it should 
be a rational decision, a process by which he makes a new 
rule, and under the advisement of the ancients. By imita­
tion of the ancients Pope certainly did not intend for the 
poet to write the Iliad and the Aenid over and over again 
Cironically he had done this in a sense by translating the 
classics), but he intended the poet to study the example of 
nature methodiz'd and to follow that example.
When we turn to Pope's text to see where the ancients
learned the rules, we see that it was not from the study of
nature as was the case for Reynolds, but it was from the
heavens that the first poets received their inspiration,
their insight into the rule of nature:
Hear how learned Greece her useful Rules indites.
When to repress, and when to indulge our Flights:
High on Parnassus' Top her Sons she show'd.
And pointed out those arduous Paths they trod.
Held from afar, aloft, th' Immortal Prize,
And urg'd the rest by equal Steps to rise;
Just Precepts thus from great Examples giv'n;
She drew from them what they deriv'd from Heav'n,
Pope's reference to flights of inspiration, I think, is an
allegory for a rational creative process. He justified
the use of rhetorical devices in the Iliad. He wrote, in
justification of Homer's allegories, that they may be
founded on t r u t h . I n  the Preface he said.
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How fertile will that Imagination appear, 
which was able to cloath all the Properties 
of Elements, the Qualifications of the Mind, 
the Virtues and Vices, in Forms and Persons; 
and to introduce them into Actions agreeable to 
the Nature of the Things they shadow'd?71
Pope's idea of beauty is very similar to that of 
Reynolds, but there is a marked difference in that beauty, 
for Pope does not appear even in the particularities of 
nature; it remains only as an ideal potential, a pattern 
which must be discovered by the poet. Homer's invention 
revealed a part of that nature sought by the poet. The 
difference between Reynolds and Pope can be attributed, in 
part, to the media which each had in mind--the form demanded 
by pictorial representation, and the ideas and words of 
poetry. But the distinction goes further than a visual 
beauty and nature methodiz'd because Pope could rely on a 
critical tradition for the specific patterns of the various 
genres, such as tragedy, epic, and ode. While there was 
a tradition of genres in art criticism, there was no strictly 
established pattern for the distribution of the action other 
than examples of earlier artists. In their critical theories, 
Reynolds thought more like a poet and musician, and Hogarth 
more like a painter. Reynolds, like Pope, fitted the genre 
theory neatly into his system, while Hogarth placed more 
emphasis on the particular configurations of things.
As we have seen, the writings of Hogarth, Reynolds, 
and Pope give us examples of an object-oriented perspective 
and have some subtle and some not so subtle differences
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be tween them. While Reynolds was influenced by another 
orientation, and Pope by another modification of the 
object-oriented attitude, Hogarth presents an example of 
what might be referred to as a pure orientation because 
beauty lies in the physical "S" curve. His Analys is is a 
relatively simple system because of its structural depen­
dence upon the foundation of beauty in a demonstrable 
physical principle. Because Reynolds was so successful in 
incorporating concepts not completely compatible with the 
object orientation, his Discourses are more complicated and 
sophisticated then Hogarth's Analysis. It has been said by
several historians that Reynolds summed up all of the dom-
7 2inant themes of art criticism to his time. He did so 
by carefully accommodating various trends of thought to his 
essays as a whole. Pope did not sura up his critical ideas 
in a form similar to Reynolds' Discourses, or Hogarth's 
Analysis. Other than the very early poem An Essay on 
Criticism his criticism was not structured into a system; 
he made many additional critical statements aft^r this 
poem which show several trends of influences. In the 
consideration of his attitude, therefore I will focus on the 
ideas which illustrate a modification of the idea of 
literary patterns.
VI
The subject-oriented perspective had two modifica­
tions in the eighteenth century. The emphasis in both of
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these was on the emotional response of the subject to 
experience, ideas, and objects; therefore, the quality of 
importance is not beauty in external objects but, rather, 
the feeling of beauty and other aesthetic modes. This 
feeling is often referred to as a sublime emotion, or 
a response to a sublime idea of vista. The differences 
between the two modes is a difference of opinion as to the 
nature of the senses; one accepts only the five external 
senses, while the other proposes a set of special senses 
which augment the physical ones. Burke, for example, based 
his aesthetic theory directly on the primary pleasures of 
the senses; for him there was no internal sense of beauty 
and no special aesthetic faculty to receive and interpret 
the ideas of the sublime and beautiful. The pleasures of 
the imagination are secondary in the sense that they are 
dependent upon a physical experience (the primary) of the 
physical world. The reaction of the subject occurs in the 
form of ideas which are caused by the external world; the 
associations which occur between ideas are imagination. 
Francis Hutcheson, on the other hand, recognized an 
internal aesthetic faculty which was a common attribute in 
all men. He asserted that there were several internal 
senses, independent of the external ones, which are aware 
of the causes; one is aware of absolute beauty through the 
aesthetic faculty of the sense of beauty. All other ideas 
of beauty (relative) arise from associations of ideas. These
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two systems will be explained in chapter four,
Burke closely followed Addison in his reliance
upon only the physical senses for aesthetic experience.
The object for Addison and for Burke still retained an
inherent ability to stimulate a response based on its
particular configuration, Yet, although the mind reacts
to these stimuli in a specific manner which depends upon
their form, the principle of association of ideas allows
for variation in response from subject to subject.
Burke wrote that all human passions (particularly
sublimity and beauty) can be traced to two basic emotions,
fear and love. The configuration of an object will affect
series of associations in the mind of the viewer and cause
a feeling of either sublimity or beauty. Furthermore, all
men will react in like manner to like stimuli.
It must be necessarily allowed that the pleasures 
and pains which every object excites in one man, 
it must raise in all mankind, whilst it operates 
naturally, simply, and by its proper power only; 
for it we are to deny this, we must imagine that 
the causes operating in the same manner, and on 
subjects of the same kind, will produce different 
effects, which would be highly a b s u r d . 7^
Burke also found that all the knowledge we have about 
external things comes through the external senses, the 
imagination, and the judgment; and as the imagination and 
judgment are dependent upon the senses for their con­
clusions, they are, like the senses, the same in all men.
For since the imagination is only the representa­
tion of the senses, it can only be pleased or dis­
pleased with the images, from the same principle 
on which the sense is pleased or displeased with
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the realities; and consequently there raus t he just 
as close an agreement in the imagination as in the 
senses of men.'^
Differences in taste (the reaction of the senses to
objects) from one individual to another are attributed
to either a personal variation in the association of ideas
connected with the stimuli, or to the differences in degree
or mode of attention of the senses.
So far then as the taste belongs to the imagina­
tion, its principle is the same in all men; there
is no difference in the manner of their being
affected, nor in the cause of the affection, but 
in the degree there is a difference; which arises 
from two different causes principally; either from 
a greater degree of natural sensibility, or from 
a closer and longer attention to the o b j e c t . 75
When it is said, taste cannot be disputed, it can 
only mean, that no one can strictly answer what 
pleasure or pain some particular man may find from 
the taste of some particular thing [said with 
reference to the palate].76
The principle of sense is universal in that it acts in
the very same way in all men; it thus forms a foundation for
a standard of taste. Any deviation from the standard is
attributable to the reasons given above as well as to
personal relishes and habits like an acquired taste for
coffee or vinegar.
True to Lockean psychology Burke traced the re­
sponses of the sense data to the response to either pain 
or pleasure. He wrote that the natural tendency is to 
like certain objects or ideas and to dislike others.
Forms which are small and smooth, for example, usually 
elicit feelings of pleasure, and thus are considered to be
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beautiful. Objects which are large and rough elicit 
displeasure, or pain, and are thus likely to rouse feel­
ings of fear (awe), which can cause a vicarious pleasure 
in artistic representation and in remoteness; this feeling 
is the sublime.
According to Burke anyone may acquire a taste for 
the bizzare or the unpleasant, coffee, for example; he may 
also acquire a taste for bad art. Taste may vary, but 
responses are generally similar. Thus, a standard for good 
art, which is founded on similarities in responses, remains 
even though there is no one in a society who can recognize 
it. The recognition of good art, taste, is based on 
experience with objects which cause a physical response of 
either pain or pleasure. If one has had no contact with 
good art, in a primitive situation, for example, he may 
be aesthetically pleased with a representation of a human 
form which is as rough as a barber pole.^^ The same 
senses that give information about physical objects are 
those which are responsible for the formulation of aes­
thetic opinions; thus, opinions about beauty and sublimity 
are affected by all general information.
One might maintain that Burke's analysis is 
object-oriented because he has a standard of beauty based 
on the object and its special features which are absolute 
and independent of the subject. However, in order for 
beauty to be theoretically complete it must be experienced
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by someone; and the manner in which it is perceived is 
central to Burke's aesthetic. Certain objects by their 
configuration, naturally cause pleasure, and thus elicit an 
experience of the beautiful; other objects cause pain 
by the same principle. Pain experienced by the imagina­
tion is capable of eliciting a feeling of the sublime,
The sublime idea, because of,its remote connection with 
pain, is experienced vicariously in the imagination and 
gives a greater ultimate pleasure than beauty, which offers 
no threat. Burke's value judgment ranks the quality and 
feeling of the sublime over beauty.
Burke's theory of aesthetic judgment is based on the 
universality of the function of the five external senses. 
Francis Hutcheson relied on a set of special senses to 
augment the physical ones. In a sense he identified more 
than one aesthetic mode, as did Burke who distinguished 
between sublimity and beauty. Hutcheson's modes, however, 
are actually modifications of beauty; and for the reception 
of these modifications he provided special senses. There 
are two major modifications of beauty: absolute beauty is 
a fixed truth; relative beauty is an idea which arises 
from associations of ideas caused by all the senses, ex­
ternal and internal. Sight understands relative beauty.
The internal senses of beauty, morality, and harmony, 
among others, perceive absolute beauty.
Let is be observed that in the following papers the
word beauty is taken for _^e idea raised in u s , and
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a sense of beauty for our power of receiving 
this idea.
It is of no consequence whether we call these 
ideas of beauty and harmony perceptions of the 
external senses of seeing and hearing, or not.
I should choose rather to call our power of per­
ceiving these ideas an internal sense, were it 
only for the convenience of distinguishing them 
from other sensations of seeing and hearing which 
men may have without perception of beauty and 
harmony.  ̂̂
Hutcheson justified distinguishing between the
ordinary and the internal senses on several grounds. His
major argument was that we call the powers of receiving
different perceptions different senses.
When two perceptions are entirely different from 
each other, or agree in nothing but the general 
idea of sensation, we call the powers of receiving 
these different perceptions different s e n s e s . 79
This is an observation about the general understanding of
the meaning of sense, but the logic is later extended to
include the sense of beauty, morality, harmony, and more.
He gives other justifications for setting these sensations
apart: (1) sensations of beauty must be distinguished from
sensations of sight and hearing which are essentially 
80different, (2) brute animals can see and hear, yet we
cannot assume they know beauty and harmony through these
81external senses, (3) the beauty of theorems, universal
truths, and extended principles of action are understood
8 2without the aid of the external senses, and (A) ideas 
(impressions) of beauty and harmony can be understood with­
out knowledge of their underlying principles, just as the
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sensations of color and sound can be understood without 
knowledge of their underlying principles.
The theory is further clarified by a distinction 
between the perception by the internal sense of beauty-- 
it perceives absolute beauty--and the external sense of 
sight which is aware of relative beauty. The difference lies, 
in part, in the principle of association of ideas. Ab­
solute beauty is not relative, and needs no comparison of 
ideas; relative beauty is dependent upon such a comparison.
Beauty [in corporal forms] is either original or 
comparative ; or, if any like the terms better, 
absolute or relative. We therefore by absolute 
beauty understand only that beauty which we perceive 
in objects without comparison to anything external; 
comparative or relative beauty is that which we per­
ceive in objects commonly considered as imitations 
or resemblances of something e l s e .84
Absolute beauty is the quality which excites the idea of 
uniformity amist variety. We can illustrate the principle 
of variety with the comparison of a triangle and a 
hexagon: the latter figure has more variety, therefore it 
is more beautiful. The principle of uniformity can be dem­
onstrated by a comparison of an equilateral triangle with
a scalenum: the former figure has more uniformity, therefore
8 5it is more beautiful.
Relative beauty consists of compared and contrasted
ideas. Several factors make up these principles: imitation,
in which a copy is compared with an o r i g i n a l probability,
which is necessary for an understanding of resemblance in
8 7similitudes , metaphors and allegories. Relative beauty
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is the subject of the arts.
Relative beauty is further compounded by the moral
sense. Moral ideas are understood through the internal
moral sense, and these impressions are compounded by
association with all other ideas of all the other internal
and external senses. These complex associations form
the idea of relative beauty. It is relative beauty which
concerns art. Thus, moral subjects excite the senses and
8 8elicit associative responses. (See chapter four for a
diagram of Hutcheson's complex operations of the external 
and internal senses.)
The basic difference between Burke and Hutcheson 
lies in the sources of ideas of beauty as well as the 
means, or senses, which receive the impressions, Burke 
devoted many pages to the analysis of objects which naturally 
excite certain emotions; the principle of this response is 
association of ideas. For Hutcheson, beauty lies in a 
principle of variety amidst uniformity, and is perceived 
by an internal sense of beauty. Our ideas of relative 
beauty are caused by the actions of the internal senses 
and the external senses together. Burke indeed mentioned 
the principle of variety, but for him it was understood 
in Hogarth-like terms; it pertains to the particular 
directions of lines and to parts of things. For Hutcheson, 
variety is linked with uniformity, and acts as a single 
principle rather than as a principle of parts. We can
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illustrate the difference between Hutcheson and Burke on
the matter of variety with flowers. Hutcheson looked at
them as a whole class: they display variety amidst
89uniformity. Burke saw flowers in terms of the variety
90of forms and lines in each individual specimen. Thus,
Hutcheson need an internal sense to understand the unfor- 
mity factor in beauty; Burke needed only the external senses 
to understand external beauty.
Like the subject orientation, the creator orienta­
tion concentrated on an emotional sensation, with the basic 
difference that the focus was on the one who makes art 
rather than on the one who appreciates it. There were two 
modifications of the creator-oriented perspective in the 
eighteenth century. One saw the artist as a possessor of 
a greater quan t ity of characteristics held in some degree 
by all men. The other attitude held that the artist 
possesses a special sense of creativity which can not be 
found to any degree in other men. As we shall see, 
Shaftesbury maintained that the principle— the sensitivity 
necessary for artistic pro due t ion-- is present to some degree 
in all mankind. Blake claimed that creativity is unique 
to the artist.
The question of the native ability of the artist
was posed early in the century by Addison who distinguished
9 1between the natural and the trained genius. This dis­
tinction was further developed during the century by other
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British writers. The difference was of central importance 
to the issues of creativity and the training of the artist. 
The implication of learned genius is that creativity can 
be taught; therefore, there is a validity in schools such 
as the Royal Academy. The implication of natural genius 
is that creativity cannot be taught, though the mechanical 
skills may be sharpened. The extreme of the later view is 
that artistic productivity is entirely spontaneous. Accord­
ing to one historian, the extreme statement was not made
until 1782 when John Pinkerton wrote in his Letters on
9 2Li terature that invention knows no rules. This was Blake's 
belief. Thus, the difference between the two modes of this 
attitude centers on the nature of creativity; the implica­
tions of the differences amount to a belief in either a 
rationally learned art, or a demonically inspired art.
Shaftesbury saw the artist as a "second maker."
For Shaftesbury beauty and truth are synomous terms; beauty 
and truth are the recognition of the harmony of the universe. 
This attitude has some characteristics of both the object 
orientation and the subject orientation because of a recog­
nition of an absolute harmony, and a response to it. In 
understanding the order of things, however, the artist- 
creator partakes in the original creation on a minor scale-- 
heis the creator of smaller worlds. Shaftesbury wrote that
A poet is indeed a second marker; a just Prometheus 
under Jove. Like thet Soverign artist of universal 
plastic nature, he forms a whole, coherent and pro­
portional in itself, with due subjection and sub- 
oniinancy of constituant parts.
10 7
His critical focus is on the artist.
In the theory of this moralist beauty assumes an
identity with the good and the right in a balanced and
moral universe. The good that the artist recreates is an
inherent principle of the universe as a whole; it is a
characteristic of nature.
Virtue has the same fixed standard [as musical har­
mony]. The same numbers, harmony and proportion 
will have place in morals, and are discoverable in 
the characters and affections in mankind; in which 
are laid the just foundations of art and science 
superior to every other human practice and com­
prehension. 94
Not only is beauty discoverable in every part of the uni­
verse, but the sense that is aware of it is common to all
men; the ability to express that beauty is a talent that 
comes to one through rational means, that is, the study 
of the ancients.
. . . to deny the common and natural sense of the
sublime and beautiful in things will appear as an
affection, merely, to anyone who considers duly 
on the affair.
an d
. thus much for antiquity and those rules of 
art . . . by which the adventurous geniuses of 
the times were wont to steer their sources and 
govern their impetuous muse. Those were the 
chartae of our Roman masterpoet [Virgil], and these 
are the pieces of art, the mirrors, the exemplars 
he bids us place before our e y e s .95
Thus, Shaftesbury believed that genius can be improved by
obse rvat ion.
Shaftesbury’s aesthetic ideas were very eclectic 
and must be gleaned from several essays in the Characteristics,
10 8
Second Characters, and some collections of letters. It is
clear, though, that the beauty for Shaftesbury appears not
in the external world, but in the world of the artist’s
mind. That creative power is aware of the creative and
changing possibilities of nature. The notions thus formed
in the artist's mind are objects in themselves.
In a creature capable of forming general notions 
of things not only the outward beings which offer 
themselves to the senses are the objects of the 
affections, but the very actions themselves, and 
the affections of pity, kindness, gratitude, and 
their contraries, being brought into the mind by 
reflection, become objects.96
These objects, of course, are not material. Yet, they are 
acted upon by the mind in the same manner as are the ob­
jects presented to the external senses; thus beauty exists 
as an idea-object in the mind of that man who aspirations 
may well be to represent it in an artistic medium.
The case is the same in the mental of moral sub­
jects as in the primary bodies of common objects 
of the sense. The shapes, motions, colors, and pro­
portions of the latter being presented to our eye 
there necessarily results in a beauty or deformity.9?
The artist in Shaftesbury's analysis is not a 
super-human; he is merely a man who has cultivated a natural 
capacity to some extent common to all men. Blake, on the 
other hand, saw the artist as an uniquely gifted individual 
who receives a special message from the "muses" or from God 
and conveys his artistic idea almost as a madman who has 
little control over the content of his work. For Blake the 
act of artistic creation is almost a religion. The mind of
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the artist-creator assumes a very powerful role of creativity
for this poet, artist, and critic. The creative vehicle,
the genius, is the ultimate and only source of art. Not
only is he born a natural genius, "man brings all that he
9 8has or can have into the world with him," but he cannot
develop his powers by any amount of observation or training.
This was the basis for Blake's stinging criticism of Reynolds
whose interest was in the Royal Academy, and whose conviction
was that the artist must learn by experience. Blake did not
need experience, he needed only imagination.
Men think they can Copy Nature as Correctly as 
I copy Imagination; this they will find impossible, 
and all the Copiers or pretended Copiers of Nature 
from Rembrandt to Reynolds, prove that Nature be­
comes to its victim nothing but Blots and B l u r s . 99
The expression of what is known by the artist beauty; 
the passion felt by the artist beauty.
The difference between Shaftesbury's genius and 
Blake's genius amounts to a difference in its creative 
methods. Shaftesbury's genius needs insight and example; 
Blake's genius needs only inspiration. Indeed, Blake felt 
that creative process is stiff led by example and rule.
Blake's statements about beauty were written for the 
most part in the nineteenth century, but as he was a pro­
duct, and indeed almost a culmination of the eighteenth, 
his thoughts are not out of place here His view of beauty 
and the part played by the artist is an ultimate expression 
of an idea expressed in the mid-eighteenth century by
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Edward Young. In his Essay on Original Composition Young 
wrote that the artist creates in an unique manner, not by 
any means visible to the critic, and that his creation is 
an act in the organic sense which produces something new
in the w o r l d . ^^O
The gradual shift in aesthetic attitudes during the 
course of the century in British thought from a pre­
dominantly object- to a subject- to a creator-oriented per­
spective is reflected in the titles of many essays and other 
works. Topics such as the analysis of beauty in poetry and 
art were fashionable in the early part of the century. 
Starting with Addison's "Pleasures of the Imagination" which 
incorporated Lockean associationalism, essays on taste in­
creased in frequency. Burke's original statement about 
beauty was the Inquiry. That Burke wrote in the object- 
oriented mode might have been a justifiable position had he 
not found it necessary to clarify his intent with the 
subject-oriented preliminary discourse Essay on Taste which 
was published with the third edition of the Inquiry in 1761. 
As the conception of the artist as originator and keeper of 
beauty became a matter of interest after Young's examination 
of the idea of creativity and enthusiasm, other essays re­
flected this new concern for creative genius. Both the idea 
of response of the viewer and the creativity of the artist as 
beginning points for aesthetic inquiry lie as potentials in 
the essay of Addison at the opening of the century. Both 
possibilities were developed by his British contemporaries 
in the following years.
ill
VII
We have seen that the perspective of critical 
interpretation had an impact upon the writer's method, 
his terms, and his values. In tue following chapters I 
will analyze characteristic features of each of the three 
orientations. Because there was a major difference in 
critical method between the object and the subject orien­
tations, we will find that the former stressed definitions 
of nature, while the latter stressed response analysis.
The creator orientation, on the other hand, was not character­
ized by a specific method in this period. Its main feature 
was an attitude which rejected the conclusions of both of 
the other orientations. From the perspective of the present 
looking back on the past, it would seem that one philosophical 
idea led logically to another, and that every possibility 
of. development of sundry themes was fulfilled. This is 
probably a distorted view of eighteenth-century reality, for 
the materials did not exist in the form that they do today, 
as a collection of documents that can be picked over and 
compared for evidences of historical systems. Yet, for 
the purposes of organization, an attempt will be made to 
demonstrate probable sequences in developments of ideas 
from one orientation to another.
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There is nothing in Nature that is great and beautiful 
without rule and order, and the more rule and order 
and harmony we find in the objects that strike our 
senses, the more worthy and noble we esteem them.
[John Dennis 1710]1
In a few words John Dennis has summed up the object
orientation. The properties of beauty--order, rule, and
harmony— exist in nature independent of our cognizance of
them, and when we do recognize them, we appreciate them.
The same is for the arts as it is for nature: Dennis went
on to write, "I humbly conceive that it is the same in
art and particularly in poetry, which ought to be an exact
2imitation of nature." Here, very briefly stated is the 
core of the object orientation. The key terms and ideas 
are: (.1) Nature is a phenome^un apart from man, (2) beauty
exists in nature, (3) beauty is based on rule, order, 
harmony, (4) art is an imitation of nature, and (5) man is 
capable of recognition of beauty through his,reasoning 
powers ;
For the purpose of an analysis of the object orienta­
tion several topics will be taken up in this chapter: (1) the
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general meaning of nature in the eighteenth century, (2) the 
meaning of nature in the critical theory of six writers,
(3) the typical structure of an object-oriented work,
(4) definitions of beauty, (5) definitions of invention 
and imitation, (6) genius and rules, and (7) the making of 
a genius.
I
Two features are typical of the object-oriented per­
spective: (1) organization of the criticism is based on
the definition of nature and the principles of beauty which 
are to be discovered in nature, and (2) because art was 
thought to reflect nature, analysis of the arts is usually 
founded on a discussion of their parts, rather than principles 
of association or principles of creativity— for example 
fable, diction, character development and meter in poetry, 
design, color, and line in painting, and harmony, melody,
3and expression in music. Let us now look at the concept 
of nature, the model for art, as it was understood in the 
eighteenth century.
In their search for a general principle of beauty 
in nature, critics were looking for a unifying and stablilz- 
ing universal law. The Pythagorean, heavenly harmony which 
cemented the universe in concert was discovered to be a 
universal law of motion by Newton, a system of monads by 
Leibniz, a polyphonic harmony by Bach,^ geometric reasoning 
processes by Descartes and Fonten elle, and ideal artistic
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patterns guided through rule by Racine, Le Brun, Ryraer, 
Dennis, Avison, Reynolds, Pope, and others. Some of these 
critical opinions reflect not only a clear object orienta­
tion, but a prejudice in stylistic taste as well. In music 
criticism, for example, Charles Avison was a proponent of 
the Baroque style: he appreciated thd fugal harmonic char­
acter of Luly, Rameau, Handel, Scarlatti and Corelli , but 
was critical of the older dissonant style of Purcell as well 
as of the newer melodic Rococo represented by Pergolesi and 
Vivaldi.^ A stylastic prejudice is demonstrated by Reynolds 
in his preference of the Roman and Bolognian schools over 
the Venetian, Flemish, and Dutch.^ Pope preferred the 
Mannerist and Baroque Shakespeare and Milton^ to the "modern 
dunces.
Nature, as Lovejoy pointed out, was a key term in
9eighteenth-century thought in Europe. In British aesthetic 
thought the word nature acquired many fine nuances. John­
son's Dictionary lists eleven definitions of the noun, and 
as many more of the adjective and noun natural. In
retrospect we can discern many more than those ennumerated 
by Johnson. Lovejoy admits that his list probably does not 
cover all the applications of the concept in the eighteenth 
century. As a generalization the definition of nature in 
a critical context in the early part of the century usually 
refers to the universe apart from man, although man occupies 
a niche in the scheme.
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By the mid-century man had become the central 
reference point for the definition of nature, taking the 
place of the created universe, as interest was increasingly 
directed toward human nature and motivation. In the 
search for man's "true" nature and the laws which govern it, 
an assumption was made which was similar to the earlier 
search for the general laws controlling the operations of 
the universe, i.e., that a reason, or system, could be 
discovered by which human behavior could be explained in 
terms of an universally operating principle. This concept 
of human nature was never totally given up by philosophers, 
although several of them looked upon man's nature as unique 
and unpredictable. For some, nature lost its predictability, 
at least any which could be discovered through reason.
Hume's skeptcism is definitely an example of this vein of 
thought, although he did not fully develop the implications 
of his theory of knowledge in aesthetic terms, and probably 
had no influence on literary and artistic criticism along 
this line.^^ For Blake, at the end of the century, nature 
had lost its appeal as a concept because his interest was 
in the supra-natura1 and the mystical.
II
In order to understand the important and complex role 
that the concept of nature played in these object-oriented 
theories, we will look at six critics' ideas of nature.
The critical understandings of nature of Hogarth, Reynolds,
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Johnson, Pope, Dennis, and Avison will be outlined and 
explained for this purpose. At times we will find that 
some definitions in one critic's system are contradictory; 
they are, nevertheless, important ideas which sometimes 
demonstrate areas of conflicting current opinions. Three 
major ideas of nature typical of the object-oriented per­
spective were indicated in the second chapter: nature as an 
empirically experienced phenomenon, nature as an abstracted 
pattern, and nature as an ideal pattern. These three inter­
pretations were accepted by Hogarth, Reynolds, and Pope 
respectively; they are the basis on which sub-modes were 
defined in chapter two. We will find, however, that as a 
generalization, each of these six critic's definitions of 
nature also falls into three general categories: nature of 
the universe, nature as a guide or mirror for art, and 
nature of man.
Hogarth’s relatively simple concept of nature as a 
physically experienced world was also recognized by Pope, 
Reynolds, and Johnson, among others who also wrote in 
the object-oriented mode, but these others also fitted a 
number of other more important definitions into their system. 
When drawing upon examples to illustrate the principles of 
beauty, Hogarth made it clear that beauty if found in 
specific things which conform to the principles. Again and 
again he referred to the human body and other specific forms 
'The beauties of the lily, and the Calcidonian Iris proceed
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12from their being composed with great variety . . . .  The
variety Hogarth wrote of is one of several causes of beauty 
in nature, along with fitness, uniformity, quantity, 
simplicity, and intricacy. Each of these principles, how­
ever, had to conform to the principle of the line of beauty.
Hogarth advised the artist to develop a method of 
looking at things which would help him develop the 1ines 
needed to represent them from any aspect, and eventually, 
with practice, from memory. The line is the central element 
of Hogarth's analysis, for, "the straight line and the 
circular line, together with their different combinations, 
and variations, etc. bound and circumscribe all visible
objects whatsoever . . . producing [an] endless variety of
13forms . . ." The method which the artist must use to
discover the necessary lines is to imagine that every ob­
ject is a shell, scooped out so that nothing is left but 
the outline; the outline form is composed of fine threads 
so that the artist can see the inside, outside, and all 
sides at once with his imagination.^^ Thus the artist 
conditions himself to conceive in terms of line to under­
stand nature, and hence, the specific forms presented to 
the eye are the central issue in Hogarth's aesthetic attitude 
The figures represented in Hogarth's accompanying 
plates demonstrate that this artist-critic finds beauty in 
some of nature's forms and not in others. The plates are 
also used to demonstrate that some representations taken
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directly from nature are more graceful and beautiful on the 
basis of the curvature of the lines used to draw them than 
others taken from the very same source. Compare the three 
human leg drawings in Plate 2 (numbers 65, 66, 67): 
figure 65 "shows the serpentine forms . . .  as they appear 
when the skin is taken off . . . .  It was drawn from a 
plaster of paris figure cast off nature . . . however, they
lose in the imagination some of the beauty they really 
have . . . ." Figure 66 "was also taken from nature; . . .
but treated in a more dry, stiff, and what the painters call, 
sticky manner." The remaining figure 67 is without the 
"waving line" and is so wooden that it could easily be used 
as a chair leg.^^ (The passage stating that some of the real 
beauty is lost in the imagination suggests that Hogarth 
thought that art could not surpass nature.)
In Hogarth's system, if the artist's purpose is to 
express beauty he needs only to use the lines and figures 
which conform to the formula (the formula must also be 
considered with respect to composition); if his purpose is 
to depict the ridiculous or the ugly, he needs only to 
eliminate the graceful lines. This is a very simple system 
of beauty, and the reader does not need to infer philoso­
phical implications about the probability of occurrences 
of the "S" line in nature or a mathematical ideal pattern, 
because beauty actually exists in some of the forms of 
nature as it is expressed by the senses, while it does not
J.2 7
exist in other f o r m s . T h e  object in nature and the ob­
ject represented in art cause appreciation in the mind, 
that is, the rational part of the mind. Appreciation arises 
from the actual qualities in objects and the fact that the 
mind was designed to be naturally pleasëd with beauty.
Hogarth's idea of nature can be demonstrated in 
outline form with three major headings representing nature 
as it appears to the senses, nature as it is reflected in 
att, and man’s nature which shows the two traditional 
characteristics of rational and irrational. Hogarth did 
not concern himself with the nature of man, and this last 
category must be inferred from his attitude about art;^^ it 
is included here to demonstrate the consistency of object- 
oriented critical attitudes in this period. The first 
category representing physical nature includes all that 
meets the senses; some of these forms are beautiful, some 
ugly, and some inbetween. The second class of nature is 
art, which imitates all of these things, depending on the 
intent of the artist; we can see that Hogarth himself chose 
to imitate the beautiful as well as the ugly in his work.
I. Physical nature
1. Forms composed of the S line (the beautiful)
2. Forms composed of straight and angular lines 
(the ugly)
3. Forms composed of a combination of these
II. Art as it reflects nature
4. A copy of forms composed of the S line
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5. A copy of forms composed of straight and 
angular lines




For Hogarth, then, nature is as simple as a human form, or 
a pineapple, copied by the artist, and appreciated by a 
reasonable person.
In Reynold's aesthetic model the physical form on 
which Hogarth's beauty depends is only a secondary truth--it 
is the particular. In art he sought the general, which is 
primary truth. Truth and nature here are synonomous. The 
primary truth is an abstract of nature called the central 
form; it is a composite of all forms in any one class, such 
as human beings or tulips. Reynolds’s is not a Platonic 
concept; it does not exist in an other-world of pure form, 
nor does it originate a priori in the mind. It exists in 
visible particulars which are combined by the artist to 
make a new form, a composite, which can be seen nowhere in 
the nature experienced by the senses.
Combinations of particulars to form a composite is an
idea which can be traced back to the early Greeks. The
story is told by Socrates that the fifth-century painter
Zeuxis chose the five most beautiful girls and combined their
18excellencies to depict Helena. Reynolds's idea of nature
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was that these excellencies comprise the intended pattern
of nature, the ideal general model from which every
19particular deviates somewhat. The definition of nature
as simply what we see— the secondary and the particular— play-
20ed a subdued role in Reynoldss critical theory. The
secondary truth is characterized by particular habits,
21customs, and distinctive features. The primary truth,
the central form, is the meaning of nature which was 
important for the aesthetic attitude outlined in the Dis­
courses . Reynolds's idea of the central form was clouded 
by his special interest in portraiture. Thus, his concept 
of the ideal tended to mean an average rather than a Platonic 
Ideal.
In his introduction to the third discourse Roger Fry
notes that Reynolds used the word nature in three separate
senses: (.1) that which is visually experienced, (2) that
which is intended in the Aristotle sense, but not fully
realized in the empirical sense, and (3) that which is
2 2agreeable to the human mind. Reynolds actually applied the 
terms nature and natural in at least eleven specific situa­
tions which appear in the outline given below. The three
classes indicated by Fry are retained within categories one
23and two, and are indicated by his name in parenthesis.
I. Nature of the universe, both as pattern and as 
actualization of that pattern
1. The empirical, sensate world (Fry No. 1)
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2. The average of the empirical world— the general 
and the central form, like the class of humans 
(Fry No. 2)
3. The generic type, more specific than the 
central form, like the Gladiator or Apollo
4. The idea of nature in the artist's mind, i.e., 
beauty
II. Nature as a pattern for art
5. That which conforms to nature (number 1), such 
as speech
6. A mode of representation, defined as artificial, 
but necessary for conveying the types of nature 
in definitions 2, 3, and 4 (poetry, painting)
7. Anything that pleases the human imagination 
(Fry No. 3)
III. Human nature
8. A human drive for truth
9. An inherent principle (not a drive) which 
appreciates regularity and congruity
10. The intellectual, judgmental, and rational 
part of man
11. The sensate, emotional, and irrational part 
of man.
Reynolds'suse of nature falls into the same types of classi­
fications as Hogarth's. His ideas, however, are much more 
complex and sophisticated, and they can be linked to a 
tradition of literary and artistic criticism. There are 
four sub-modes of nature as it is experienced by the senses; 
only one of these is physical, number 1, which is a col­
lection of particulars, all of the individual things we see, 
as well as customs and individual habits. Within this
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24class we will find such things as modes of dress, pre­
ferences of familiar types of beauty accepted by custom and 
2 5habit, and such accidental forms as the variety in the
shapes of l e a v e s . T h e  last three sub-modes of empirical
nature are all conceived in the mind of the artist, but
are based on his experience with nature as defined in
number 1. The average, or central form, consists of the
summary of particularities the artist observes in empirical
nature for a certain species of things. Thus, there is
2 7a central form for humans, presumably a young man. This
central form consists of the average of all the generic types
such as the gladiator and the Apollo. The generic type is
much more specific than the central form; besides the gladia- 
2 8tor, etc., it presumably contains a generic Etheopian and
29a generic European. There will be a central form and
generic type for all classes of things as trees,and all
creatures. The idea of nature as it appears in the artist's
mind is a concept that comes close to Platonism; yet, it is
still an idea of beauty which is based on individual things,
and not gathered from the world of ideas. Of this idea
Reynolds wrote,
but the beauty [nature] of which we are in quest 
is general and intellectual; it is an idea that sub­
sists only in tlio mind; the sight never beheld it, 
nor has the hand expressed it: it is an idea residing 
in the breast of the artist . . . .30
Reynolds's first object was to define what it is that
the artist is to r e p re s en t--wh a t beauty there is in nature.
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The second objective was to define art in terms of its
representation of that nature and that beauty; thus we have
the three classes of representation. The first is an
accurate or exact imitation of nature such as the work of
31the Dutch schools. The mode of representation recommended
by Reynolds for the "higher styles" in the arts was called
artificial in the thirteenth Discourse. The natural kind of
imitation, he said, is the exact copying we first learn
and admire. The higher, more artificial, means of poetry,
singing, drama, and the painting of Raphael, is art.
For want of this distinction [between imitation of 
actual nature and departure from nature], the world 
is filled with false criticism. Raffaelle is praised 
for naturalness and deception, which he certainly has 
not accomplished, and as certainly never intended; 
and our great late actor, Garrick, has been as 
ignorantly praised by his friend Fielding . , . by
introducing in one of his novels . . .  an ignorant 
man, mistaking Garrick's representation of a scene 
in Hamlet, for r e a l i t y . 32
Art as a reflection of nature in the sense of anything
that pleases the human imagination includes both the lower and
higher styles of all the arts. It includes things which
please those who have not cultivated their imaginations,
33as well as things which please the most refined tastes.
The number of things which please the imagination indicates 
an object orientation because attention is focused on the 
object and its configuration,rather than on the principle 
in the mind which makes one pleased with them. Here 
Reynolds seems to be very close to Hogarth because the 
cause of man's pleasure is imposed from without and bears
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a direct correspondence to the object. We have seen, how­
ever, that Hogarth identified beauty as the "S” curve; 
Reynolds's concept of that which delights the imagination 
is more inclusive.
Reynolds's seventh Pis cours e is almost entirely de­
voted to a study of human nature. The artist, he wrote,
must understand the human mind in order to "be a great
artist. Reynolds's understanding of human nature
has several modifications, but two major assumptions pervade 
his entire attitude: that there is a general uniformity
among men, and that human nature, whatever form it takes,
is static. His argument for general uniformity sounds 
like something his friend Burke might have said, that is, 
that the general uniformity of our forms implies a similitude 
of feelings and imaginations.^^ Of the static nature of 
things, he wrote that nature is a fixed principle, implying 
both human nature and external nature,
There are four distinct facets of human nature in 
Reynolds's attitude. The natural appetite of the mind, he 
said, is for truth,
whether that truth results from the real agreement 
or equality of original ideas among themseleves; 
from the agreement of the representation of any 
object with the thing represented; or from the 
correspondence of the several parts of any arrange­
ment with each o t h e r . 37
His conception of truth was in step with the feeling of his
era, for it reflected not only association of ideas, but
traditional literary and artistic critical standards as well.
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The imagination is a feature of human nature which
roughly parallels the central form (definition number two)
because the.general ideas which appeal to it are a kind of
internal central form.
My notion of nature comprehends not only the forms 
which nature produces, but also the nature and 
internal fabrick and organization, as I may call it, 
of the human mind and imagination.^^
We have already seen that there are a number of classes of
things which appeal to this imagination; but the principle
of the imagination is general and uniform for the species.
It is on these grounds that a system of rules can be devised
to appeal to the imagination in general. The imagination
is different from taste, which can be either good or bad: the
Dutch appeal to the imagination, and they conform to nature
(definition number one). Such an appeal, and such an ob-
39servance of nature, however, do not constitute good taste.
Man's nature can also be characterized as intellectual, 
reasoning, and judgmental on the one hand, and sensitive, 
emotional, and enthusiastic on the other. Reason and judg­
ment are connected with good taste:
We will take it for granted that reason is something 
invariable and fixed in the nature of things . 
whatever goes under the name of taste, which we can 
fairly bring under the dominion of reason, must be con­
sidered as equally exempt from c h a n g e . 40
The other side of man's nature, the sensate part, is re­
sponsible for his attraction to the inferior styles and
subjects. The artist must not address himself to this 
41nature. Enthusiasm is also an apparent characteristic
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feature of this side of human nature; in the third dis­
course Reynolds opposed reason and enthusiasm, noting
that the artist learns his art through experience and ob-
4 2servation, not flights of fancy. By the time of the
thirteenth discourse,Reynolds was willing to give the part 
of feeling more importance in the workings of the imagina­
tion and less to an observance of nature.
The great end of all the arts is to make an im­
pression on the imagination and the feeling. The 
imitation of nature frequently does this. Some­
times it fails and something else s u c c e e d s . 43
The meaning of nature in this context is not simply the
central form which the artist has labored so long to find
in the obvious forms; here he fully intended the artist to
take advantage of some of the accidents of nature in order
to fire the imagination.
the Painter ought always to have his eyes open,
I mean [to use] accidents; to follow when they 
lead, and to improve them, rather than to always 
trust to a regular plan . . . . Upon the whole it
seems to me that the object and intention of all 
the arts is to supply the natural imperfection of 
things, and often to gratify the mind by realizing 
and embodying what never existed but in the imagina­
tion. 44
Two further observations must be made about Reynolds's 
concept of nature. He did not see nature in any modern 
sense as changing or evolving. The static character of 
external nature and human nature was the basis upon which 
he built his standards of art. To have accepted a fluctuat­
ing nature would have jeopardized his theory. Also,
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deformity was explicitly eliminated from his concept of
nature; he stated, "deformity is not nature, but an
A 5accidental deviation from her accustomed habit." He
A6had written earlier that deformity had its central form.
We can see from the context, though, that the mode of nature 
in the third discourse was the sensitively experienced 
(number two). Thus, deformity exists in physical nature and 
has a central form; it does not, however, exist as an in­
tent of nature as pattern.
Johnson's awareness of the diverse meanings of the
concept of nature is apparent in the numerous definitions
he lists in the Dictionary. However, his critical use of
the idea falls into three major categories analogous to those
used by Hogarth and Reynolds: empirical nature as it is
discovered through the senses, nature as an asethetic norm,
47and human nature. The three classes are indicated in 
the outline below with sub-modes within each. A very care­
ful reading of his critical works would very likely reveal 
more applications, but those below are the most obvious 
and important nuances in his system of criticism.
Hagstrum also talks about Johnson's use of nature in
terms of these three categories: the general-particular
48external nature, art, and man. He tries to reconcile
the conflicting elements of Johnson's definitions of 
nature to demonstrate the continuity of his critical 
system; I am, however, merely enumerating them. Two other
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things should be noted about the following outline: several 
types of representations of nature in aesthetic forms have 
been included under sub-heading number two because they 
reflect Johnson's attitude about the relationships between 
empirical nature and art. Also, it should be noted that 
Johnson had no dualism of physical nature and its abstract 
or ideal; thus all nature is realized in action or in form. 





II. Nature as a pattern for art
3. That which conforms to general nature (a 
copy of number 1)
4. That which conforms to particular nature 
(a copy of number 2)
5. Artificial: a pattern for styles and genres
6. Naturalness of things for styles and genres 
of tragedy and comedy— general and particular 
at the same time
7. Unnatural, indecorous, a deliberate mixture 
of style and content
III. Human nature
498. Common sense (a principle)
9. Judgment--common sense (a general principle) 





12. Natural taste (similar to number 11 but 
without power of execution)
13. False taste, an appreciation of unnatural 
(number 7)
14. Physical, social, and cultural decay
Most of these definitions can be found in the Dictionary 
under nature, genius, a rt, and related terms. The uses of 
nature in a critical context can be seen in his Preface to 
the Works of Shakespeare (1765), a few essays from The 
Rambler (1751), and the Lives of the Poets (1781).
Johnson's understanding of the difference between
general and particular nature is similar to Reynolds's
distinctions. Specific customs such as costume, and
stereotyped habits such as "kingly behavior" as opposed to
general human behavior are examples of particular nature;
Shakespeare is praised for his avoidance of these traits.
We knew that Rome, like every other city, had men of 
all dispositions; and wanting a buffoon, he went 
into the senate-house for that which the senate- 
house would certainly have afforded him. He was 
inclined to shew an usurper and a murderer not only 
odious but despicable, he therefore added drunken­
ness to his other qualities, knowing that kings 
love wine like other men, and the wine exerts its 
natural power upon kings.
General nature, as for Reynolds, concerns the non­
particular, or the broad similarities between various 
people and places; thus, Johnson was not concerned that 
Shakespeare's characters do not dress in the fashion of 
the period they represent, or behave in the particular 
manners of their societies. He wrote on this point about 
Shakespeare's generalities,
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His adherence Co general nature has exposed him 
to the censure of critics . . . . Dennis and
Rhyme r think, his Romans not sufficiently Roman;
and Voltaire censures his kings as not completely 
royal . . . .  His story requires Romans or kings, 
but he thinks only on m e n . 5 1
Although Johnson recognized several meanings of the word
nature as it applied, to the physical world, only the general
and the particular in the sense of something experienced
by the senses were important to his critical theory;
in other words, the word nature applied not to the physical
laws and God's intent, but to things as they are actually
experienced (see footnote 47). Hagstrum also notes this
aspect of Johnson's criticism, writing that in general
Johnson was not influenced by philosophical systems, viz.
Platonic, Cartesian, and Leibnizian cosmologies. Thus,
moral purposiveness has no place in his system, "religion
5 2and poetry are effectively divorced." (A glance at the
outlines will demonstrate that Reynolds, Dennis, and Pope
all recognized a regular, purposive pattern to the universe
which can be identified, in some cases, as a moral law.)
Johnson thought of art in terms of a copy, or mirror
of nature; in this context of art as an aesthetic norm, he
defined five distinct categories of representation. A
copy of particular nature is simply an imitation of the
particular habits and customs which distinguish one class of
men from another. It is artistic realization of empirical
nature (number two).
Shakespeare is above all writers, at least above 
all modern writers, the poet of nature; the poet
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who holds up to his readers a faithful mirror of 
manners and of life. His characters are not 
modified by the customs of particular places, un­
practiced by the rest of the world; by the 
pecularities of studies of professions . . .  or 
by the accidents of transient fashions or 
temporary opinions . . . .53
To copy general nature, on the other hand, is to imitate
true nature.
Shakespeare has no heroes; his scenes are occupied 
only by men, who act and speak as the reader thinks 
that he himself should have spoken and acted on 
the same occasion.
Johnson thought of art as an artificial mode of
expression, a pattern for the styles and genres in the arts
He noted that the arts artificial in the sense that
they provide means for entertainment which is not to be
realized in day to day existence. Here his opinion as
close to Reynoldss (and likely influenced it); artificial
refers not only to such elements as rhyme and meter, but
to form, such as drama and ode.
The original of this precept [only three speaking 
persons on stage at once] was merely accidental.
Tragedy was a monody or solitary song in honor of 
Bacchus, improved afterwards into a dialogue by 
the addition of another speaker; but the ancients, 
remembering that the tragedy was a first pro­
nounced only by one, durst not for some time venture 
beyond two . . . .  55
Within representation of the general is naturalness 
of things as they exist, such as the co-existence of comic 
and tragic elements in life— the co-existence of good and 
evil.
Shakespeare's plays are not in the rigorous and 
critical sense either tragedies or comedies, but
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compositions of a distinct kind, exhibiting the 
real state of sublunary nature, which partakes of 
good and evil, joy and sorrow, mingled with end­
less variety of proportion and innumerable modes 
of combination; and expressing the course of the 
world in which the loss of one is the gain of 
ano ther . . . .56
The unnatural is an indecorous and deliberate false wit-
conceits.
These conceits Addison calls mixed wit, that is, 
wit which consists of thoughts true in one sense 
of the expression and false in the other . . . .
That confusion of images may entertain for a 
moment, but being unnatural it soon grows weari- 
s orae . 5 7
Johnson's view of human nature was complex and covered
a number of qualities. Man is characterized by common
s e n s e , b y  his passions or f e e l i n g s , a n d  by his reason
and j u d g m e n t . T h e r e  is also an element of natural
talent, expressed as natural f a c u l t i e s . H i s  aesthetic
preferences may be good in a natural sense:
But this kind of disgust [in a mean or common thought] 
is by no means confined to the ignorant or super­
ficial; it operates uniformly and universally upon 
readers of all classes; every man, however profound 
or abstracted, perceives himself irrestibly alienated 
by low terms . . . .^%
This natural taste is similar to talent, but without the
skills of execution. Man may also acquire a false taste,
a preference for artificiality, or the accumulation of bad
rules. Rambler number 156 is devoted to such a situation in
societies. Societies and governments naturally accrue too
many laws and rules and become cumbersome under the weight
of regulation. An accumulation of rules, he wrote, has
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dictated a certain taste, and "it ought to be the first
6 3endeavor of a writer to distinguish nature from custom."
Johnson's concept of nature as a system of cultural,
social, and physical decay entered into in his criticism
because it explained the superiority of the ancients as
well as the superiority of Shakespeare who was an ancient
in the sense of having been unaware of the rules.
Every government, say the politicians, is perpetually 
degenerating towards corruption. . . . Every animal
body . . . [is] continually declining towards dis­
ease and death. . . .  In the same manner the studies
of mankind not being subject to rigorous demonstra­
tion, admit the influence of fancy and caprice, are 
perpetually tending to error and c o n f u s i o n . 6 4
Johnson and Reynolds had similar ideas about nature; 
differences can be attributed to the nature of their media, 
and to Johnson's strong emphasis on human nature--his 
defiance of the established rules--as well as Reynolds's 
acceptance of them. Some points in common are very general, 
and to some extent can be seen in several writers of the 
period. The similarities between these two are striking 
because they each use almost the same illustrations to prove 
their points: they recognized: (1) the general and the
particular in nature, assigning the major value to the 
general in artistic representation, (2) a basic dualism in 
human nature between the judgmental and the emotional, and 
the need to cultivate the judgmental in order to appreciate 
the general in nature and in art, (3) the critical 
method of evaluating the categories, or hierarchies of the
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arts as reflections of nature, and (4) "artificial" nature 
o f the arts.
As we have seen, John Dennis wrote that there is 
nothing in nature that is great without rule and order.
His ideas of nature are stated clearly enough that they can 
be ordered almost entirely on the basis of one source. In 
The Advancement and Reformation of Poetry we can see that 
Dennis's categories of nature roughly correspond to those 
of Reynolds and Johnson: the material world and its pattern
(rule), called the larger universe; the nature of art which 
is founded upon the material world; the nature of man. Of 
these, art and man are copies of the larger universe.
I. The larger universe
1. The pattern or law of the universe
2. Regularity in the visible world
3. Irregularity in the visible world
II. Art as a copy of the larger universe
4. The pattern of art, rules and genres
5. Regularity in art, which follows the rules
6. Irregularity in art, which does not follow 
the rules (bad art)
III. Nature of man
7. The guiding pattern of behavior, reason
8. Behavior which follows the pattern of reason
9. Behavior which does not follow reason's pattern
Dennis's theory of art and nature is so succinctly
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stated in one paragraph from the Advancement that his
definitions one through nine are easily discernable.
(The paragraph begins with the two quotes at the beginning
of this chapter.)
Now Nature, taken in a stricter Sense, is nothing 
but that Order and Rule, and Harmony, which we 
find in the visible Creation. And the little World, 
which we call Man, owes not only its Health and 
Ease, and Pleasure, nay, the Continuance of its 
very Being, to the Regularity of the Mechanical 
Motion, but even the Strength too of its boasted 
Reason, and the piercing Force of those aspiring 
Thoughts, which are able to pass the Bounds that 
circumscribe the Universe. As Nature is Order and 
Rule, and Harmony in the Visible World, so Reason 
is the very same throughout the invisible Creation.
For Reason is Order, and the result of Order. And 
nothing that is Irregular, as far as it is Irregular, 
ever was, or ever can be either Natural or Reasonable. 
Whatever God created. He designed it Regular, and as 
the rest of the Creatures, cannot swerve in the least 
from the eternal laws pre-ordained for them, without 
becoming fearful or odious to us, so Man whose Mind 
is a law to itself, can never in the least transgress 
that Law, without lessening his Reason, and debasing 
his Nature.^5
Art, he wrote, should imitate the order of nature, for order 
has made things beautiful, and the cessation of order would 
bring c h a o s . A r t  must also be reasonable in the sense 
of its function in society. If it is detrimental to that 
society it is unreasonable, and thus, contemptible. Dennis, 
for example, thought that the opera was a pernicious form 
of art which would have an adverse effect on ma n ’s behavior. 
A large part of the Essay on Public Spirit (].711) was 
devoted to the extravagance of the Itallianate opera; he 
censured the opera on several grounds in his Essay on the 
Opera (17 06).
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The object-oriented attitude of Dennis'è structure 
and theory of nature and art is more obvious and more orderly 
than either Johnson's or Reynolds's. Dennis stated that 
the "little worlds" of man and the arts are but copies of 
nature "in the stricter sense." The outline sketch does 
not show, however, the apparently subjective element which 
can be detected in his major works, the element of the sub­
lime. His high regard for the sublime was so noted in his 
own time that he was dubbed "Sir Tremendous Longinus" by 
his contemporaries. Dennis thought that the imitation of 
religious topics would elicit the emotions of awe, wonder, 
and astonishment. The sublime, though, is not an aesthetic 
mode apart from beauty, but rather a higher form of beauty; 
and, like beauty, it is found in the subject matter, that 
is, in the object which receives artistic attention. The 
idea of the sublime as a mode distinct from beauty, and 
having a different cause than beauty, as well as a different 
effect, lies just below the surface of his critical attitude; 
it was left to Addison to expressly state that different 
emotions can be attributed to aesthetic causes.
Although Dennis and Pope quarreled on personal and 
critical matters, their ideas about art and nature were 
very similar. Pope's philosophical ideas were much more 
complex than Dennis's probably because his interests were 
broader, (extending into architecture, gardening, philosophy) 
and his genius was brighter. Pope's system of nature was
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built on a well defined metaphysical structure and supported 
in part by various ideas drawn from Leibniz's "best of all 
possible worlds" in the moral sense, Hobbes's and Mandes ville ' s 
philosophies of society, and Bolingbroke's political ration­
ale.^^ Pope's Essay on Man is a virtual laboratory for the 
study of early eighteenth-century ideas of nature; the first 
fourteen examples in the following outline were drawn from 
this source alone; numbers fifteen through eighteen come 
from the Essay on Criticism. Because Pope's use of the con­
cept of nature was so important in his criticism, other 
methods of categorization are possible, and some applica­
tions may have been overlooked. The first, second, and 
fifth classes correspond to the previous examples of
Hogarth, Reynolds, Johnson, and Dennis; the third and fourth
are unique to Pope. The lines from which the ideas are 
drawn are indicated in parenthesis, along with Epistle 
number where applicable, followed by the words man or




1. A pattern which functions as a whole and 
operates by general laws, implying the 
order of the physical world (I, 6, 60, 146,
Man); a plentitude with all possible 
positions filled— the Great Chain of Being 
Cl, 33, Man); the best of all possible systems 
whose order is maintained by strife (I, 168- 
172, Man)
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2. A conscious principle in charge— God; a 
purposive intent of nature (ll, 175-202) Man); 
nature acting by laws toward an end (III,
1-2, Man)
3. A universal moral pattern (I, 168-172, Man)
B. The physical order
4. Mother nature as a wild garden full of
plagues, earthquakes, etc. (I, 7-8, 155,
Man); self sustaining and plentitudinous 
(TIT, 15-26, 42-48, Man)
5. Generator of life, animate and inorganic 
(I, 131-140, Man)
II. Human nature; non-material nature
6. What is usually characteristic on man, 
e.g., flawed (I, 36, Man); sufficiently 
perfect (I, 70, Man); hopeful (I, 95, Man); 
too much knowledge (II, 5, Man)
7. Passions and drives in the sense of a
Divine plan (II, 112-120, Man); natural 
drives of self-love, sex-love, race-love 
(III, 131-134, Man)
8. Moral nature, determined by his position 
in the Great Chain (I, 205-210, Man)
III. Original and present states of nature
9. Man before socialization, in which state 
all creation lived without strife (III, 
147-161, Man)
10. Artificial, unnatural; present social 
state in the sense that man-created insti­
tutions are unnatural (III, 151, 169,
Man)
11. Naturalness of the present social state in 
that it is a copy (although a poor one) of 
the original (number nine)--(III, 283-300,
Man)
IV. Organic nature
12. Societal growth hinted at in the origin of 
societies, a philosophy of society and his- 
story (III, 199-302, 277-278, Man)
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V. Mimetic pattern for art and for man 
À . Behavioral
13. A physical pattern to follow for 
socialization (III, 171-198, Man)
14. A moral pattern to be imitated 
(I, 205-210, Man)
B . Artis tic
15. Nature as a pattern for artistic imita­
tion; the average as decided by concensus 
gentium (68-69, 297-298, Criticism)
16. A set of rules which summarize nature 
(88-89, Criticism)
a. Genres (323, Criticism)
b. Modes of expression (345-373, Criticism)
17. The ancients as a summarization of nature 
(135-140, Criticism)
18. A moral pattern for art (559 et passim. 
Criticism)
Pope’s interest in philosophy obviously affected his 
critical attitude, making it much more complex than any 
previously outlined. His orientation, however, was as 
object oriented as Dennis's and Reynolds's. Pope and Dennis 
both saw the cosmological order as a pattern for imitation 
by man and art. Beauty is intrinsic in nature's order and 
its determinable principles; beauty and the principles of 
nature exist as a rule or pattern whcih can be "seen" with 
the understanding. It is not directly observable as Ho­
garth's "S" line, but it is just as real as a principle of 
art.
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Charles Avison’s idea of nature is also based on a
pattern, the pattern of harmony. Avison's system, however,
is so eclectic that his idea of nature comes very close to
Hogarth’s: the emphasis is on the sound as it is represented
in harmony, melody and expression rather than on the har-
70monic pattern of the universe which music imitates.
The musician composes with actual sounds and blends them 
into patterns of melody and harmony, which when fortuituously 
combined, create musical expression. The principles of 
melody and harmony are as physically understood as the "S" 
curve.
Avison made a distinction between expression and
imitation; imitation is the representation of things or
symbols, such as a division of "half a dozen bars on the
word divide." This practice is frowned upon because it
"diverts the attention from the purpose of expression.
Expression is a mixture of airs and harmony which elevates
7 2our thoughts and gives pleasure. We see further that
73expression is based on harmony and air. Music, though
limited in its mimetic capacity, that is other than its 
ability to imitate the harmonic patterns inherent in nature, 
can imitate sound and motion.
Without the two introductory essays, "On the Force and
Effects of Music," and "On the Analogies between Music and 
Painting" Avison's system would be as simple as Hogarth's.
The first essay shows considerable influence of a subject
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orientation; Avison wrote, for example, that man possesses 
an internal sense of harmony, and a principle of sympathy 
which operate in a manner reminiscent of Hutcheson and 
Gerard. The second essay on music and painting discusses 
the relationship of the two arts to empirical nature. The 
third section which comprises the major portion of the 
Essay is devoted to an object-oriented analysis of music 
based on the application of a fixed standard of the science. 
In many ways the three divisions of the work cannot be 
integrated into a compatible whole because some of the ideas 
are contradictory. Thus, the second and third sections 
stand in opposition to the attitude of the first section. 
Avison's system is based on an implied understanding of 
a geometrically patterned universe.
I. Empirical nature
1. Nature experienced through the senses
2. The geometric pattern of the universe
II. Art as a representation of the empirical universe
3. Defective compositions
4. Art as a representation of the patterns 
appropriate for their media: harmony 
and melody, color and design
III. Human nature
5. A sense which appreciates harmony (and etc.)
6. The physical senses
Because Avison was not interested in a philosophical 
order of the universe, the structure of "empirical nature"
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is drawn largely from inference and not direct statement.
The sources of beauty, he wrote, are melody, harmony, and 
expression; their operations are by a fixed standard inherent 
in the nature of music, and the misuse of any, or the im­
balance of one over another, will result in an imperfect 
7 5composition. A discussion of the internal sense of
harmony is found in the first essay; Avison’s intent seems 
to be that there is a difference between this sense and 
the ability to hear sounds,
The general idea of nature expressed by Hogarth, 
Reynolds, Johnson, Pope, Dennis, and Avison had in common 
a fixed principle which can be discovered by reason and the 
observation of empirical nature. Each of these interpre­
tations of nature was offered with the express understanding 
that the artist was to imitate the beauty he finds, 
whether it is in a pattern, an ideal combination of parts, 
or in the physical material itself.
Ill
Imitation and method (or the means of imitation) are 
the two basic concepts for the object orientation; they 
involve an intelligent observation of nature (Just defined) 
and a set procedure of artistic representation which is 
determined by the "type” or mode of nature the critic 
had in mind. First an examination of the characteristic 
structure of an object-oriented work is in order, followed
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by a look at the concepts of beauty upon which structure 
is based, and at imitation as a means of achieving beauty 
in art. Finally, characteristic attitudes toward rules 
and genius will be discussed.
The second clue to an object orientation (the first 
was the definition of nature) is the structure of the 
criticism,since object-oriented analysis tends to be organiz­
ed on the basis of the elements of the arts under con­
sideration. The obvious reason for this kind of emphasis 
is that the elements of the arts represent an application of 
the rules, the method of imitation. And the rules are a 
short cut, an established method for the observations of 
nature which have been made over the centuries. Thus, the 
unities of time, place, and action, among other rules in 
drama, color and line in painting, and harmony and melody 
in music are fundamental to the object-oriented attitude 
in criticism.
Dryden, as we have seen, compared the elements of 
poetry and painting--congruity and conception, expression 
and coloring, and invention. Harris and Avison devoted 
large sections of their essays to the similarities of the 
elements of the arts. Reynolds drew several analogies 
between poetry and painting. In writing of invention, 
which is an important ingredient of all the arts under 
various names. Pope called it one of the tres partes of 
p o e t r y . W a r r e n  writes that Pope applied the term inven-
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tion in its Aristotelian sense of "to find" or "to dis­
c o v e r . T h e  object of Pope's discovery was the pattern 
in nature; thus, invention is the observation and imita­
tion of nature in a very special sense as opposed to 
making up one's own pattern. Pope's invention obviously 
corresponds to Reynolds's conception and Johnson's invention, 
all are used to indicate one of the fundamentals of art. 
Language and versification are the two other parts of poetry 
which concern Pope. These two elements are of utmost 
importance to his poetic theory, for they are ultimately
based on the patterns he found in nature and in art, the
79imitation of nature. Both of these are elaborated on in
the Essay on Criticism and the Preface to the Illiad.
Dennis, like Dryden and Pope, based his literary
criticism on the structural elements of the art. The
important element to him was the subject matter, that is,
the object of imitation. In the Advancement he wrote that
the success of a literary work depends on its subject
rather than some external influence such as time period,
80geography, climate, or location. It is the subject which
provides the opportunity for the poet to express passion—
the subject, rather than the imagination of the poet, is
great. Dennis defined a poem as "an Imitation of Nature, by
a pathetic and numerous Speech [which is] more Passionate
81and Sensual than Prose." The passion (not ordinary passion, 
but enthusiasm) is in the poem by reason of its subject; it 
is not necessarily in the mind of the poet, who indeed
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merely transfers it from the subject to the art through 
the observation of the rules. The rules are, as for 
Reynolds, an accumulation of hundreds of years of observa­
tions of nature.
Although Johnson was critical of the traditional 
rules, his aesthetic interpretation is object oriented.
He advised the artist to follow general nature--the same 
general nature Reynolds wrote of, the average of empirical 
nature. In the Preface to Shakespeare Johnson based his 
analysis of the plays on character depiction, development 
of the story, propriety of the genres, and representation 
of general nature, that is, a valid representation of human 
nature in sentiment and motivation sans pecularities and 
particularities. In the criticism of Shakespeare Johnson 
spoke of faults and excellencies; the faults are seen to 
be in the art— the narration, speeches, plots and unities.
James Harris's observations, as pointed out in a 
previous chapter, were based on the limitations and ad­
vantages of the various media to render an accurate 
imitation of ideas and things. Thus, he directed his 
attention to motion, sound, color and figure as they are 
received by the senses and reproduced in the arts. The 
delight of the senses, however, is Aristotelian rather 
than Lockean, for delight is founded on the mimetic 
qualities of the arts and not a train of ideas. The use 
of symbols to elicit ideas is an important factor in
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Harriss criticism,as it is on this principle that he
8 2ranked poetry as the highest of the individual arts.
Avison made comparisons of the arts similar to 
Dryden's and Harris's, Indeed, he quoted Harris several 
times in his footnotes. His parallels, like their's, 
were based on the structure of the arts. Both music and 
painting are "founded in geometry"; in both, excellence 
depends on design, coloring, melody, harmony, and expression, 
Although he devoted the first section of his book to 
subject-oriented analysis of the effects of music, his 
basic work, section two on the parallels of music and paint­
ing, and parts two and three on expression in music are 
addressed to the importance of balance between the three 
fundamentals of harmony, melody, and expression. The work 
is not as technical as many musical treatises tend to be 
because his basic concern was the general principles of the 
art rather than the particular techniques of the musician.
In the plastic arts Hogarth, Reynolds and Jonathan 
8 3Richardson spoke to the fundamentals of line, coloring, 
composition, and form. Hogarth's analysis is as close to 
a purely object-oriented perspective as can be found in the 
eighteenth century. Reynolds had been strongly influenced 
by the consideration of the subject's reaction to the 
material. Yet, for Reynolds, the subject's response is 
gaur d largely by what is contained in the art rather than 
by what he brings to the art from his own experiences and 
background. In Reynolds's sys tem if Llie subject or the
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artist, does temper his judgment with personal opinions, 
which may be irratic and enthusiastic, his judgment is 
incorrect and in bad taste. Ideas about the central form 
and general nature, not individual and particular notions, 
constitute the basis of judgment. Although this critic 
and artist put considerable emphasis on coloring, com­
position, and clothing, among other details, (which he would
prefer to leave to the teachers in the A c a d e m y ) , h e  put
8 5his major emphasis on the "grand conception." This con­
ception is similar to Pope's and Johnson's use of invention; 
it is also based on the observations of general nature. And 
like Pope, Reynolds found that general nature is expressed 
by "those rules of old discover'd, not devis'd." Both 
Reynolds and Pope wrote of that "nature methodiz'd", the 
traditionally accepted method of expression, the rules. 
Hence, all of these object-oriented critics structured their 
theories on the elements and fundamentals of the arts, which 
reflected the reasonableness and regularity of nature.
IV
The definition of nature and the structure of 
criticism are basic elements of an object-oriented 
aesthetic statement. We have seen that nature, for the 
object-oriented author, is a static, reasonably under­
standable pheonoraenon into which man fits as an integral 
part. Because the crucial aesthetic mode, beauty, is to 
be found in nature, it is an unchanging, universal
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principle which can be discovered and appreciated because 
there is in man's basic nature a capacity for learning 
and the use of reason. Since nature had been observed 
over the hundreds of years represented by an accumulation 
of artistic products, and has been systemized into a set 
of generally accepted rules, critical analysis in the 
object-oriented perspective tended to judge the arts by 
the standard of these rules. Within this framework the 
critic found certain concepts necessary to his analysis-- 
beauty, training, imitation, taste, and the purpose, or 
definition of art.
Of all the critics considered thus far in this chapter 
as representative of the object orientation, none had made 
a truly clear distinction between the aesthetic modes of 
beauty and sublimity. For the two authors who fitted the 
sublime into their systems, Dennis and Reynolds, the sub­
lime retained the traditional definition of a style, and 
a higher mode of beauty. Yet both of these critics were 
definitely moving in the direction of a theory of the 
sublime. We will look at Reynolds's ideas closely because 
his object-oriented criticism was typical of all object- 
oriented attitudes in this period, and because both of the 
other orientations had an effect upon his ideas. His Dis­
courses provide excellent material for a study of these 
influences because they were formal statements of critical 
system which were delivered at regular intervals over a 
period of several years. Thus, we can see definite changes
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between the first and the last addresses.
Reynolds referred several times in the Discourses
to the Sublime style, Grand Gusto, taste, and the Grand
Style. Taken in context, all of these refer generally
to the same thing, a superior style brought about by the
' 8 6artist's "grand conception." Reynolds did not separate 
the sublime and the beautiful into aesthetic experiences 
based on different emotions as his friend Burke had done.^^ 
Reynolds did show the influence of Burke's theory, however, 
especially in his discussions of the emotional effects of 
the virtues and faults of the two giants, Michalangelo 
and Raphael. We will see that his attitude about these 
two artists changed over the years as his concept of the 
sublime matured and as the value he placed on the sublime 
in art gradually took precedence over the value of beauty.
Reyno 1 ds's idea of beauty corresponded to his idea of 
nature because he felt that the purpose of art was to copy 
nature, and that beauty resided in nature. For each of 
Reynolds's definitions of nature, there was a similar 
definition of beauty; beauty is in the central.form ; it is 
in the generic type; it is in the idea in the artist's 
mind; it is in the nature of mind which appreciates the 
congruent and the beautiful. Reynolds's idea of the sublime 
emerged from the combination of the style grand gusto and 
the "idea" in the artist's mind. The grand gusto moves the 
passions, fires the imagination; the artist's idea
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eventually became an energy in Reynolds's system, similar 
to Shaftesbury's creative force.
Three representative statements taken from the Dis­
cours es over a period of time demonstrate the change in 
attitude toward the roles and definitions of beauty and 
sublimity in art. In the first, beauty can be seen to be 
the leading principle of art; the second passage also praised 
beauty, but with considerable warmth and emphasis on the 
fact that it is in the artist's imagination; in the third 
passage he boldly proclaimed his preference for the sublime.
This idea of the perfect state of nature, which the 
artist calls the Ideal Beauty, is the great leading 
principle, by which the works of genius are c r e a t e d . 88
The art which we profess has beauty for its object; 
this it is our business to discover and to express; 
but the beauty of which we are in quest is general 
and intellectual;it is an idea that exists only in 
the mind; the sight never beheld it nor has the hand 
expressed it; it is an idea residing in the breast 
of the artist.89
The sublime in painting, as in Poetry, so over­
powers, and takes such a possession of the whole 
mind, that no room is left for attention^ to minute 
criticism. . . . The correct judgment, the purity
of taste, which characterize Raphaelle,[sic] the 
exquisite grace of Correggio and Parmegiano all 
disappear before them [ the great ideas of Michelangelo, 
which are sublime].90
Lifted from the context these words seem to indicate 
that Reynolds contradicted himself; yet, he did not have 
to admit that there had been a substantial change in his 
attitude over the years. The sublime was originally 
submerged as an attribute of beauty since it was contained 
in the object, and at the same time it was in the idea in
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the artist's mind since this was an abstract of the ob­
ject. When the sublime emerged later as an idea or force 
in the artist's mind, it could easily be confused with the 
idea of the abstract, the general.
Beauty, as Reynolds defined it in the first few 
discourses, is the abstract of nature which is derived from
a generalization of all particular forms of physical nature;
9 1that abstract is called the central form. Beauty is also
a generic type which is more specific than the central
form. The Apollo and the Gladiator are generic types; a
combination of these forms, along with numerous others— an
abstract of all possible types--is the central form.
The potentially dynamic element of Reynolds concept
of beauty was the idea which exists in the artist's mind.
In the third discourse we see that this "idea" is both
the central form and the abstract.
Thus, it is from a reiterated experience, and a 
close comparison of the objects in nature, that
an artist becomes possessed of the idea of that
central form. . . .9 2
Eventually, however, that idea became infused with an
energy, which bordered on being a creative force. Reynolds's
recognition of the creative power of Michelangelo is seen
in the fifth discourse.
Michaelangelo's works have a strong, peculiar 
character; they seem to proceed from his own mind 
entirely, and that mind so rich and abundant, that he 
never needed, or seemed to disdain, to look abroad 
for foreign help.93
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Finally, he wrote of Michelangelo's conception in the
last discourse:
Turn your attention to this exalted Founder and 
Father of modern Art, of which he was not only 
the inventor, but which, by the devine energy of 
his own mind, he carried at once to its highest 
perfection.94
The energy of the artist's mind is beauty in one of 
its forms, and it is also the emerging idea of the sublime. 
The concept shows the influence of a subject orientation 
because of Reynolds's continuing emphasis on the effects 
produced in the viewer, but it also had an overtone of the 
creator orientation because of the divinity and the powers 
of the artist as a creator in his "own mind," independent 
of "foreign help".
The general tone of the early discourses tells the 
reader that the principal concern of the artist is to dis­
cover beauty in nature and to convey it to the viewer.
Beauty is a fixed quality which is discovered by the judg­
ment and reason of the artist, and it is appreciated by the 
connoisseur in the same manner. This concept is emphatically 
reiterated in the seventh discourse.
We will take it for granted that reason is some­
thing invariable and fixed in the nature of things . . .
whatever goes under the name of taste, which we can 
fairly bring under the dominion of reason, must be 
considered as equally exempt from change. If 
therefore, in the course of this inquiry we can 
show that there are rules for the conduct of the 
artist which are fixed and invariable, it follows, 
of course, that the art of the connoisseur, or in 
other words, taste, has likewise invariable p r i n c i p l e s .^5
The sublime, on the other hand, is founded on emotion.
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and does not flow directly from reason. When the sublime
emerged as an important element of Reynolds's criticism,
he modified the role of reason saying that it is reason
which tells us to give way to emotion.
Reason, without doubt, must ultimately determine 
everything at this minute it is required to inform 
us when that very reason is to give way to feeling.
The great end of all those arts is, to make an 
impression on the imagination and the f e e l i n g .96
The change from the dominance of reason to the dominance 
of feeling is clearly seen in the final statement of his 
preference for the powerful effects on the mind generated 
by Michaelangelo's art. At the beginning of his critical 
career Reynolds was ambivalent about the relative merits 
of Raphel and Michelangelo, but expressed a reserved pre­
ference for the former, probably because the traditional
9 7taste preferred his elegant beauty. In critical terms 
Raphael stood for the classical adherence to the rules, the 
use of judgment and the representation of beauty. Although 
the idea of sublimity had been applied to both artists when 
the sublime was thought to have been a superior beauty, 
Michelangelo gradually came to represent the idea of sub­
limity, great faults, and the particular and personal state-
9 8ment over the general idea.
Thus it was that Reynolds's idea of beauty, founded 
on a rational., invariable principle of nature, discovered 
by the artist's reason, clearly an object-oriented inter­
pretation, gradually took on nuances of the subject and
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creator orientations. Yet, the total impact of the Dis­
courses does not suffer from the change, for Reynolds still 
believed the artist's training through experience, his 
contact with a nature characterized by fixed and invariable 
principles, and his knowledge of other artists' work would 
produce a superior art. And he still used the same critical 
vocabulary in the nineties that he had used in the fifties; 
the difference lies in the emphasis and subtle changes in 
definitions. The third stage of the artist's development 
was the phase that Reynolds dwelt on for the twenty-one 
years he addressed the Academy; his final statement is 
similar to the original passage in the third discourse where 
he had introduced the program.
When the student has been habituated to that grand 
conception of the Art, when the relish for this style 
is established, makes a part himself, and is woven 
into his mind, he will by this time, have got a 
power of selecting from whatever occurs in nature that 
is grand, and corresponds with that taste which he 
has now acquired.99
Dennis, who also spoke of the sublime, found it in
the object, which is actually in the nature of things--an
underlying truth or pattern--and in the style, or the
artistic representation of that truth in nature. In the
Advan cemen t Dennis tells us that the sublime is an element
in the art which produces an emotion in the audience.
Thus we have shewn, that Enthusiasm flows from the 
Thoughts, and consequently, form the Subject 
from which the Thoughts proceed. . . . Now no
subject is so capable of supplying us with Thoughts 
that necessarily produce these great and strong 
Enthusiasms, as a Religious S u b j e c t . 1^0
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Several emotions are given which arise from the sublime
S u b j e c t ,  and t h e s e  a r e  more p o w e r f u l  than o r d i n a r y  e m o t i o n s -
they are called enthusiasm.
For all which is great in Religion, is most exalted 
and amazing; all that is joyful, is transporting; 
all that is sad, is dismal; and all that is terrible, 
is astonishing.tOl
The fact that there was a distinction made between ordinary
emotion and aesthetic emotion led Honk to state that Dennis's
treatise contained the earliest theory of the sublime in 
102England. Dennis attempted to discover what it is in the
art that leads to an emotional reaction in the viewer; he 
looked for that principle in the subject matter rather than 
in a general principle in the mind as Burke was to do years 
later.
Monk writes that Dennis was definitely out of harmony
with the prevailing temperment of his time with regard to
the convention of poetry because of his strong emphasis on
the emotional rather than the intellectual content of 
103poetry. Yet, Dennis never clearly distinguished
between the beautiful and the sublime in terms of the
origin of those emotions in a principle of human nature,
or in terms of aesthetic modes or qualities; the sublime
was actually the highest beauty and therefore caused the
104greatest emotions. All beauty for Dennis is founded in
nature, and it is characterized by regularity, rule, and 
h a r m o n y . I t  is dependent on the rules of art which 
arise from the observations of nature and the sacred
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subjects inherent in nature. In the Grounds of Criticism
Since therefore 'tis for want of knowing by what 
Rules they ought to proceed, that Poetry is fallen 
so low, it follows then that it is by the laying 
down of those Rules alone, that can reestablish 
it. . . . Besides, the work of every reasonable
Creature must derive its Beauty from Regularity; 
for Reason is Rule and Order, and nothing can be 
irregular either in our Conceptions or in our Actions, 
any further than it swerves from Rule, that is, from 
Reason,lOG
This cosmological aesthetic system Dennis had devised
demanded that man discover God’s law and follow it in
behavior and in art.
As Man is the more perfect, the more he resembles 
his Creator; the Works of Man must needs be more 
perfect, the more they resemble his Maker's. Now 
the Works of Man, tho infinitely various, are 
extremely regular.10?
The emerging concept of the sublime in aesthetics 
apparently had a considerable effect on the criticism of 
Reynolds and Dennis. While beauty was the mode which was 
traditionally discovered by the poet and artist in nature, 
the sublime, because of its implications of feeling and 
great emotion, turned the critic’s attention to the nature 
of the mind and its capacity to be affected by art. Both 
Reynolds and Dennis, however, adhered to the classicist's 
position that the goal of art is to mirror true nature, and 
not to reflect the artist's personal concept of it. A 
truly subject-oriented position takes the artist's dis­
tortion of nature into consideration since his impressions 
are peculiar to the association he has built up in his
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experiences. The distortions of Michelangelo's mind which 
contained the energy Reynolds wrote of contain an element 
of a subject-oriented perspective, but Reynolds's system could 
not support any further development of the idea without 
becoming very eclectic and disorganized. Dennis emphasized 
the subjective character of emotions, yet retained the 
classical object-oriented view that art is based on an 
unalterable principle in nature.
Beauty as a discernable principle in nature was an
important aesthetic mode for the other critics mentioned
in this chapter. Although Pope and Johnson had little to
say about beauty per se, it was implicit in their criticism.
Johnson's concept of the general as opposed to the particular
is identical to that of Reynolds. In Rasselas Johnson's
hero says that the artist is not to enumerate the stripes
of the tulip, but to convey the idea, the beauty of it in a
general description.
The business of a poet, said Imlac, is to examine 
not the individual, but the species; he does not 
number the streaks of the tulip, nor describe the 
different shades of tfhe verdure of the forest.^®®
General human nature was of much more concern to 
Johnson than general physical nature. His opinions of art, 
beauty, and nature are integrally tied to his conceptions 
of truth, virtue, and the final goal of art, to instruct 
by pleasing. To search for solid statements about beauty 
in art or in nature leads the reader back to virue, human 
nature, and the idea that man tends to be influenced by
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what he observes in nature and the arts. In an essay on
fiction he wrote:
It is justly considered as the greatest excellency 
of art, to imitate nature; but it is necessary to 
distinguish those parts of nature, which are the 
most proper for imitation: greater care is still 
required in representing life, which is so often 
discolored by passion, or deformed by wickedness.109
Beauty, then, is the potential of nature, and not the actuali­
zation of it. Deformities are not only wickedness and 
certain passions, they are also the particular habits and 
customs' that mark groups of men.
The truth and beauty in nature is the general pattern 
of behavior in its most virtuous aspects. In his criticism 
of Shakespeare, Johnson wrote that this poet had bypassed 
the particular in favor of the general in nature. Johnson 
also criticized Shakespeare for too much unnecessary wicked­
ness and vice: "he sacrifices virtue to convenience, and
is so much more careful to please than to instruet."^
Johnson was aware of the newly emerging principle of 
the sublime as a distinct experience from beauty, His 
familiarity with his friend Burke's publication is reflected 
in Rasselas :
Whatever is beautiful, and whatever is dreadful, 
must be familiar to his [the artist's] imagination: 
he must be conversant with all that is awfully vast, 
or elegantly little,HI
However, this refinement had little effect on Johnson’s
critical attitude toward beauty and sublimity as distinct
aesthetic modes. His attention was focused on truth.
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nature, and virtue into which both of these qualities 
were submerged as one. The emphasis on virtue and in­
struction laid a great responsibility upon the poet: he 
was expected to be familiar with all of nature and "modes
of life," his character was to be an in terpreta tor of nature
112and a legislator of mankind.
Like Johnson, Pope thought of beauty in terms of
nature and the art which was to mirror it; and like him
also, he made no real distinction between the aesthetic
modes of beauty and sublimity. Pope was influenced by
113Longinus through Boileau. But that source had a very
different effect on Pope's criticism than it had on Dennis's 
Dennis made the issue of the emotional and religious 
experiences central to his criticism; Pope made wit, natural­
ness, ease of expression and thought central to his criticism, 
Pope was interested mainly in style--the art of poetry--as 
it was reflected by the models of the ancients: Dennis was 
interested in the most beautiful--sub1ime--as it was re­
flected in the subject matter of the ancients. Beauty 
indeed existed in nature for Pope, but the specific methods 
for the expression of beauty are the focal point in much of 
his critical material because he emphasized the idea of 
ordering nature in art. Nature as it appears to the naive 
observer is unorganized, and realizes its reasonable po­
tential only in the expression of the artist: "True Wit
is Nature to advantage dress'd; what oft was thought but 
ne'r so well express'd."^^^ The "beauties" and "graces"
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of the arts are, for the most part, expressed by the artist
through the use of rules and examples set in the past; only
on occasion may the artist step over the limits established 
by tradition.
The pattern of nature, regularity, that Pope advised 
the artist to represent is to be discovered by the study 
of the great examples of art, an opinion similar to
Reynolds's. Reynolds placed a strong emphasis on the direct
observation of nature; Johnson stressed direct observation 
even more strongly than Reynolds. In all three of these 
sub-modes of the object orientation the artist must look 
to nature through the eyes of a number of men, great 
artists, tradition, the consensus gentium.
The word sublime had also entered the vocabulary 
of Jonathan Richardson. He wrote that the word was a 
"wild term" and he wished to tame it; his definition was 
almost identical to Dennis's, that is, the highest beauty.
He also used the sublime to indicate a style as Longinus 
had,^^^ and wrote of a sublime l a n g u a g e . R i c h a r d s o n ,  
then, did not stray from the traditional idea of beauty; 
and like others early in the century merely added a new 
word to his critical vocabulary, not a new concept. Be­
sides sublime, Richardson used grace and greatness to mean
degrees of beauty; neither is clearly defined, although many
118pages are devoted to their place in art.
An object-oriented concept of nature, art, and beauty
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seems to have come very easily to music critics because 
the fundamentals of that art are almost a mathematical 
science. Since the time of Pythagoros the laws of music 
appeared to have been established in the natural order 
of things. It remained for the artist-musician only to 
discover the laws of harmony, melody, and consonance and 
to apply them to tonal compositions. Charles Avison and 
Dr. Charles Burney both had an object-oriented concept of 
beauty and nature. Avison had indeed adopted rhe idea 
of an internal sense which apprecaites the arts, but his 
definition of beauty, the aesthetic mode which drew his 
attention, depended on the science of harmony and the in­
tegration of melody with it. Harmony is equated with geo-
1 1 9metry and gives beauty to the composition. Burney fully
concurred: music is an expression of the order of the
universe by means of its very nature, that is, a science
of ratios which are fixed principles. The ratios are not
invented by man; they exist, and are discovered by him.
Harmony seems a part of nature, much as light 
or heat; and to number any one of them among 
human inventions would be equally absurd. . . .
The ancients by experiments on a single string, 
or monochord, found out the relations and pro­
portions of one sound to another; but the moderns 
have lately discovered that nature . . . had
arranged and settled all these proportions in such 
a manner, that a single sound appears to be com­
posed of the most perfect harmonies. . . .120
The appeal of musical beauty is explained in terms 
Reynolds and Johnson would have approved of.
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Indeed nature seems to have furnished human 
industry with the principles of all science; 
for what is Geometry, but the study of those 
proportions by which the world is governed.121
Human nature is endowed with a principle which appreciates
the beauty of nature and of the arts.
The love of lengthened tones and modulated sounds, 
different from those of speech, and regulated by 
a stated measure, seems a passion implanted in
human nature.122
Burney made no attempt to explore the possibilities of an 
internal aesthetic sense or a psychological principle which 
operates in response to the sound,
Hogarth's understanding of the beauties of nature 
was very similar to that of the musicians just discussed. 
The principle of the "S" surve which is observed in nature 
is infinitely beautiful; it is a scientific endeavour to 
discover evidences of it in natural objects just as the 
geometrician discovers natural relationships, and the 
musician discovers harmonic relationships. Again, human 
nature is so comprised that the appreciation of the beauti­
ful is natural. Hogarth offered the illustrations in 
his Analysis in order that the reader might have a clue as 
to what to look for in nature.
I am persuaded that when the examples in nature, 
referr'd to in this essay, are duly considered and 
examined upon the principles laid down in it, it 
will be thought worthy of a careful and attentive 
perusal: and the prints themselves too will , . ,
be examined as attentively, when it is found that 
almost every figure in them . . .  is refer'd to singly 
in the essay, in order to assist the reader's 
imagination, when the original examples in art, or 
nature, are not themselves before h i m . 123
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In all of these critical examples beauty was the 
important aesthetic quality; for most of these writers, 
the consideration of the sublime was almost non-existent, 
and for some, beauty was hardly mentioned apart from the 
ideas of nature and the natural. The sublime was men­
tioned by Reynolds, Johnson, Dennis, and Richardson. Of 
these, only the first two saw it in the light of a distinct 
aesthetic mode, and neither incorporated it into his 
system. Dennis linked the sublime with great emotion, but 
called it a higher beauty. Richardson identified the sub­
lime as the highest beauty.
V
Nature and beauty were integrally related concepts 
for the object-oriented perspective. Imitation, invention, 
and genius were likewise inseparable ingredients of this 
critical mode. We need to look now at the definitions 
of invention and imitation since they are the means whereby 
a genius makes art. Both terms had several critical mean­
ings in the eighteenth century. Imitation meant both a 
literal copy of nature or of art, and a copy of the general 
idea of nature and of art. Usually imitation implied an 
application of time-tested rules of art. Invention also 
implied the use of traditional methods of rule and ob­
servation. There were various modifications of the mean­
ings of these terms from critic to critic: let us look at
s ome of these.
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In writing of the means of producing good art
invention (and conception) and imitation were used
fairly frequently. The meanings of both were very similar
and had a positive connotation. Imitation as a means of
artistic expression had been discussed and promoted by
critics from the time of Aristotle's Poetics . The rationale
for imitation was provided by Aristotle on the assumption
that it is man's nature to imitate as a natural learning
process; thus, he is pleased with it in the imitative arts.
Poetry in general seems to have sprung from two 
causes, each of them lying deep in our nature.
First, the instinct of imitation is implanted in 
man from childhood, one difference between him and 
the other animals being that he is the most imita­
tive of all living creatures, and through imitation 
learns his earliest lessons, and no less universal 
is the pleasure felt in things i m i t a t e d . ^24
Since imitation is the major means of art, the closer the
copy is to the original, the more the mind will be pleased 
12 5with it.
Wittkower has discovered four modes of imitation which
had been developed by critics up to the end of the eighteenth
century: (.1) direct imitation, (2) imitation of parts,
C3) imitation of the masters, and (4) imitation of the
artist's imagination. The "direct imitation of nature"
is what Johnson called "imitation" and Reynolds called
12 7"copying" and "imitation in the vulgar sense." Direct
imitation posed the question of what nature is; Raphael, 
Girgonie, Leonardo, and Giotto were all said to have 
followed nature. Yet each saw it in a different light.
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Direct imitation also suggested an exact imitation of 
nature as it is experienced by the senses; such a procedure 
was almost always condemned. Imitation of other artists, 
Wittkower's second mode, as we shall see, was condemned 
by Johnson and condoned by Reynolds. The third mode, 
imitation of the parts of nature, is a very broad category 
which includes the physical parts referred to by Hogarth 
as the "S" curves, the new combinations referred to by 
Johnson and Pope, Pope's "nature to advantage dress'd," 
and Reynolds's central form. This is the mode of imitation 
to which most object-oriented critics referred. Finally, 
Wittkower's fourth mode, imitation of the imagination of 
the artist, is an idea that appeared in Reynolds's fifteenth 
discourse, as well as in Blake's and Shaftesbury's criticisms 
It conveys an idea of a certain power which the artist draws 
upon in the place of external nature. We will look par­
ticularly at the uses of imitation as it was used by 
Reynolds, Pope, and Johnson.
Copying is a term closely related to imitation and 
invention; it was used with both a positive and a negative 
intent. The term was used by Reynolds to indicate an 
exact replication of what the artist sees in nature or in 
art; it is to be very carefully employed by the artist for 
training purposes only. In learning the uses of color, 
copying is almost useless because of color deterioration 
in older paintings.
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The great use of copying, if it is at all useful, 
should seem to be in learning to colour; yet even 
colouring will never be perfectly attained by 
servilely copying the model before you. . . .  By 
close inspection, and minute examination, you will 
discover, at least, the manner of handling . . . and
other expedients . . .  by which nature has been so 
happily imitated.
Old pictures are often changed by dirt and var­
nish. . . . An exact imitation, therefore, of
those pictures, is likely to fill the student's 
mind with false opinion.128
On the other hand, copying can serve a valuable func­
tion in the training of the artist. Reynolds saw the 
growth of the artist’s ability taking place in three stages 
acquisition of basic skills in drawing, modeling, use of 
colors--skills which he compared to grammar in literature; 
study of the stock of ideas which has been amassed to his 
time through familiarity with great works of art; and a 
final stage in which he must depend upon his own reason 
and judgment, going beyond the examples of the past. Copy­
ing is valuable to the training of the artist in the second
stage of his education. Yet, even at this point, only
129select parts should be chosen for future reference. 
Reynolds's own use of this practice, which he called bor­
rowing in some cases, can be seen in several of his com­
positions where an attitude or a pose was taken from a 
familiar painting and adapted f o r  his own composition.
His use of this technique has been the subject of much 
130controversy.
In music, copying was reserved for the performances
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of written music: the performer literaly copies in sound
what appears in symbol. Avison dealt with this aspect of
131music in a section of expression in performance. Copying
in the sense of representation of natural sounds, such as
Vivaldi's imitation of a dog and other things in the 
132Seasons, and representation of the meanings of symbols
13 3(words) were both condemned.
Servile copying obviously had no place in literature. 
On some occasions imitation was used by Johnson in much 
the same sense that Reynolds used copying. On other 
occasions he used the word in a technical sense to indicate 
an artistic mirroring of general nature. In the Preface to 
Shakes peare Johnson referred to drama as imitations which 
produce pain and p l e a s u r e . H e  also employed the term 
in a third context as a critical word applied to the use of 
certain generic forms of literature such as ode, satire, and 
pindaric. His dictionary definition of this third appli­
cation calls it a "translation looser than paraphrase in
which modern examples are used for ancient, or domestic 
135for foreign." Pope's historical section of the Essay on
Criticism is an imitation of Boileau by this definition.
Generally, however, Johnson had a negative attitude
toward imitation--it was often employed as an antonym of
invention. He did not approve of the imitation of the
ancients in style, form, or content. Ilmac says, "I soon
136found that no man was ever great by imitation." On
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another occasion Johnson wrote, "no man yet ever became 
great by imitation." In this instance he was examining 
the necessity of studying the examples of the past, a task 
which is necessary for the advancement of the arts, but 
which must be undertaken with the understanding that
13 7"invention," not "imitation," is the means of the artist.
If invention and not imitation is to be the artist's
method, the meaning of invent ion must have been clearly
identified in the mind of this eminent lexicographer. Upon
close examination we see that he applied the term in the
same sense that Reynods used imita t ion and grand conception
and that Pope used invent ion. Invention is first of all
rooted in nature. It is the ability to generalize from
human behavior and devise a probable series of events and
a probable dialogue to accompany it.
Among the powers that must conduce to constitute 
a poet, the first and most valuable is invention, 
and of the degrees of invention, the highest seems 
to be that which is able to produce a series of 
events . . .  to strike out the first hints of a new 
fable; hence to introduce a set of characters so 
diversified in their several passions and interests 
that from the clashing of this variety may result 
many necessary incidents; to make these incidents 
surprising, yet natural . . . .138
Another "degree" of invention, also rooted in nature,
is the ability to make characters speak and act as one
would expect persons in similar situations to behave, in
other words, to depict general nature.
Shakespeare has no heroes; his scenes are occupied 
only by men, who act and speak as the reader thinks 
he should himself have spoken or acted on the same
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occasion. It may be said that he has not only 
shown human nature as it acts in real exigencies,
but as it would be found in trials to which it
cannot be exposed.
In these examples an astute observation of nature
is implicit in the meaning of invention. Also implicit is
the farailarity with works of the past; the poet must not
waste time with things that have already have been done.
In R a mb 1er essay Johnson compared the poet with the
scientist who must know what has been tried in order to
improve upon and build his art. The prominant feature of
invention, however, is newness.
No man even became great by imitation. Whatever
hopes for the veneration of mankind must have 
invention in the design or in the execution; 
either the effect itself must be new, or the means 
by which it is produced.140
By newness Johnson did not mean the invention of something 
from nothing. The artist must have the materials of 
experience in his mind, that is, works of other artists 
and a familarity with general and particular nature. New­
ness is the development of unique situations and accompany­
ing interaction. The example of Shakespeare's new use of 
old stories illustrates Johnson's idea.
It is easy when the thread of the story is once drawn 
to diversify it. To tell over and over again a story 
that has been told already and to tell it better 
than the first author is no rare qualification; but 
to strike out the first hints of a new fable . . 
is the utmost effort of the human m i n d . 141
Newness applied also to the ability to offer variation of
a familiar topic, and to use an established artistic form or
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genre in a pleasantly unusual manner.
He [Pope] had invention, by which new trains of 
events are formed and new scenes of iraagrey dis­
played, as in the Rape of the Lock, and by which 
extrinsick and adventitious embelishraents are 
connected with a known subject, as in the Essay on 
Criticism.14 2
It has already been noted that Pope used the word invent ion 
in the sense of to discover. The discovery is similar to 
one of Johnson’s meanings, the realization of general nature.
Imitation was such an important concept to Reynolds 
that he devoted the entirety of two discourses to its
definitions and principles. Three different meanings were
indicated by Reynolds: (1) imitation of general nature, that
is, the parts of nature, (2) imitation of other artists, 
and (3) imitation of the imagination of the artist. In 
the third discourse he addressed the technique of the imi­
tation of general nature; in the sixth he wrote of the 
imitation of other painters; and in the fifteenth he men­
tioned the very radical idea of imitation of the artist's
own (and hence, very personal) imagination. Only the first
and second modes of imitation are a part of his critical 
system; the third mode is an eclectic idea which is not 
supported by his theory o'’ the central form and general 
nature. Thus, he wrote of imitation in the "larger" sense 
and in the "narrower" sense— imitation of the general and 
of the particular.
Let it be observed, that a painter must not only 
be of necessity an imitator of the works of nature.
180
which is alone sufficient to dispel the phantom 
of inspiration, but he mus t be as necessarily an
imitator of the works of other painters; this
appears more humiliating, but is equally true; 
and no man can be an artist, whatever he may sup­
pose, upon any other terms.-43
In the "larger sense" imitation is an artistic render­
ing of general nature; it is this imitation which is the 
topic of the sixth discourse. The term inven tion was em­
ployed in the second, and again in the sixth discourse as
the larger sense of imitation. The fact that Reynolds did 
not consistently use one word can possibly be attributed 
to stylistic variation; it can possible be attributed to 
the unsettled meaning of these critical terms. Reynolds's 
definition of invention was similar to Johnson's.
Invention, strictly speaking, is little more than 
a new combination of those images which have been 
previously gathered and deposited in the memory; 
nothing can come of nothing; he who has laid up 
no materials, can produce no c o m b i n a t i o n s . 144
Art is not brought about by inspiration; it is the 
result of long years of work and s t u d y . S i n c e  it is 
the business of the artist to depict beauty, and beauty 
is not to be found in particular nature, the artist cannot 
copy what he sees. He must generalize from his visual 
experience to arrive at the central form. In doing this 
his artistic process is similar to the one described by 
Johnson: he generalizes from experience to arrive at some­
thing which the eye never has seen, something which is 
possible, but not probable. The character of his imitation 
is a little different from Johnson's invention, however.
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for it is the excellencies of nature that Reynolds
emphasized, not newness in art.
I will now add that Nature herself is not to be 
too closely copied. There are excellencies in 
the art of painting beyond what is commonly 
called the imitation of nature.146
To Reynolds the excellencies and the generalities of nature 
were the same thing; they are both called beauty (the cen­
tral form). They are understood by the artist through 
experience and the use of reason and judgment.
An aid to the artist in discerning the beauties of
nature is the work left by acknowledged masters of the
art. Imitation was advised in its second sense of reference
to other artists. For the artist has a set of rules hy
their example— a short cut to beauty. This mode of imitation
is one of the four discussed by Wittkower. Reynolds seems
to have meant both the imitation of art and of imagination.
His tone in his advice to imitate other artists is an
Indication of the value he placed on this kind of imitation.
Invention is one of the great marks of genius; but 
if we consult experience, we shall find, that it 
is by being conversant with the inventions of 
others, that we learn to invent; as by reading the 
thoughts of others we learn to think.147
Invention and imitation, in the sense of combining 
particulars to discover the general and make new combina­
tions of materials, were important concepts in the subject- 
oriented attitudes of Pope, Reynolds, Johnson, and others. 
This attitude toward the process of artistic "invention" 
was characteristic of the object orientation because the
182
artist had to rely upon the empirical evidence in order to 
discover the nature of beauty. The short cut of rules and 
the understanding of the universality of taste based on 
a fixed standard of beauty was accepted by all object- 
oriented critics, even Johnson. Rules signified the 
rational basis of art, which was founded on the regularity 
of nature, and the rational nature of man, who could dis­
cover and codify that regularity. Familiarity with the 
rules, genres, technical skills and that elusive ability to 
invent characterized artistic genius for these critics. Let 
us look at genius in this context of the application of 
rules.
VI
Dennis believed fully in the value of the rules; one 
of his treatises. The Advancement and Reformation of Poetry, 
proposed to reestablish and improve art through the appli­
cation of the rules which he said has been neglected. His
high regard for the established rules permeated his works
and gave them a distinctive character. He wrote on one 
occasion :
The necessity of observing the Rules, to the 
Attaining a Perfection in Poetry, is so apparent,
that he who will give himself the Trouble of
Reflecting, cannot easily doubt it. Rules are 
necessary in all the inferior Arts, as in 
Painting and N us ic k.l^S
The rules are discovered through reason and are totally
binding on art.
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Poetry, which is an imitation of Nature . . .
can neither have Greatness nor Real Beauty, if 
it. swerves from the Laws which Reason severely 
prescribes it.149
Rules are connected to the moral responsibility of 
art, and prescribe the use of religious topics. Dennis in 
his cosmological aes.thetic, drew a parallel between rule 
and sacred subjects; he wrote, "writing Regularly, is 
writing Morally, Decently, Justly, Naturally, Reasonably." 
Thus are rules and subject commonly identified. The fact 
that the ancients produced better art than the moderns can­
not be attributed to any advantage other than the subjects 
they have treated.
The Writers, who surpass others in the same kinds of 
writings must do it from some internal of external 
Advantage, or from the Subject itself. I shall 
endeavour to shew in the Two following Chapters, 
that the Ancients could not derive their Pre-erainance 
from any internal of external Advantage, and after­
wards we shall proceed to examine whether they de­
riv’d it from the Subjects they treated of.151
Of course, we see that the sacred subject matter of ancient
literature assured its superiority.
Reynolds's attitude toward, rules was more liberal than 
was Dennis's. Like Johnson and Pope, he felt that there was 
a point from which the artist could add to the pool of 
knowledge; this is the creation of new rules through the 
discovery of new combinations. Genius, for Reynolds, was 
founded on the rules. The use of rules in the first two 
stages of the artist’s training is obvious. At the third 
stage of his development, the artist’s imagination can
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exercise its own power, for the rules have become internalized
as an automatic discipline, and the habits of good taste
and observation of nature provide him the foundation for 
152invention.
Johnson thought that the artist should assume a
greater responsibility for his own judgment and rely on the
rules only if they served his purpose. This is a very
rational approach to art, for the artist's own reasoning
power is superior to any rules. He wrote in the Rambler,
Every new genius produces some innovation, which, 
when invented and improved, subverts the rules, 
which the practice of foregoing authors had 
established.^ ̂ ̂
For Johnson rules did not signify general beauty as they did
for Reynolds, but instead they held the implication of
particular taste which has accrued to the tradition of
literary forms, such as the drama. The artist must
transcend this particular in order to express the general,
and in so doing he may see fit to break these expressions of
particular taste which have been accepted by his society.
He must divest himself of the prejudices of, his age 
and country; he must consider right and wrong in 
their abstracted and invariable state; he must dis­
regard present laws and opinions, and rise to general 
and transcendental truths, which will always be the 
same.15 4
Several rules in particular, which applied to the 
drama, received Johnson's attention because they did not 
conform to reason. In defense of Shakespeare he wrote that 
the playwrightwas actually closer to nature and truth when 
he ignored conventions concerning the. unities of time and
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place. Commenting on the development of the conventional 
forms of comedy and tragedy, Johnson noted that these forms 
are not mandatory guides for the poet; they emerged as 
separate styles and are not inherent in nature. In com­
bining the two,Shakespeare is the true witness of nature.
Almost all his plays are divided between serious 
and ludicrous characters, and, in the successive 
evolutions of the design, sometimes produce seri­
ousness and sorrow, and sometimes levity and 
laughter. That this practice is contrary to the 
rules of criticism will be readily allowed; but 
there is always an appeal open from criticism to 
nature.^55
Art forms, wrote Johnson, are artificial, and in 
this opinion he found support for a disavowal of certain 
rules, and support for others. The genius in his "inventions" 
from nature seeks higher truths than opinions and customs. 
Custom had set the standard for drama in the unities; the 
traditional support of the unities was an appeal to the 
possible. Ideally an action should take no longer to 
perform than it would take place in life; thus a "reasonable" 
limit of twenty-four hours was determined to be the absolute 
limit for the action of a play to represent. The audience 
was not expected to believe that those dramatic characters 
could be transformed from one great distance to another, 
or that several days, weeks, or months could be squeezed 
into a couple of hours; thus, the action traditionally 
had to take place in one setting. Johnson felt that the 
artificiality of the art form does not fool the audience 
one minute, and hence the limitations of the imagination
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and probability, rather than time and place, are the
artist's guide for dramatic action.
The truth is that the spectators are always in 
their senses and know, from the first act to 
the last, that the stage is only a stage, and 
that the players are only p l a y e r s . 156
If the story in the artist's conception requires a
lengthy time span, or movement from place to place, it is
the artist's privilege to break with conventions. In this
respect Johnson went beyond as a mirror of nature as it
should be, to nature as it could be.
The artificiality of art forms also supported other
conventions. These are the necessities of the genres in
order that their purposes be attained. Different rules
exist for different forms. The drama, for example, must
have a unified action;^^^ the biography demands that
15 8particularities of the individual be given; letter-
159writing had its necessary form. For someone who was so
critical of rules Johnson could descend into the particulars
of them very easily. Writing on versification he said of
the caesura, or pause in his criticism of Milton,
It may be, I think, established as a rule, that 
a pause which concludes a period should be made 
for the most part upon a strong syllable, as the 
fourth and sixth: but those pauses which only
suspend the sense may be placed upon the weaker.
Each of these object-oriented critics, then, discussed the
fundamentals of the arts in their criticisms. They wrote
about the arts in terms of structure, subject, composition,
and form, rather than in terms of processes of physical
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reaction to it. We will see now that genius was also 
defined in terms of a rational and "regular" form of 
express ion.
VII
Attitudes about the nature of artistic genius are 
closely allied to the identification of the goals of art 
and the means of attaining them. Since art was seen to be 
a copy of something in nature and was based on a universally 
observable principle, an artist could be trained to identify 
that principle, usually beauty, and be trained as well to 
duplicate it. All of the writers thus far considered, 
with the exception of Hogarth, were willing, however, to 
admit that there is something in great art, an unidentifiable 
je ne scai quoi, which cannot be rendered by everyone who is 
so trained in the arts. Hogarth mentioned the je ne scai quoi, 
called it the sublime part, and went on to announce that he 
had identified it in the "S" line.^^^ Johnson thought the 
great artist possessed a greater ability that the average 
person, but that a person of "superior parts" could excel 
equally in any "science." Pope spoke of a "grace beyond the 
reach of art," and Jonathan Richardson mentioned grace and 
greatness in a context which equated them with that unknown 
quality.
Reynolds identified two distinct modes of genius, that
of mechanical performance and a broader category of genius
16 2which is capable of conceiving as a poet or as a painter.
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Without the mechanical skills, the genius in the poetic
16 3sense is just a man with good taste. The skills of
execution are particular to poetry, painting, music, 
criticism, and each of the liberal arts. On this point 
Reynolds's opinion is very different from Johnson's, for 
Johnson believed that a man of superior talents could excel 
in any of the arts. Reynolds's thinking on this issue was 
not substantiated by his general critical system, as was 
his friend's. According to Reynolds, human nature is 
characterized by an ability to order life by reason; all 
the arts are based on reason and experience; thus, the 
artist should be able to «press his genius in any medium in 
which he has been trained.
The idea that genius is specialized is reinforced by 
Reynolds's genre theory; each artist has a capacity for 
expression in certain genres only, and he should not only 
be aware of his limitations, but he should also restrict 
his work to the highest genre his talents will allow. 
Throughout his writing career Reynolds mentioned this 
theme, pointing to the works of Loraine, Canaletto, Dürer, 
and others. The fourteenth discourse was devoted to an 
examination of Gainsborough's genius and limitations.
He felt his own genius was a little short of that required 
by the historical genre, and above that of face painting. 
Thus, his own highest potential was historical portraiture, 
which he called the composite s t y l e , a n d  upon which he 
modeled most of his own work.
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Johnson's genius was no less rational than Reynolds's
even though he was critical of the rules. His definition
of genius was similar in substance to Reynolds's, although
his rationale was very differently phrased. They both
felt that genius was expressed differently at different
times and circumstances. Reynolds said:
But the truth is that the degree of excellence 
which proclaims genius is different, in different 
times and different places; and what shews it to 
be so is, that mankind have often changed their 
opinion upon this matter [beauty
Johnson said in reference to Shakespeare;
Every man's performances, to be rightly estimated, 
must be compared with the state of the age in 
which he lived and with his own particular 
opportunities.1&7
The basis for these statements was not the inconsistency 
of the arts, but rather the conventionalities of them—  
custom, habit, and particular taste--as well as a belief that 
these can inhibit the progress of the arts. It is not 
genius which is inconsistent, for that is a general attri­
bute, but rather the circumstances which are conducive to 
genius. The genius is limited by his circumstances and 
his opportunities, and his ability to observe general nature. 
The substantial difference between these two men on this 
matter was Johnson's belief that genius was of a more 
general nature, and that a man is limited by circumstance 
and not particular bent. Johnson himself was a writer by 
chance; and by inference, Reynolds was a painter and not 
a musician, a portraitist and not an historical painter
.90
by the same quirk of fate.
One man has more mind than another. He may direct 
it differently . . .  I am persuaded that, had 
Sir Issac Newton applied to poetry, he would 
have made a fine epic poem. I could as easily apply 
to law as to tragic poetry . . .  I had not the 
money to study l a w . 1^8
Pope wrote of -the nature of genius in the same gen­
eral terms as Johnson and Reynolds. The two necessary 
ingredients are observation or nature and invention.
Both are founded on the consistency of nature, man's ability 
to discover it, and his need to codify and follow it. A 
clear distinction was made by Pope between two different 
modes of genius; although both are dependent upon the 
observation of nature for their success, the inventive 
genius of Homer is seemingly preferred to the judgmental 
genuus of Virgil.
No Author or Man ever excell'd all the World in 
more than one Faculty, and as Homer has done this 
in Invention, Virgil, has in Judgment. Not to 
think that we are to think Homer wanted Judgement, 
because Virgil had it in a more eminent degree; 
or that Virgil wanted Invention, because Homer 
possessed a larger share of it: Each of these 
great Authors had more of both than perhaps any 
man besides, and are only said to have less in 
Comparison with one another. Homer was the greater 
Genius, Virgil the better Artist.l&9
Here Pope wrote of the two requirements of genius which were
repeated by Reynolds and Johnson, judgment and invention.
Pope's preferences for the invention of Homer over the
judgment of Virgil is an expression of critical prejudice
in favor of Homer, and an evidence of the raaturity of his
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critical ideas between the time of his Essay on Criticism
, „ 170ana tne translation ot Homer.
Intrusions upon a classicist confidence in order, 
rule, and the heavenly harmony can be detected in all but 
one of the object-oriented critics surveyed in this 
chapter. Hogarth alone was absolutely sure of an ordered 
art dependent upon reason for its expression. Into the 
writings of all the others crept a subjectivism in the 
guise of one or another concern: for Dennis it was the 
supreme feeling of the sublime; for Pope it was the 
artistic freedom of poetic license; for Johnson it was an 
admiration for the great non-regular poet Shakespeare and 
an interest in human nature; for Reynolds it was an idea 
of the sublime distinct from beauty and a reluctant aware­
ness of the ensuing implications? for Avison it was a 
feeling of the power of music. Each of these critics 
expressed in some form or another certain aspects of a 
new asesthetic attitude--the full realization of which can 
be seen in the subject-orientation.
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There is perhaps not any real Beauty or Deformity 
more in one piece of Matter than another, because 
we might have been so made, that whatsoever now 
appears loathsome to us, might have shown itself 
agreeable. Addison, 1712.1
With the study of the subject-orientated writers we 
leave the field of traditional literary and artistic 
critics to enter the domain of scientists and philsophers, 
as well as the emerging schools of psychology and economics 
represented by such men as David Hartley, Adam Smith,
Joseph Priestley, Thomas Reid, Edmund Burke, David 
Hume, and Francis Hutcheson, among others. Aesthetic analysis 
for the subject-oriented critic centered on the operations 
of the mind rather than on an object, rule, or tendency 
in nature from which beauty could be discovered and re­
produced, which was the case for the object-oriented 
critic. The difference between these two approaches to 
art entails a major difference in methodology, as we shall 
see later in this chapter. Association of ideas was the 
major principle of human behavior cited by subject- 
oriented writers in this period, which extended from
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Addison in the opening years of the century, to the 
late eighteenth-century Scottish school of common sense.
In order to examine the subject orientation several 
topics will be discussed in this chapter: Cl) some
implications of the subject orientation in terms of 
differences between it and the object orientation, (2) the 
historical origins of the associationalist foundation of 
the subject orientation, (3) an analysis of six typical 
theories in terms of aesthetic systems, accompanied by flow 
charts, (4) the tendency of subject-oriented critical 
definitions to be polarized, and the foundation of these 
definitions in the method of an analysis of pain and 
pleasure, and (5) some problems presented hv this aesthetic 
attitude.
1
The importance of the shift from a focus on the ob­
ject to an analysis of the subject--the audience--in 
aesthetic perspectives lies not only in the major revision 
of methodology, but also in the growing importance placed 
on feeling, or sentiment, over reason in an evaluation of 
the arts. Such a critical position could, and eventually 
did, justify the unusual, the irregular, the bizarre, and 
the emotive in art. However, in the early stages of this 
radical kind of criticism taste in the arts did not deviate
from the accepted norm; contemporary prejudices were merely
2justified on different grounds. Such critics as Reynolds
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and Johnson, who were largely object-oriented classicists, 
frowned on the Gothic and other obviously non-classical 
styles on the basis of their irregularity. Addison, Burke, 
and others were able to justify the irregular on the basis 
of its appeal to the imagination. In their investigation 
of the psychological basis of human motivation, these 
British philosophers almost always included a look into the 
arts; thus, the body of critical tradition became in­
corporated into associational aesthetics.
In the preceding chapter it was pointed out that 
clues to an object-oriented perspective were: (1) an
emphasis on the definition of nature as an aesthetic norm, 
and (.2) an organization of materials based on an investi­
gation of the art object itself in terms of its funda­
mentals, whether they were grammar, design, harmony, or 
other principles. There are also two distinctive features 
of a subject orientation: (1) organization of materials
centers on the definition of human nature, and the work 
usually opens with this consideration, and (2) the principle 
of association of ideas, founded on cause and effect, is 
a central critical assumption. The principle of associa­
tion is accompanied by an assertion that the standard for 
aesthetic taste exists in a physical-psychological response 
to art and to nature, rather than in nature and its re­
flection in art.
The associâtional response was generally accepted
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to be a universal phenomenon which usually followed Locke's 
pain-pleasure dichotomy. Man had become the reference 
point of art in the subject-oriented perspective in place 
of the traditional standard of nature which was character­
istic of an object orientation. Pope's dictum that "nature" 
was "at once the source, the end, and test of art," so 
appropos for the object-oriented attitude, was no longer 
an adequate criterion for criticism. One might say instead 
that "man's response" was the test of art.
Addison's statement at the opening of this chapter is
representative of this new attitude. Most critics writing
in this mode, however, at temp ted to prove that there was
something in matter itself, or in its arrangement, which
caused certain reactions--Addison himself pointed to the
3attraction of the species to their own kind and to harmony 
and symmetry. Karnes asserted that certain qualities in 
things caused an intuitional recognition of their actual 
character.^ Yet most, like Addison, found that principle 
in nature to be very general, and also found response to 
be highly subject to modification by experience, that is, 
to individual association of ideas.^ The central point 
of Addison's statement was that like or dislike, taste, 
of things depended on the condition of the subject, that is, 
the individual variation of sharpness of sense and of 
associations of ideas.
Other key terms and ideas besides the association of
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ideas which characterize a subject-oriented perspective
us, feeling, and sublimity.^ Often subject--
oriented concepts appear as pairs of modes; for example, 
sublimity and beauty, pain and pleasure, natural and 
trained genius, emotion and judgment, and relative and
g
absolute beauty.
There was a marked tendency for some systems in this 
perspective to be mechanistic because the emphasis was on 
the reaction of the subject to aesthetic data received by 
the senses and its interpretation by the mind solely on a 
sensationalistic basis. (Bishop Berkley is an obvious 
exception to this rule.) The general interest for the culti­
vation of taste, an operation of preference for good art 
based on experience, and a refined sensitivity, rescued 
many systems from a heavy mechanistic stamp.
Abrams writes that "pragmatic" critical theories are
ordered toward the audience; he particularly has in mind
9the utilitarian ends of art. A subject-oriented attitude 
is indeed concerned with the utile effect of art on the 
audience, but more specifically it deals with psychological 
and physical response to art as sense data. The subject 
orientation as defined here differs from Abrams^pragmatic 
orientation to the extent that it is seen as a stage in 
the development of critical history rather than as an 
expression of the Aristotelian potential of didacticism.
This stage in the development of aesthetics is character-
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ized by a search for a universal moral rule, an equivalent 
for the law of gravity— a moral gravitation as one his­
torian calls it.^^ Didacticism in the guise of ethics 
became incorporated into aesthetics and criticism for many 
subject-oriented writers as they delved into the questions 
of knowledge, motivation, taste, and morals. The aesthetics 
of Karnes and Hutcheson, for instance, are highly moralistic.
The utilitarian aspect of the arts was also important 
to the object-oriented mode of criticism as we have seen 
in the writings of Dennis, Reynolds, Johnson, and others. 
Many object-oriented critics were influenced to one degree 
or another by subject-oriented theories, not only because 
they had a great concern for the theoretical diadactic 
potentials of the arts, which, as Abrams has pointed out, 
they had inherited with the traditional attitude.
The subject-oriented perspective defined in this 
chapter as a stage of historical development characterized 
by mechanism, empiricism, and as sociationalism is only 
one possible modification of a subjective aesthetic 
attitude. The creator orientation to be taken up in the 
following chapter, and the art orientation mentioned in 
chapter two, are both subjective modifications since their 
aesthetic standards are, like the subject orientation, 
relative to variable factors. The variable factor for the 
subject-oriented mode is individual experience and its 
tendency to have an effect on the interpretation of sense
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data. Such an attitude had the potential to completely
obliterate a solid foundation of aesthetic standards,
leaving one totally without a criterion for good art. Hume
noted this potential, writing,
There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off 
all hopes of success in such an attempt [ to set a 
standard of taste], and prevents the possibility 
of ever attaining any standard of taste. The dif­
ference, it is said, is very wide between judgment 
and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because 
the sentiment has reference to nothing beyond 
itself. . . .12
Hume was only one of many eighteenth-century British philo­
sophers who tried to eliminate as much of the subjective as 
possible by proposing an objective factor in human behavior 
and experience: Hume pointed to the commonality of ex­
perience; Hutcheson postulated his famous moral calculus.
It was pointed out in the second chapter that there 
are two sub-modes of the subject-oriented perspective. The 
basic difference between the two centers around the nature 
of the senses. One attitude is that ideas arise from 
stimuli, and cause opinions without the help of special 
aesthetic or moral senses. The other is that man has a 
special sense to receive moral and aesthetic impressions, 
a sixth sense (or more) which goes beyond the physical 
ones. Burke is representative of the first vein of thought: 
his model man is affected by only the senses of sight, 
hearing, taste, smell, and touch. Kames, on the other hand 
adds the internal moral sense of virtue (and many more 
internal senses) as a basic human faculty.
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The distinction between these two sub-modes, and 
between the objective and subjective modes is made clear 
by Broad who divided theories of perception into two main 
classes: the "naively realistic account" and the "disposi­
tional account." In both modes of perception there is an 
objective correlate and a subjective correlate: in the 
naive account the objective correlate is a quality which 
lies in the object waiting to be experienced by a subject, 
whose subjective correlate is the ability to prehend it. 
Hogarth's and Reynolds's theories are naively realistic 
according to this scheme. In the dispositional account 
the objective correlate is held to be a "certain kind of 
minute structure" of the object, the properties of which 
are not at all prehended by the subject, whose subjective
correlate is then the ability to have sensations of a
13certain kind in response to that object. Associationalistic, 
subject-oriented critical perspectives are of the dis­
positional kind according to Broad's scheme.
The dispositional is again divided into two types, 
which correspond to the two sub-modes defined above: (1) moral
feelings (here aesthetic) are a kind of emotion, or (2) they
are a sensation analogous to taste and smell, but not 
14sight. Addison, Hume, and Burke can be classed as dis­
pos i t i o nal- 1 : Hutcheson, Kames, and perhaps Gerard, can 
be classed as dispositiona1-2. The importance of the dis­
tinction between the dispositional accounts is that in the
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former, beauty may be called an emotion and therefore does 
not call for a special sense to understand it; in the later 
beauty is seen as a secondary quality (analogous to color 
by Locke's definition), and needs a special sense for 
its reception. We will consider these distinctions again 
later.
II
The shift in emphasis from an objective idea of beauty 
based on nature (object orientation) to a subjective idea 
based on a principle of association (subject orientation) 
did not occur overnight in British thought. In order to 
understand the origin of this radically new attitude to­
ward the arts we must look to Hobbes and Locke in the 
seventeenth century ; to understand its first coherent 
statement we must look to Addison. A foundation for an 
empirical, mechanistic and materialistic interpretation 
of experience had been laid in the mid-seventeenth century 
by Hobbes who postulated that knowledge arises from sensa­
tion a l o n e . I n  other words, all knowledge can be reduced 
to ideas caused by the motions of bodies and their effect 
upon the senses. Knowledge, then, must be gained by con­
clusions of particular and individual data. And these 
conclusions, or ideas, are merely sense data, and decaying 
sense data;^^ they are literally material impressions pres­
sed upon the mind through the senses.
Locke incorporated Hobbe's materialism into his 
empirical method. Locke's theory of knowledge can be 
divided into an intuitive awareness of self, and an aware-
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ness of the external world through impressions. (That 
there is an idea is certain; that the idea corresponds to 
the external world is uncertain.) The emphasis on the data 
of the senses for knowledge, and the uncertainty of that 
knowledge were two very important factors in the subject- 
oriented attitude. An emphasis on the collection of 
individual sensations gave greater importance to the par­
ticular, as opposed to the general, for a foundation of 
knowledge; and the division of causes of sensations into 
primary and secondary modes provided a dualism of cause. The 
emphasis on the particular as opposed to the general, and dual 
modes of ideas are two important features of the subject 
orientation.
Locke's principle of association, as its implications
were developed, eventually led to the downfall of rationalism,
rule, and the general in art. In the traditional vein of
object-oriented criticism in which the artist "discovers"
the rules of beauty and art in nature, reason is the essential
tool of his industry. Reynolds emphasized again and again
that his art, like poetry, is an endeavor of the mind.^^
According to Reynolds, the artist invalidates the truth of
the particular on the basis of the general; the particular
18is merely a deviation from the central form. Locke's
epistemology, however, based as it was on sense data and on 
emotional response to the particular, eventually undermined 
the validity of reason, the general, and the central form.
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The particular, or the individual, was central to
Locke's system, for it provided all information on which
knowledge is based. He wrote that there are no preconceived
ideas, no a priori knowledge, and that all impressions, or
sensations, are accompanied by either pain or pleasure which
19serve to fix ideas in the mind. Knowledge and opinions
come about through reflection and association of these im­
pressions of the particular. The "individual" is important 
in larger sense in that it is the source of all knowledge, 
and in the narrower sense in that each person has his own 
unique set and sequence of impressions.
Addison's role in the development of critical theories 
in Britain was a crucial one: his theories form a link between 
the psychological philosophers of the seventeenth and the 
aestheticians of the eighteenth centuries, define the pro­
blems, and point the direction of aesthetic speculation.
He seems to have been immediately influenced by Longinus via 
Boileau, and by Locke; and under these mentors he molded 
traditional attitudes to British empiricism. Addison was 
the first critic to write in the subject-oriented mode, al- 
though Dennis before him had included identifiable subject- 
oriented thoughts in his speculations. Dennis, a con­
temporary of Addison's, did not adopt Addison's obvious 
subject orientation. Some of Dennis's major works which 
appeared after the Spectator papers, continued in the same 
vein as his earlier writings, that is, an object-oriented 
concern for specific qualities in nature (sacred themes)
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which art is to reflect.
Addison's critical opinions do not add up to a 
coherent system, but he introduced and popularized two very 
potent ideas —  the terrible as a pleasurable aesthetic ex­
perience, and the idea that aesthetic pleasure arises from
20associations derived from sensational experience. His 
unique polarization of certain concepts was to have a pro­
found effect on the course of British aesthetics. An 
especially powerful idea, for example, expressed in the last
of his essays on the imagination, was that the imagination
21was capable of pain as well as pleasure. Addison also
wrote of two kinds of genius, the natural genius, and the
22genius formed by rules, or trained genius. The problems
presented by the difference between a poet like Homer and 
like Virgil had been so successfully answered by Addison by 
this distinction, that classicists such as Reynolds and 
Johnson incorporated the distinction into their theories.
In the Spectator papers 411-421, collectively called 
"The Pleasures of the Imagination," Addison reduced aesthetic 
pleasure to the delight the imagination receives upon con­
templating and comparing what is great, uncommon, and beauti­
ful. He obviously had some misgivings about founding aesthetic
qualities totally in the mind: he indicated in more than one 
place that beauty exists in things. Yet many of these state­
ments leave the reader to infer that there is a beauty in 
things, that is, an absolute beauty.
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And these [pleasures of the imagination], I think, 
all proceed from the sight of what is Great,
Uncommon, or Beautiful.23
But there is nothing that makes its way more 
directly to the Soul than Beauty, which . .
gives a finishing to anything that is Great 
or Uncommon.24
The Fancy delights in anything that is Great,
Strange, or Beaut iful, and is still more pleased
the more it finds of these Perfections in the
same obj ect. . . .25
Other statements about the inherent quality of beauty
in nature are more direct. He found one source of beauty
in the mutual attraction which draws one member of a species
to another; he also found a second kind of beauty in nature
which can be separated into two basic kinds: that of harmony
and related ideas ultimately connected with Locke's primary
qualities, and that of color and other ideas related to sight
and ultimately connected with Locke's secondary qualities.
Only one of these three kinds of beauty is inherent in things-
the idea of harmony. Harmony, symmetry, or arrangement of
parts was a basic feature of object-oriented modes, as we
have seen in the last chapter. The validity of harmony, or
unity, was reinforced by Newton's law of motion. Addison
did not give up this absolute aspect of aesthetic value; it
was merely submerged into his newer ideas and nearly lost
in the subjectivism of his new approach. The problem of
absolute beauty was more successfully handled by Hutcheson
as we shall see later.
Of the three kinds of beauty described by Addison,
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two are relative beauties which are modified by the con­
dition of the viewer: (1) attraction of the species to one
another varies according to the species in question (that 
which attracts one bird to another depends on nothing of 
the arrangement of its parts, but depends on the bird),
(2) the beauties whicli can be appreciated by the sense of 
sight (color, etc.) give rise to the "pleasures of the 
imagination," which involves an activity of the mind. The 
emphasis in the Spectator papers is definitely on these last 
beauties, the pleasures of the imagination, which arise in 
response to the visual world. Addison's concern with the 
primary characteristics of matter such as solidity, motion,
and extension is also as a visual phenomenon and not as the
2 7foundation of an inherent beauty. In other words, according
to Addison, the mind makes beauty; it arises not from any
external relationship between objects, but from our own
2 8ability to associate and create relationships.
Addison's ideas of beauty and the operations of the
imagination were directly influenced by Locke. Lock's
epistemology was based on primary and secondary qualities.
The primary qualities--motion, extension, solidity, and
figure--inher in matter and can be understood by more than
once sense; the secondary qua1ities--color, sound, taste,
smell, all sense data which are interpreted by one sense—
2 9are imparted to matter by the mind. The importance of this
distinction is that some qualities are a property of matter.
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while others are created in the mind as ideas. Our ideas
of the primary qualities are resemblances of the things which
produce them; our ideas of the secondary qualities are
not resemblances, for there is nothing like those qualities 
30in matter.
Addison made a somewhat parallel distinction to 
Locke's primary and secondary qualities: he distinguished 
between primary and secondary pleasures of the imagination. 
Primary pleasures arise from the direct observation of ob­
jects; secondary pleasures flow from the idea of these ob­
jects which are not before us. Primary pleasures arise
from direct impressions, secondary pleasures from memory,
31comparison, and contrast. The similarity to Locke's
distinction is striking, since in both theories the dif­
ference between primary and secondary lies between the 
material, and the activity of the mind in response to it. 
Locke's primary quality is a property of matter; Addison's 
primary pleasure depends upon direct experience of matter. 
Locke's secondary quality is caused by a power of matter 
to produce sensations in the mind; Addison's secondary 
pleasure is caused by a power of matter to produce com­
binations of ideas in the mind. Addison wrote of this 
secondary pleasure.
This secondary pleasure of the Imagination proceeds 
from the Action of the Mind, which compares the 
Ideas arising from the Original o b j e c t s . 32
Addison, like Locke, saw more substance in the primary
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than in the secondary; he implied in several passages 
that the primary pleasures are greater than the secondary 
ones, and at the same time he made a connection between 
the primary pleasures and nature, and between the secondary 
pleasures and art. He wrote, for example, that art as com­
pared with nature is defective in its capacity to please:
If we consider the works of Nature and A r t , as they 
are qualified to entertain the Imagination, we shall 
find the last very defective, in Comparison of the 
fo rmer.^3
And writing of the arts, he indicated that architecture is the
most pleasing of all as it more closely approaches the
characteristics of natute, that is, it has bulk and body,
34greatness and majesty.
The senses, especially the sense of sight, assumed a
priority over reason for Addison, and for many other subject-
oriented critics. The word imagination,perhaps because of
its root connotation of image, became a building block for
a visual concept of aesthetic pleasure, and a stumbling
block for other facets of aesthetic experience. Addison
3 6and many of his later contemporaries felt that sight was
so very essential to enjoyment, that the blind, having no
visual impressions to compare, and combine, could not be
capable of aesthetic experiences. Addison wrote:
We cannot indeed have a single Image in the Fancy 
that did not make its first entrance through the 
Sight.
Of the special limitations of the blind he said.
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Let one who is born blind take an Image [statue] 
in his Hands, and trace out with his Fingers the 
differenc Furrows and Impressions of the Chisel, 
and he will easily conceive how the Shape of a 
Man, or Beast, may be represented by it; but 
should he draw his Hand over a Picture, where all 
is smooth and Uniform, he would never be able to 
imagine how the several prominances and Depressions 
of the Human Body could be shewn on a plain piece 
of Canvas, that it has no Unevenness or Irregularity.
Thus, in the early years of the century, Addison 
firmly separated reason from the senses, and gave the 
senses clear superiority over reason in aesthetic apprecia­
tion. Such a radical departure from the traditional approach 
to art, along with the idea that the terrible could produce 
pleasure was bound to have a profound effect on the course of 
criticism under the proper condition of receptivity to these 
ideas. The epistemologies of Hobbes and Locke served as a 
foundation for aesthetic ideas in systems; Addison provided 
a rudimentary system, and his suggestions were developed with 
an increasing sophistication throughout the century.
The suggestion of natural and chance association
3 8added to the fourth edition of Locke’s Essay appears to 
have s timulated the directions of associationalism in aesthetic 
speculation, one stressing a rationally determinable order of 
ideas and knowledge of things as they are, the other stress­
ing an irrational, or chance associationalism, and an in­
ability to determine the existence of things as they are.
As the two directions were worked out in subject-oriented 
systems, a tendency to accept chance associations reduced the
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objective correlate to an unknowable, while the sub­
jective correlate became all that could be determined with 
any accuracy. Hume's system, as we shall see, points in 
this direction. When the natural associative tendency 
was stressed, not only was the objective correlate identified 
as certain principles (such as novelty, variety, greatness, 
etc.), a corresponding principle in the subjective correlate 
was seen to be responsible for knowledge. Such are the inner 
senses of Hutcheson, Karnes, and Gerard. These senses are 
the special asethetic faculties, and not emotions. (Gerard's 
case, however, is thus classified with reservations, for 
the inner senses according to his definition are modifications 
of the external senses and not independent of them. These 
senses are labeled "internal" by Gerard because of their
similarity to the external ones in their independence of 
39volit ion.)
The significance of the rational and irrational 
tendencies for aesthetics concerns the problem of estab­
lishing a standard of taste and rules of art. Often in 
subject-oriented criticism the two trends of rational and 
irrational association can be detected in the same work;
Hume's "Of Taste" provides an example of this kind of 
conflict, his epistemology reinforces it. He wrote in this 
essay :
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists 
merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each 
mind perceives a different b e a u t y . ^0
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And a few paragraphs later he countered with:
But though poetry can never submit to exact truth, 
it must be confined by rules of art, discovered to 
the author either by genius or by observation. If 
some irresponsible authors have pleased, they have 
not pleased by their transgression or rule or 
order, but in spite of these transgress ions.41
The "standard of taste" was a difficult problem which was
tentatively solved by the "inner sense," as we shall see
later.
Ill
It has been noted that the two major features of the 
subject-oriented mode are an organization of materials based 
on the definition of human nature, and a cause and effect 
analysis of response to art. Both of these factors lend a 
characteristic tone to the subject-oriented work as a study 
of man rather than of his art. Indeed, as a generalization, 
specific works and authors are cited with far less frequency 
than was the case for the object-oriented c r i t i c i s m . M a n  
was generally defined in this mode of philosophy and aesthetics 
in terms of his acquisition of knowledge, the formulation of 
his opinion, and the origin of his emotions. It is also 
characteristic that a subject-oriented work will have a 
philosophic and analytical tone. The authors were, in many 
cases attempting to achieve sound philosophic systems which 
were usually reductionistic, that is, problems were reduced 
to their simplest elements.
Several representative subject-oriented ideas will be
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examined in terms of systems. Such an approach offers 
several advantages: the differences in method from object-
oriented criticisms can be indicated; the function of the 
pa in-pieasure principle can be illustrated; the complex 
structure of association of ideas and the subsequent 
concentration of the subject's response to cause can be 
emphasized; a writer's reasoning can be readily followed by 
the reader; and the similarity between subject-oriented 
systems can be graphically demonstrated. These six systems 
will be illustrated in flow charts (systems analysis).
These six systems are those of Addison, Burke, Hume,
Hutcheson, Karae, and Gerard.
Aesthetic theories for this group of subject-oriented 
writers are usually either embedded in their total philoso­
phic systems, or they constitute a complex structure with 
interdependent elements. The flow charts are designed to 
graphically illustrate the relationships of aesthetic 
systems to their total philosophic systems and to indicate 
the feedback characteristics of these complex structures.
In each case the structure of a chart varies according to 
the demands of a particular system. Therefore, many 
associative links have not been completed on the charts; 
many ideas are left with no links where they are not 
important to criticism and aesthetics, or where the writer 
has drawn no connection. In the case of Addison, for example, 
only aesthetic aspects were developed in the Spectator
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papers, the source for his chart, and any other relation­
ships would be a matter of speculation. On Karnes's chart 
only a few aesthetic associative principles arc indicated 
since there are so many basic principles in his philosophy 
that to demonstrate more than a few of them would add to 
an already very confusing system.
Following the lead of Locke, Addison defined man as
a creature capable of forming simple and compound ideas
on the basis of sense impressions; these ideas are capable
of imparting either pain or pleasure. Addison's primary
concern was for the workings of the imagination, and he
thus did not develop the idea of pain to any extent beyond
the suggestion that the imagination associates certain
pleasurable ideas with it. He wrote that there are three
distinct types of pleasure, which, as indicated on his chart,
stem from ideas and stimuli: pleasures of the sense, which
are of a grosser nature, pleasures of the understanding which
are of a more refined nature, and pleasures of the imagina-
A 3tion which fall between the two. The pleasures of the
imagination are founded on the sense of sight. They are
be subdivided into primary and secondary pleasures, that is,
direct observation, and comparison and contrast (thought,
4 4memory) of the direct impressions. The formulation of
secondary reactions apparently indicated both a reflexive and 
a voluntary operation. (For the sake of completeness of this 
rough system we may assume that the sense and the under-
A U U 1 3 U W
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standing each have primary and secondary pleasures, and 
that pain and pleasure extend co the sense and understanding 
with the same distinctions of primary and secondary exper­
iences . )
Addison has indicated further associative links 
between the primary and secondary experiences of sense 
ideas. We can see that the imagination is a faculty which 
is separate from reasoning (understanding); yet there is a 
connection between the two, either by association from the 
reasoning faculty, or within the imagination itself in the 
form of secondary association. Addison did not clarify the 
precise character of the secondary pleasure as to whether 
it is emotional or rational; we can assume that it is mostly 
emotional however, because of the terms as tonishment, wonder, 
surprise, and others which Addison applied to the aesthetic 
experience.
In his discussion of primary pleasures, Addison assert­
ed that the direct impression (primary) is more immediate, 
and thus provides more entertainment to the imagination.^^ 
This pleasure is the delight in actually seeing things. 
Addison’s tone seems to indicate that the secondary pleasure 
arises in a mechanical fashion which is involuntary,similar
to sight. The pleasures arise from contact with what is
4 6great, uncommon, or beautiful. This secondary reflex seems
but little capable of improvement.
A Man should be born with a good Imagination, and 
must have well weighed the Force and Beauty which 
lie in the several words of a Language. . . .  ̂?
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The faculty of judgment has only a slight impact on the
imagination, and a weakness of the imagination faculty is
compared to a weakness of sight.
Addison did not make a direct statement to the effect
that the secondary pleasure is that derived from art, but he
intimated as much in more than one place. He wrote, for
example, that architecture is more capable of producing
primary pleasures than any other of the arts because of its
physical characteristics. He also made it very clear that
nature pleases more than art, and that art pleases more the
48closer it approaches to igture. If we can draw a parallel
between Locke's secondary qualities (sound, color, taste,
etc.) and the secondary pleasures of the arts (Addison does
indeed mention the "fact" that colors and light are qualities
49created in the mind) we can see that Addison’s intention 
was that one makes the associations leading to pleasures in 
the arts much in the reflexive fashion that color is exper­
ienced. If we take into consideration Addison's definition 
of genius (which will be discussed later in this chapter) 
we can see that the secondary pleasures may be compounded 
by the action of the understanding. On the chart this could 
be indicated by an input from understanding to the imagina- 
t ion.
We are left with the question of Addison's definitions 
of greatness , beauty, and novelty . In some contexts of the 
papers these qualities can be understood to actually exist
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in things as they are and can be immediately understood by
snthe perceiving mind. ~ In Locke's terms these aesthetic 
characteristics must be primary qualities in order to 
inhere in matter. Addison's meaning, however, seems to be 
that figure, size, and mass are the primary qualities which 
are conducive to the experience of greatness. Addison 
stated in another context that beauty is created in the mind 
by association through the faculty of s i g h t . T h e  sub­
jective corollary, in this case, is the power to have the 
sensation of beauty, and the objective corollary is the 
structure of matter which causes these sensations. The pro­
blem is, then whether Addison understood beauty as a quality 
in things (primary) or a quality created by the mind (second­
ary) by association. Regardless of statements to the 
contrary, Addison's analysis points to a beauty created in 
the subject's mind.
Burke's system is very similar to Addison's with the 
addition of some very impressive refinements. These refine­
ments, as we shall see, lead to some paradoxical problems. 
Taken by itself, without the introductory easay "On Taste"
added to the second edition^ An Inquiry into the Origin of
5 2Our Ideas of the Beautiful and the Sublime appears to be an 
object-oriented study of the qualities in things which is 
tinged with a subject-oriented observation of the mechanistic 
action of the mind on these objects. The Inquiry placed great
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emphasis on the causes of our ideas of the aesthetic modes, 
which are seen to be the qualities in objects of roughness, 
smoothness, obscurity, clarity, smallness, largeness, among 
others. The essay on taste, however, puts the total work 
into perspective and throws light on Burke's truly subject- 
oriented associationalist attitude toward art.
Dividing the powers of the mind into imagination, 
judgment, and sense, Burke wrote that we are made aware of 
external objects by these faculties a l o n e . B y  this 
structure it would seem that imagination and judgment are 
independent of and equal to the senses. In actuality they 
both arise form, and affect the senses. Of the senses 
Burke wrote.
We do, and we must suppose, that as the confor­
mation of their organs are nearly or altogether 
the same in all men, so the manner of perceiving 
external objects is in all men the same, or with
little difference.54
These impressions of the senses are called ideas, and these 
■are either painful or pleasant.
The imagination is a creative power of the mind,
but it is not independent of the senses.
The mind of man possesses a sort of creative power 
of its own; either in representing at pleasure the 
images of things in the order and manner in which 
they were received by the senses, or in combining 
these images in a new manner, and according to a 
different order. This power is called imagina­
tion. . . . But it must be observed, that this 
power of the imagination is incapable of producing 
anything new; it can only vary the disposition of 
those which it has received from the senses.56
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The imagination, like the senses, acts uniformly in all 
5 7men. The faculty of judgment arises from knowledge and
experience. It is a process of comparing and contrasting
various examples of nature and art; thus, it also arises
5 8from the senses. For Burke, as for Addison, the pleasures
of the senses are primary, and the pleasures of the imagina­
tion are secondary.
Locke's two responses of pain and pleasure are an 
integral part of Burke's system. All human responses are 
based on either self-preservation, linked with pain, and 
causing the emotions of fear and its modifications, or social
drives, linked with pleasure and causing the emotions of
59pleasure and its modifications. Burke wrote that the imag­
ination is as capable of pain as the s e n s e s . B o t h  basic 
drives have two major modifications which give rise to var­
ious emotions, and which act as associative links with 
other emotions. These drives either directly or indirectly
ft 1cause the aesthetic experiences of beauty and sublimity.
These two (beauty and sublimity) are the only aesthetic
modes, and they each arise from different ultimate causes-
sublimity from fear, and beauty from love. They are
reductible to pain and pleasure respectively.
Pain and pleasure both produce several emotional
modifications, the most important of which are delight and
fear in the case of pain, and love, sympathy, imitation, and
6 2a mb ition in the case of pleasure. Sympathy, for example.
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which arises from the social drive, acts as an associative
link, which can relate to love, causing the experience of
beauty; it can relate directly to delight, a modification
of fear which comes from either being removed or remote
from danger, causing an experience of the sublime; or it
can indirectly give rise to the sublime through the
6 3terrible (see chart). While the emotions caused by pain 
and pleasure act as associative links by joining ideas, the 
faculties of imagination and judgment also add their in­
fluence to the sensitive experiences.
Burke's system is a clear, neat mechanistic explana­
tion of aesthetic experience, and it makes a final schism 
between two aesthetic modes and their causes. Yet, it poses 
the same problem as Addison's, that is, whether these qualities 
which cause emotions exist in things, or whether they are 
in fact created in the mind by association of ideas. Burke's 
preoccupation with qualities such as texture, size and 
quality lead us to conclude that qualities are properties 
of things. The essay "On Taste," however, draws quite another 
conclusion, that qualities are created in the mind. What­
ever the reader's final judgment may be on Burke's position 
on this matter, his analytical system is based on the reac­
tions of the mind to these qualities whether they inher in 
things or are created in the imagination,
Hume's system offers a solution to the origin of 
aesthetic qualities; they originate in the mind. Reference
7 7 1
to the flow chart shows that the only connection with 
external causes is perceptive power, that is, the five 
external s e n s e s . I m a g i n a t i o n  and judgment are clearly 
dependent on sensitive experience. Reasoning power, or 
judgment, is one of the effects of ideas--ideas are 
impressions— which in turn are the effects of sensations. 
There are two kinds of sensations, impressions and ideas, 
each having two degrees, the simple and the complex.
Our simplest ideas always correspond to the simplest im­
pressions, and our complex ideas only sometimes correspond 
to the complex impressions.^^ In this system the simple 
ideas and impressions are more reliable than the complex 
i d e a s . H u m e ' s  system has obviously given more credibility 
to man's emotional nature (feeling) than to his rational 
nature.
Hume demonstrated that ideas are connected by cause 
and effect, and that such connections can only be attributed 
to things which are verified by the senses through exper­
ience.^^ This line of reasoning obliterates the grounds for 
the reliability of cause and effect since it is founded on 
experience through sensation rather than on a knowledge that 
can get behind experience.
I shall venture to affirm, as a general propo­
sition, which admits of no exception, that the 
knowledge of this relation [cause and effect] is 
not, in any instance, attained by reasonings a 
priori; but arises entirely from experience. .
Causes and effects are discoverable, not by rea­
son, but by experience. . . .
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Cause and effect is, along with resemblance and contiguity, 
a principle of association by which ideas are connected,
The significance of Hume's distinction between ideas 
and impressions and the subsequent reliability of impressions 
(feelings) over ideas, is that aesthetic experience falls 
within the realm of impressions. It is also a reinforcement 
of the superiority of the primary experiences. Reason (idea) 
is capable of conversing about aesthetic feeling, but it is 
is not always correct. On the flow chart the reflexive im­
pressions, which arise from the correspondant ideas and 
impressions, are divided into calm and violent emotions. It 
is from the calm, reflexive impressions that man's experience 
of beauty and morality o r i g i n a t e , M a n ' s  idea of beauty
arises from two causes here, usefulness and pleasantness, and
7 2it is usually caused by a combination of the two.
Structurally, within the system, Hume sees ideas of
beauty arising from feeling, and, as he had stated in his
essay "On Taste," sentiment has reference to nothing but 
7 3itself. Although he attempted to give sentiment the 
status of objectivity on the basis of the universality of 
perception, Hume's aesthetic suggests the irrational, chance 
association mentioned by Locke merely by the fact that the 
correctness of associations (knowledge) cannot be verified. 
Hume's idea of the origin of beauty is subject-oriented not 
only because of the stress on the process of idea formation, 
but also because beauty is not an inherent property of 
m a tter--it is created entirely in the mind.
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Hutcheson's system (1728), while still centered on
the origin of ideas and cause and effect, is very different
from the three just described. The uniqueness of his system
is that there are four senses apart from the five external
ones which can be aware of cause. These he called the
internal senses of "beauty," "moral," "public," and "honor.
He also stated that the internal senses do not presuppose
innate ideas;^^ he was simply giving names to perceptive
powers analogous to the power of determining harmony through 
76hearing.
Hutcheson made a basic distinction between external 
and internal senses; the internal senses "have nothing of 
what we call Sensible Perception in them."^^ While the ex­
ternal senses are suited to receive specialized data such 
as sound, color, or smell, the internal senses are suited
to receive compound data such as uniformity, order,
7 8arrangement, and imitation. Compound data concerns infor­
mation that must be compared, contrasted, or otherwise under­
stood as relative to various factors. Reference to the flow 
chart will show that both the internal and external senses 
have knowledge of cause.
Distinguishing between absolute beauty and relative
beauty, Hutcheson wrote that the former exists as a cause
7 9and has a correspondent sense' to perceive it. The ideas
of relative beauty on the other hand are formed by associa-
8 0tion of the ideas which arise from all of the senses. Ab-
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solute beauty is conversant with cause, relative beauty
is not (see chart). Processes of association are called
81compounding, comparing, contrasting, and abstracting.
These processes connect all the ideas caused by both types 
of senses, and affect the idea of relative beauty.
Hutcheson, who was a student of Shafesbury, was 
influenced by his mentor, but Shaftesbury’s ideas were 
sifted through the Lockean perspective of association of 
ideas and the ultimate reduction of all experience to pain 
and pleasure, Shaftesbury wrote not of pain and pleasure, 
but rather of moral good; his aesthetic attitude falls with­
in the scope of the next chapter.
Unlike Hume, Burke, and Addison, Hutcheson developed 
the Lockean choice of the rational and the irrational tend­
encies of as sociationalism in the direction of the 
rational. For this philosopher the knowledge of the order 
of association, cause and effect, was assured by an aware­
ness through senses beyond the physical experience of cause 
Actual perceptive powers give man the ability to know ab­
solute beauty; chance association gives rise only to re­
lative beauty.
Structurally Kames's (1762) system is very much 
like Hutcheson's. Kames added the sense of self, and the 
powers of wit, judgment, and memory to the same basic 
two powers of internal and external senses agreed upon by 
Hutcheson. Judgment, wit, and memory are not actually
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perception on the level of self. Internal, and external 
senses, but they have a power independent of these and 
are thus graphed on the flow chart as conversant with 
cause. Judgment, wit, and memory act as associative 
principles, along with certain sentiments arising from 
the external senses, and serve to connect ideas.
Each of the emotions which stem from the external
8 2senses of sight and hearing has an operative
principle, or internal sense, to reassure the perceiving
mind that there is a correspondence between perception and 
83its cause. The skepticism of Hume is thus avoided, for 
cause can be determined by the co-operation of the internal 
and external senses. (Hume wrote that cause cannot be 
known.) In the respect that there is a duplication of the 
direct sense with a correspondent perception, Kames’s 
system resembles Hume's (cf charts). For the latter philo­
sopher, however, all perception lies within the realm of the 
external senses; for Kames the external senses are aided 
in their understanding of. cause by a direct perception, a 
kind of common sense.: In Kames's system aesthetic per­
ceptions arise from the pleasant emotions which are caused 
by the senses of sight and hearing. Like Hume, Kame sees 
the aesthetic experience arising from the emotional side 
of man's nature; and like Hutcheson, Kames agrees that the 
aesthetic senses are aided by association of ideas from a 
non-physical source. Wit, judgment, and memory are capable 
of further compounding ideas by association.
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Kames attributed the feeling of beauty to demonstrable 
cause as did Hutchison and Burke. These causes however, 
lie not in the object, nor in the perceiver (sub­
ject), but in the operation which combines ideas. Pointing 
to the primary and secondary qualities of Locke, Kames noted 
that some qualités such as color cannot possibly inhere in 
matter; other qualities, such as regularity, also are not 
a property of matter. Thus, in this system Broad's objective 
correlate is a disposition of matter which causes a process 
(the subjective correlate) in the subject by which he attri­
butes beauty and other qualities to matter,
A singular determination of nature makes us perceive 
both beauty and color as belonging to the object, 
and, like figure or extension, as inherent properties.
In the same context he wrote.
Beauty, therefore, which, for its existence, depends 
on the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property
in either.86
Kames's system is an expression of the rational pot­
ential of Locke's principle of association, for there is an 
assurance from the internal senses that the external senses 
are correct in their perception of things. Kames's aesthetic 
was structured to prove that the associationa1 process, 
"thoughts in a train," as he termed it, is demonstrably nat­
ural and that perceptions are true representations of things 
as they exist. Kames's aesthetic system flows neatly into a 
critical system, which is, at its core, philosophically 
oriented to opistemology. Thus, he moved from a treatment of
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cause of emotion and of ideas, to external expression of 
emotion, to genres and rules which promote pleasurable 
aesthetic emotions.
Gerard, the last philosopher whose system is demon­
strated here, presents a systemwhich bears a similarity to 
those of Hutcheson and Kames. His major publication An 
Easay on Taste (1759) actually preceded Kames's Elemen ts 
(.1762) by a few years. Several major differences between 
these two Scotts can be indicated: Gerard's internal senses, 
unlike those of Kames, are clearly modifications of imagina­
tion-one of the faculties arising from sense perception; 
unlike Kames, Gerard did not include a theory of criticism 
in his purely aesthetic system; and Gerard's philosophy is
much more satisfactory than Kames's as an aesthetic system.
8 7The three faculties of associât ion--judgment,
memory, and imaginâtion--each stem from perception: each
is responsible for a kind of association, and each acts
upon the others. (.Only the links to imagination are indicated
on the flow chart.) The imagination itself has two
modifications, internal senses which are not independent of
89the external senses, and emotions. There is a duplication
between the external senses and the emotions, This type of 
duplicate structure was seen in the systems of Hume and 
Kames; here it has been refined to have Hume's dependence 
upon the external senses, and Kames& type of awareness of 
complex ideas through some avenue other than emotions.
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Gerard's internal senses seem to act like a common sense 
which is similar to Kames's internal senses.
Feelings arising from the emotions are reflexive
and are immediately verified by the internal senses. There
is an associative link between the senses and the emotions
(the modifications of imagination), as well as links between
the faculties themselves. Through the internal senses and
the emotions there are seven aesthetic modes which can be
experienced, virtue, ridicule, imitation, beauty,
sublimity, harmony, and novelty. The three causes of
aesthetic experience indicated by Addison novelty, beauty,
and greatness (here sublimity), have all been reduced to
distinct modes by Gerard. These seven modes, along with
their correspondant emotions, are effects which arise from
cause. The mind, or set of faculties, also conforms itself
to the cause so that there is an assured conformity of cause
to effect. The skepticism of Hume is thus by-passed.
When an object is presented to any of our senses, the 
mind conforms itself to its nature and appearance, 
feels an emotion, and is put in a frame suitable and 
analogous; of which we have a perception by conscious­
ness or reflect ion.90
Thus, a feedback makes a complete and interwoven progress
through all the faculties and back to the cause in an almost
immediate, reflexive process.
This unique feedback process gives Gerard's system 
a closed aesthetic structure in which the subject is aware 
of cause almost immediately, while it eliminates the need
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for faculties independent of the external senses. In a 
sense Gerard has taken a middle path between Locke's 
two alternatives regarding the rational and irrational 
associations. He has combined the best features of Hume's 
system, which stressed the irrational--that is, total 
inability to know cause— with the best features of 
Hutcheson's system, in which the mind is aware of cause by 
powers beyond the senses.
These six systems have not been presented in a 
chronological order, but in a structural order demonstrating 
similarities between various representative subject-oriented 
theories. A clear separation of aesthetic modes and philo­
sophical support for them can be seen in three of these 
six systems, those of Burke, Kames and Gerard. Addison, 
Hume, and Hutcheson made no distinction other than beauty 
which is itself two aesthetic modes, Gerard named seven 
and Kames gave many. Besides proliferating the principles 
and new critical definitions, the systems increased in 
complexity in order to come to grips with problems pre­
sented by the basic assumption of man's dualistic motiva­
tions of pain and pleasure, and his dualistic rational- 
irrational nature. Both of these features, new terms and 
new problems will be discussed in turn.
IV
Locke's two very potent explanations of man's nature.
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the sensationalist pain-pieasure dichotomy, and the "mad-
rational" tendencies, had a profound effect on the critical-
aesthetic vocabulary and systems of subject-oriented theorists
who developed the implications of these ideas in the arts.
The dual character of man's nature, seen by Locke to arise
9 1both from natural and from chance association, can be 
detected in all the important British subject-oriented con­
cepts of this period, for the nature of man was the cen­
tral issue of this aesthetic orientation, and Locke's in­
fluence was pervasive. As we have seen, it was Addison who 
first resolved aesthetic problems in terms of Lockean psy­
chology to solve several very old problems, and thus to 
separate key ideas into distinct polor modes.
Addison's influence to the direction of subject- 
oriented aesthetics can be seen on two levels--on the 
level of overall systemic structure, and on the level of an 
evolving critical terminology. Systemic structure involves 
the relationship between ideas (as indicated on the flow 
charts) such as the central role of pain arid pleasure, and 
the rationale and support for more than one aesthetic mode. 
Terminology refers to the specific words used to indicate 
sets of ideas generally agreed upon by subject-oriented 
critics to be crucial to aesthetic discussion. Such terms 
as sublimity, taste, genius, feeling, experience, and 
association were extensively used by this group of writers.
Addison was the first, following Locke's lead, to make 
a clear separation of pain and pleasure and relate each
specifically to aesthetic experience. His treatment of the
beautiful was to find that the "great" and the "novel"
enhance "beauty." The great, as Addison conceived it, was
to eventually be developed into the mode of sublimity by
9 2his successors. Addison also divided "imagination" into
two modes. The imagination, he said, is capable of pain as
9 3well as pleasure, and it is capable of receiving pleasure
9 4from the unpleasant as well as the pleasant. Locke's in­
fluence, as we have seen, extended even to Addison's 
primary and secondary modifications of the imagination.
Further development of polarized definitions and functions
9 5can be seen in Burke and Hume.
The concept of genius held by representative writers 
of this perspective is distinctive enough in its outlines, 
and seems to be completely dependent upon the system from 
which it springs (that is, a dual concept of man based on 
the experiences of pain and pleasure), to indicate that there 
is a characteristically subject-oriented idea of genius. As 
attention was shifted from art and nature to man, the 
requisites of artistic production and especially apprecia­
tion came under investigation. Basically two major concepts 
of genius can be identified in this perspective which roughly 
correspond to and reflect the two major modes of sublimity and 
beauty. The rational genius is identified with Locke's natural 
association and the expression of beauty, the enthusiastic 
genius with Locke's chance association and the expression 
of sublimity.
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Addison's attitude toward genius demonstrates the 
typical subject-oriented solution of the problem of the 
relationship of the artist to his material, and of the 
conoisseur to art and nature. Addison's concept has four 
major features which in some degree or form are to be found 
in his later contemporaries: (1) there are two kinds of
genius in the arts, (2) the imagination as a process of 
association is essential to genius, (3) the imagination 
necessary to genius is innate, yet improvable to a slight 
degree, and (4) there is a suggestion of different kinds 
of genius for the different disciplines.
In the Spectator 160 Addison defined two types of 
genius, an idea which he reiterated in the later papers 
on the imagination. The two kinds of genius are capable 
of producing two distinct kinds of art, the "nobly wild 
and extravagent" in the case of natural genius, and the 
refined, correct, and restrained in the case of trained 
g e n i u s . S u c h  a distinction conveniently explains the 
differences between Homer and Virgil, Pindar and Aristotle, 
Shakespeare and Milton. Pope made a similar distinction 
in his preface to the Iliad, but he did not provide a 
psychological or philosophical foundation for the 
distinction. Again in the papers on the imagination Addison 
took up the issue of genius, associating Homer with the
97great, Virgil with the beautiful, and Ovid with the strange.
His treatment of genius points in the direction of separate
aesthetic modes and their expression by special kinds of
imaginative powers.
Addison was reluctant to call one kind of genius
98superior to the other, but his argument taken in its
totality as well as his tone, indicates that the natural
genius was superior to the trained one because (1) the
ancients, who were natural geniuses, had a "greater and more
daring genius," and (2) the trained genius is more likely
to follow rule to the extreme, and hence will not allow the
9 9full play of his "own natural parts." He anticipated the 
trend of the later part of the century in this idea. In 
discussing taste and how one goes about acquiring it he 
said.
The faculty must in some degree be born with us, 
and it very often happens, that those who have other 
qualities in Perfection are wholly void of this. . . 100
which indicates that there is some degree of inexplicable 
intuition involved in the operation of genius. Addison's 
preference for the qualities of the sublime were to be 
echoed throughout the century, to be questioned only by the 
later fashion for the picturesque.
As we have seen, genius for Reynolds indicated a 
quality which could be cultivated through the acquisition 
of necessary skills and powers of observation. Genius for 
Addison, on the other hand, involved the associative powers.
248
And, as he was at a loss to explain "the necessary cause"
of the operations of the imagination, the subsequent effect
was hidden; he explained that it must be born in us, to be
augmented by the understanding.
But notwithstanding this Faculty must in some measure 
be born with us, there are several Methods for Cul­
tivating and Improving it, and without which it will 
be uncertain, and of little use to the Person that 
possesses it.^^^
The innate talent and the cultivation of it extends even to
10 2the very appreciation of the arts, that is, taste. Taste
and Genius are integrally related. Taste, Addison wrote, is 
"that Faculty of the Soul, which discerns the Beauties of
10 3Author with Pleasure, and the Imperfections with Dislike.
Finally, Addison left us with the suggestion that genius
may haye several types of imagination. He wrote of the
special imaginative genius of the historian, the philosopher,
10 4the geographer, as well as of the poet. This idea
naturally flows from the concept of an innate talent which must 
be expressed in some medium or another.
Addison thus laid out the direction of critical vo­
cabulary as well as aesthetic system. The critical polarities 
indicated by Addison were further developed, expanded, or 
denied by his successors in the subject-oriented perspective. 
Beauty, sublimity, natural and trained genius, natural and 
cultivated taste, absolute and relative beauty--the central 
issues of this p e r s p ec t i ve-- w?r e clearly based on the Lockean 
pain-p1easure dichotomy. Although Hutcheson defined
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no aesthetic modes other than beauty, he founded his system 
on pain and pleasure', he wrote of aesthetic pain in terms 
of aversion, rather than in terras of the terrible as Addison 
had done, or of the awesome as Dennis had done, or of the 
horrible as Burke was to do.
The development of the sublime as an aesthetic ex­
perience distinct from beauty was the most remarkable feature 
of the subject-oriented perspective. Its fundamental ration­
alization, however, is the polarization of human experience 
into pain and pleasure. Monk's history of the idea of the 
sublime, the definitive study of the subject, traces the 
course of the concept from its réintroduction into western 
thought in the seventeenth century, through its role in the 
development of an associationalist school of aesthetics in 
B r i t a i n . W h i l e  Addison had suggested the separation of 
aesthetic modes, especially in the Spec ta tor 417, Mark 
Akenside deliberately contrasted the sublime and the beauti­
f u l . I t  was Burke, however, with his Lockean psychological 
foundation of pain-pieasure, love-fear, who gave philsophical 
credibility to the theory.
With Burke the schism between beauty and sublimity was 
completed: the sublime achieved an independent and somewhat
superior status to the beautiful through Burke's peculiar 
attribution of causes and emotions to the two modes. Accord­
ing to Burke's ingenius scheme, fear, pain, and the sublime 
ruled the world of the dark and obscure, the rough and large.
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the terrible and fearful. Powerful emotions were attributed
to the sublime feelings similar to what Dennis had described
earlier in the century. By comparison, the beautiful was
timid. Love, pleasure, and the beautiful were associated
with smallness, smoothness, clarity, and similar at tributes.
This separation of aesthetic modes, of course, did
not stop with the sublime, Wc have s'._n that Addison
had suggested the possibility of yet another mode by the
10 8"novel and strange" associated with Ovid. Certainly the
beautiful and sublime as defined by Burke did not cover all 
the categories of things which appealed to the human imagina­
tion. More categories were needed too, for the moralistic 
aesthetic structure of Kames and Gerard. Toward the end of 
the century the mode which occupied many critics and surpassed 
the sublime in the fashionable language was the picturesque.
The major defenders of the picturesque were William Gilpin, 
Uvalde Price, Richard Payne Knight, and Humphrey Repton.
While the picturesque was developed specifically to handle 
the problems of landscape and gardening, it grew out of the
tradition of Burkean psychology^ and Gerard defined it in terms
109to fit into his system.
Further aesthetic modes were defined by Gerard who 
listed beauty, sublimity, novelty, imitation, harmony, ridi­
cule, and virtue. The first three of Gerard’s senses ob­
viously could be aesthetic modes in terms of Addison's and :
Burke’s systems. The direction taken after Addison in the
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subject-oriented mode was that aesthetic emotion was a pre­
requisite for the identification of an aesthetic category. 
According to Gerard, each of his seven categories correspond 
to distinct aesthetic feelings. He said of the sense of 
virtue,
The Moral sense is not only itself a tast [sic] of a 
superior order, by which, in characters and conduct, 
we distinguish between the right and the wrong, the 
excellent and the faculty but it also spreads its 
influence over all the most considerable works of 
art and genius.HO
Of the ridiculous he wrote.
In our enumeration of the simple powers which con­
stitute taste, we must not omit that sense which 
perceives, and is gratified by the odd, the ridi­
culous, the humorous, the witty. . . . H I
Harmony, he said, is a sense related to the arts but especially
112to the "beauty" of music. Even imitation, when seen from
113Gerard's viewpoint, is an aesthetic sense.
Gerard's internal senses are thus capable of dis­
cerning seven distinct modes of aesthetic experiences. The 
internal causes of experience are compound, but their effects 
are as simple as the seven c a t e g o r i e s . T h e y  are authentic 
aesthetic modes in a Humean and Burkean, sense as each has a 
correspondent emotion,and affect the other through the 
associative principles. The passions and the internal senses 
are both modifications of the imagination, and are affected 
by the judgment by the associative principle (see chart).
Aesthetic categories were further multiplied by Kames, 
who saw them in a somewhat different perspective than had
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Addison, Burke, Hume, and Gerard, These last four men 
made a very close connection between emotions and aesthetic 
modes: for them, the passions or feelings arise as a response
to the contact of the senses with stimuli, and are compli­
cated and compounded by associations. Burke for instance, 
wrote of beauty and sublimity in terms of feelings and 
p a s s i o n s . K a m e s ' s  intuitive awareness of the aesthetic 
modes, on the other hand, bypasses the passions altogether 
in its knowledge of cause, because awareness of cause does 
not come about entirely through the external senses (see 
chart). Yet the internal senses still relate to the emotions 
and to the physical character through the associative prin­
c i p l e s . W r i t i n g  of virtue, Kames said.
But no man hath a propensity to vice as such: on the 
contrary, a wicked deed disgusts him, and makes him 
abhor the author; and this abhorrence is a strong 
antidote against vice, as long as any impression 
remains of the wicked action,117
The associative principles which come into play with regard
to virtue, or the abhorrence of vice, are imitation, habit,
disapproval, and approval.
The proliferation of aesthetic categories in the subject- 
oriented mode was accompanied by a basic change in attitude 
toward the origin of aesthetic pleasure. Beauty was under­
stood by Reynolds and Hogarth to exist either in nature, or 
in an abstract of nature. Beauty for the subject-oriented 
writers was seen to be an emotion or feeling of a quality, 
which may actually exist in nature as it did for Burke; or
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it may be compounded in the imagination as it was for 
Addison and Hume; or it may be caused by a principle 
analogus to sound and taste with correspondent senses to 
perceive it as it was for Hutcheson and Kames. Subject- 
oriented writers acknowledged the complexity of feeling 
by their creation of numerous modes to supplement beauty.
Subject-oriented definitions of genius, following 
Addison's pattern, closely corresponded to the distinctions 
between aesthetic modes. The typically object-oriented 
attitude toward genius, as we have seen, was that ability 
could be universally applied to any of the arts and sciences. 
Reynolds and Johnson both express this theory: Reynolds said 
that the painter should think like a poet; Johnson thought 
that a poet could easily have been a painter, mathematician, 
or scientist under the proper conditions. Both men, and 
Hogarth as well, were theoretically committed to this posi­
tion because of their emphasis on the training of the artist. 
Generally speaking, the subject-oriented attitude defined 
several kinds of genius which were each suited to a parti­
cular type of imagination. Addison, for instance, wrote of 
the trained and natural genius, and suggested that a 
specialized type of imagination was necessary for each of the 
arts and sciences.
The idea of genius, along with its modifications, is 
also an integral element of the concept of taste which 
occupied all cf the subject-oriented writers. Most of these
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men were more concerned with art as it affected the 
viewer than with art as it was created by the artist. In 
other words, the topic of genius was very often phrased 
in terms of appreciative genius (taste) rather than in 
terms of the artist's creative process or his association­
al processes. Hippie writes, "the beautiful, sublime, and 
picturesque being feelings raised up from impressions and 
associated ideas, it was natural that the mind as per-
ceving rather than creating should have been the focus of 
118discussion." It was probably not so much because aes­
thetic experience was a feeling, for the implications of 
this idea were only slowly realized, as it was the fact that 
analysis was based on the commonality of experience which 
led to a philosophic focus on the subject, or perceiver.
There was certainly more perceivers than creators.
V
Some of the problems raised by a subject-oriented 
critical perspective were difficult indeed. Most trouble­
some of all was the fact that a subjective system of analysis 
eliminated a fixed standard of good art. Hume made it quite 
clear that cause, here beauty, could never be discovered by 
inquiry because man's emotions stood between him and the 
underlying form of things; reason for Hume was merely a 
result of the very same thing which caused feelings, that is, 
stimuli. The lack of a standard of beauty seemed to be 
reinforced by a growing body of evidence of a wide diversity
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of h uman caste.
The empirical basis for knowledge proposed by 
Locke and accepted by a whole century of British philoso­
phers left those followers on the horns of a dilemma. 
Locke's system was analytical; he reduced experience to its 
most elemental parts which he called primary and secondary 
qualities. Only the primary qualities were real in the 
sense that they inhered in matter; secondary qualities 
were merely created in the mind upon its contact with 
things--a very subjective process since the principle of 
association left open the way for so many individual varia­
tions . Hume's ideas were the consequences of a development 
of Locke's suggestions to their conclusion.
Hutcheson offered an interesting solution to the dis­
crepancy between the idea of a universal standard of beauty 
and the actual diversity of taste. The object-oriented 
critics had approached the problem of beauty from the 
standpoint of universal recognition of true beauty--a fixed 
truth--a position which could not possibly accommodate 
the rapid influx of styles which were becoming fashionable 
in circles which should have a unquestionable standard of 
taste. Hutcheson proposed two types of beauty. Absolute 
beauty is indeed universal, and established on the very
general principles of variety, variety amidst uniformity, 
119and harmony; it is tempered, however, by relative
beauty which is variable, and conditional to a number of
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associations, only one of which is the perception of
120absolute beauty. It is the relative beauty which is
the concern of the literary and art critic, as well as of 
the artist.
Hutcheson's solution seems at first to avoid the 
Lockean difficulty. He proposed a "sense of beauty" which 
was to perceive beauty in much the same way that the eyes 
receive color and the ears hear harmony. Yet, his four 
internal senses are remarkably like the external senses in 
that they cannot really perceive the underlying quality of 
things except in terms of "uniformity amidst variety," 
a characteristic very similar to Locke's extension, motion, 
volume, and figure. Though for Hutcheson, as for Kames, the 
internal senses are independent of the external ones, they 
suffer the same shortcoming of having the same distinction 
between primary and secondary qua1ities--if only by impli­
cation through the analytical process. In terms of the 
"dispositional account" defined above, Hutcheson's position, 
like Locke's, is that the mind cannot prehend the real 
qualities of things, but can only have ideas of them.
The severe reductionism of the analytical system was 
not the only problem to plague subject-oriented systems; 
the tendency to polarize ideas into opposites (and other 
modes) posed other problems. At the root of this situa­
tion is the pa in-p1easure dichotomy, which, when followed 
through its implications, led to the separation of many other
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concepts. Because the aesthetic categories were implicitly
tied to the distinctions of pain and pleasure, even in the
imagination, the terms carried the burden of philosophical
difficulties associated with physical experience. The
experiences of pain and pleasure, as Burke pointed out,
can vary from individual to individual, and thus reinforce
the subjectivity of experience and art.
There was also conflict between the enthusiastic and
the rational in art; the enthusiastic had gradually become
linked with the expression of the sublime, and the rational
with beauty. Furthermore, the sublime gradually assumed
a superior artistic value to beauty. Addison pointed in
this direction when he differentiated between the nobly
wild and unrestrained, and the refined, correct, and
121"broken by rules," and associated them respectively with
the great and with the beautiful. Reynolds recognized the
tendency when he defined Michelangelo's art as enthusiastic,
and Raphael's as studied. The dualistic concept, of man's
imaginative nature continued to be a feature of subject-
oriented literature throughout the century. Gerard united
the fanciful and the reasonable in the imagination, the
associative power of the mind; the fancy is that part of
the imagination which makes natural connections, while the
12 2judgment handles the philosophic relations. (Gerard's
distinctions recall Hume's.) The genius, however much he 
may rely on the fancy, is a relatively rationally conceived
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one, for he can only combine impressions, not invent new 
ideas.
William Duff (1767), who also reflected the dualistic
interpretation of the imagination of fancy and reason,
enthusiasm and restraint, assigned one kind of genius, the
philosophic, to the scientist, and another, the poetic, to
the artist. Duff wrote,
The kind of Imagination most properly adapted to 
Original Philosophic Genius, is that which is 
distinguished by REGULARITY, CLEARNESS, and ACCURACY.
The kind peculiar to Original Genius in Poetry, is 
that whos e essential properties are a noble 
IRREGULARITY, VHEMENCE, and ENTHUSIASM.123
Duff's terminology sounds remarkably like the creator-
oriented Edward Young. His emphasis is on originality and
newness, not on associations recognizable or common to the
consensus gentium. We will consider Duff in the next chapter
as a creator-oriented critic. His theories, however, do have
several elements of subject-oriented ideas in them. The
most obvious is this distinction between the two kinds of
genius: one is philosophic and rational, the other poetic
and enthusiastic. His idea of enthusiastic genius is, as
we shall see later, a creator-oriented one.
The dualistic interpretation of artistic imagination 
had finally led to a conflict between creativity and freedom. 
Was the artist indeed limited to associations of combined 
ideas, in itself an analytical process, or could he have the 
freedom of unique invention? The development of a dualistic 
interpretation of the imagination had proceeded from the
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pain-pleasure basis of experience, through Addison's 
aesthetic application, through Burke's exposition of human 
nature and Hume's skeptic approach to knowledge. Later 
philosophers like Gerard and Duff struggled with the inherent 
conflict between expression of the creative imagination in 
its traditional modes, and creative freedom. Nahra, for 
example, writes that the question of the sublime was raised 
in the eighteenth-century principally to account for the 
freedom of the artist to produce n o v e l t y . T h u s  we see 
that the subject-oriented method attempted to provide answers 
to some questions posed by the traditional object-oriented 
criticism--the functions of taste and the appeal of the 
irregular and "nobly wild"; the question of creative free­
dom; and the question of the relationship of art to external 
nature and to man's nature. These problems could not be 
fully resolved by a subject-oriented approach. The creator- 
oriented mode had an answer for many of these problems— or 
rather a non-answer--for it did not attempt to analyze the 
creative process, but called it inspiration, intuition, a 
gift of the muses, or a gift of God.
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CHAPTER V
THE CREATOR ORIENTATION
revere; That gives 
us pleasure. This gives us rapture; That informs, 
This inspires; and is itself inspired: for Genius
is from Heaven, Learning from Man: This sets us 
above the low, the illiterate; That above the learn­
ed, and polite. Learning is borrowed knowledge; 
Genius is knowledge innate, and quite our own.l
The changing critical attitude in eighteenth-century 
British thought can be illustrated not only by new defini­
tions of nature and the proliferation of modes of aesthetic 
experience, but by new definitions of art as well. Object- 
oriented critics tended to look at art in terms of its 
representation of nature; subject-oriented critics generally 
analyzed art as a stimulus which caused an association of 
ideas (effect) in the mind of the subject who experienced 
it. (Associationalism, as I pointed out in the last chapter, 
is founded on Hobbes’s theory that ideas are caused by the 
impression of sense data on the mind; the mind combines the 
the impressions to form thought. Locke added the idea that 
pain and pleasure serve to fix ideas in the mind.) Creator- 
oriented writers saw art in an entirely different light: art 
was deemed to be an expression of the artist's feeling--an
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ebulliton of his innermost character--and an insight into 
his creative, and sometimes his moral nature. This attitude 
toward art was a result of the critical focus on a defini­
tion of that quality in the artist (genius) which could 
make art. We shall see that the attitude toward the artist 
was the major focal point of this orientation; and that 
usually, other definitions arose from ideas about the 
creative qualities.
The creator orientation has three major features which 
will be discussed in this chapter: (1) genius is defined as
a creator of art, who has a power which is often identified 
with a "universal plastic nature", (2) the artist and his 
art are defined as particular rather than general, (3) the 
message or symbols of art as they are represented in a medium 
are but a small part of what is in the artist’s mind— in 
other words, his idea cannot be fully expressed in words (or 
in pictures). All of these ideas will be found in some 
degree or another in each of the creator-oriented writers 
to be discussed here. As was the case for the other orien­
tations, intrusions upon a pure orientation can be found in 
the form of various ideas which do not fit the main pattern; 
yet each of the writers selected for this part of the study, 
Shaftesbury, Young, Duff, and Blake, was obviously basically 
concerned with the character of the genius. It should also 
be noted that this perspective is a subjective one, as was 
the one previously discussed: the variables in the subject-
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oriented mode were taste, sensibilities, and associations 
of ideas within the subject; the variable in the creator- 
oriented mode is the creative power of the artist.
In order to clarify the creator orientation and to 
identify it as a distinct mode of thought we will discuss 
the ideological context of the mode, the two extreme state­
ments of the mode as represented by Shaftesbury and Blake 
(see outline in chapter two), and each of the three character­
istics just mentioned.
1
Abrams writes that "the year 1800 is a good round number"
to mark the displacement of mimetic and pragma tic inter-
2prêtât ions with the expressive. It will be remembered that 
there is a similarity between Abrams's mimetic-pragmatic-
3expressive orientations and in object-subject-creator modes. 
Abrams, however, sees the "expressive" as the orientation 
of the nineteenth-century Roman t ic theory rather than as 
a specific expression of eighteenth-century thought. He 
writes, for instance, that examples of the expressive are 
isolated in history, and that even Wordsworth's theory is 
"embedded in a traditional matrix of interests and emphasis."^ 
The creator orientation, as defined here, is indeed an 
eightcenth-cenfury critical mode which can be seen in its 
full expression in Shaftesbury, Edward Young, William Duff, 
and Blake. Some features of this mode can also be identified 
in a number of other eighteenth-century works as in intrusion
Ill
upon the writers' major critical mode. Such are the writings 
of Gerard, Kames, Blair, and Reynolds. These critics ex­
hibited some features of the creator orientation because it 
grew out of some of the same trends which caused their basic 
critical attitudes. All of these critical attitudes even­
tually flowed together toward the end of the century to mark, 
as Abrams said, the end of the dominance of two modes and 
the predominance of another, which for Abrams means the 
beginning of Romanticism. The creator mode is not Romanticism, 
but Romanticism is a result of a creator orientation.^ The 
critical point of view should not be confused with artistic 
style, which as we have seen in chapter one, is determined 
by content and by form. The content and form, however, can 
be influenced by the artist's perspective.
In the opening years of the century Shaftesbury 
spoke of the poet in terms of inspiration and feeling rather 
than reason;^as we shall see he was a classicist like Pope 
to the extent that he felt that the harmonious goodness of 
nature, rather than the passionate appetites guide the 
artist's (and all men's) actions. In raid century Edward 
Young wrote in warm tones about poetic enthusiasm, origi­
nality, and mystery. Less than a decade later, William Duff 
echoed the same sentiments. In the last quarter of the cen­
tury Blake was writing poetry by divine (or demonic) dicta­
tion and had devised a new engraving process with the help 
of a dead brother who appeared to him in a vision.^
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The attitude which directed attention toward the 
artist seems to have risen from several different sources 
in the eighteenth century. Although Shaftesbury was the 
student of the associationalist-empiricist Locke, his 
philosophy stemmed from the Cambridge Paltonists. Edward 
Young showed the eclectic influences of Addison, Shaftesbury, 
and perhaps Johnson. Duff seems to have had a copy of 
Addison in one hand and Young in the other. Blake's opinions 
were raised in the form of rebellion against almost everyone, 
although he would have agreed about certain points in 
Shaftesbury's and Young's ideas.
Shaftesbury's contemporaries, notably Addison, attempted 
to answer critical problems within the empiricist framework 
put forward by Hobbes and Locke; even the Earl's own protoge 
Hutcheson resorted to the associationa1ist pain-pleasure 
dichotomy to resolve the appeal of art and nature, and fit­
ted his mentor's internal sense theory into this mechanistic 
scheme. Shaftesbury himself, as we shall see later, saw 
in Locke's sensationalistist foundation of knowledge a 
definite threat to virtue and order. The problem simply 
stated is that if ideas are impressed on a tabula rasa then 
moral concepts are a matter of chance association rather 
than knowledge of right and wrong. Shaftesbury rejected 
associationalism in favor of older ideas. Burrows main­
tains that the influence of the classics on Shaftesbury can 
be followed in detail in a set of exercises which he wrote
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prior to his published works. Ancient sources are marginally
cited in his manuscripts; contemporary sources were not so
noted, but Burrows states that the ideas show the influence of
gDescartes, Hobbes, and the Cambridge Platonists.
The Cambridge Platonists were a school of philosophers 
centered at Cambridge University inthe seventeenth century 
who answered the mechanism of Hobbes with an interpretation 
based on Platonism mixed with Christianity, This spirit­
ualistic world view was an attempt to render Christian truths 
and scientific facts compatible. Brett says that the platonic 
view of this school was that this world is a symbolic repres­
entation of the spiritual w o r l d . S h a f t e s b u r y  adopted this 
idea and interpreted it on the level of human nature: the
world of human nature is a copy of the "larger universe," the 
world of the creator. The element in this philosophy which 
Shaftesbury drew upon was the active anima mundi principle 
which proposed to explain purposive behavior, growth, and 
change— features which the mechanistic world view failed to 
accoun t for.
Brett maintains that tie vital active capacity (con­
natural) of the mind was Shaftesbury's particular adaptation
1 2of the Platonists' anima mundi. In the place of "decaying 
sense," a passive role assigned to the imagination by Hobbes, 
Shaftesbury proposed the active principle in which the imagi­
nation assumes a creative nature, working with truth, beauty, 
and virtue. These it recognizes in its own mind and in the
275
mind of the creator.
Like Shaftesbury, Young drew upon a tradition other 
than Locke's associationalism, and at the same time he 
rejected the classical interpretation of art and creativity. 
There are certain elements in Young's Conjectures on Original 
Compos it ion which indicate his indebtedness to Johnson, 
Addison, Shaftesbury, and others, and at the same time antici­
pate Duff and Blake. For his inward directed, self searching 
criticism. Young seems to have been influenced by Shaftes­
bury's Advice to an Author: Young wrote.
Since it is plain that men may be strangers to their 
own abilities . . .  I borrow two golden rules from 
Ethics, which are no less golden in Composition, than 
in life. 1. Know theself; 2dly, Reverence t h y s e l f .13
He wrote further on, "contract full intimacy with the
Stranger within thee." As we shall see later, Shaftesbury
had expressed the same sentiment about the dual character
of man's nature, one side being virtuous, poetic, and of the
mind, the other being mean and commonplace.
Showing perhaps, the influence of Johnson, Young 
based his discussion of genius on the differences between 
imitation (in the Johnsonian sense of the word) and origi- 
anlity. Young, like Johnson, felt that imitation is a form 
of copying and that it is therefore inferior to originality, 
or newness. Originality is the product of genius. Young 
also relied on Addison, further developing his ideas of the 
two kinds of genius —  the natural and the trained--and 
calling them the adult and the infantine. He made the same
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observations and comparisons about these two kinds of genius 
as had Addison with the addition of the idea of a vegetable 
nature of poetic genius. Addison's observations, which 
had been subject-oriented, became creator oriented in Young 
because his definition of genius concentrated on the origi­
nality, enthusiasm, and mystery of creativity. Two brief 
passages from Young indicate the complete change in tone 
and emphas i s .
An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; 
it raises spontaneously from the vital root of 
Genius ; it grows, it is not made. . . .14
Genius is a Masterworkman, Learning is but an instru­
ment; and an Instrument, tho' most valuable, yet not 
always indis pensible. Heaven will not admit of a 
Partner in the accomplishment of some favorite Spirits; 
but rejecting all human means, assumes the whole 
glory to itself.I5
In the last quote Young seems to have divided genius into
two categories, the learned and the natural, as Addison
had done; but the whole tone really indicated that there is
only one kind of poetic genius —  the original, or natural.
The other category is composed of mere imitators. Young,
then was truly ecclectic, blending elements of Johnson's
object orientation, Addison's subject orientation, and
Shaftesbury's creator orientation into a single essay, which
seems to be a creator-oriented critical opinion rather than
a critical theory.
Duff's debt (1767) to the subject-oriented type of 
analysis is much more obvious than Young's use of sundry 
ideas. One might be tempted at first glance to classify
!77
his as a subject-oriented attitude because of its associa­
tion alistic structure, that is, its reliance upon sense 
data. Duff's use of sensationalism was much more sophis­
ticated than the very early ideas of Addison which Young 
relied upon. He too divided kinds of genius, but his dis­
tinctions were between the scientific, or philosophic, and 
the artistic. Scientific genius utilizes judgment based 
on the sense data (as in the subject-oriented mode of 
criticism), and artistic genius utilizes imagination. Artis­
tic imagination, we discover, is more similar to Shaftes­
bury's inward knowledge of self than to Johnson's inven­
tion. Duff used the terras en thus iasm and ins pifat ion in 
defining imagination:
. the word ENTHUSIASM, . . .  is almost uni­
versally taken in a bad sense; and, being con­
ceived to proceed from an overheated and distempered 
imagination, is supposed to imply weakness, super­
stition, and madness. ENTHUSIASM, in this modern 
sense, is in no respect a qualification of a Poet; 
in the ancient sense, which implied a kind of divine 
INSPIRATION, or an ardor of Fancy wrought up to 
Transport, we not only admit, but deem it an 
essential o n e .16
Blake seems to have drawn upon all of these tra­
ditions only to refute them. Genius, he felt, owes nothing 
to the past as it is entirely self-sufficient.
Knowledge of Ideal Beauty is Not to be Acquired.
It is Born with us. Innate Ideas are in Every 
Man, Born with him; they are truly Himself. The 
Man who says that we have No Innate Ideas must be 
a Fool & Knave, Having No Con-Science or Innate 
Scienc e .17
There are, however, certain features of the thoughts of
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Shaftesbury, Young, and Duff which Blake could have agreed
18with. He approved of some of Reynolds's statements.
Several of Shaftesbury's concepts, such as inspiration as 
an insight into the inner self, the particular nature of 
art, the plastic creative nature of genius, and the inexpres- 
sibility of the whole of the artist's idea, are all com­
patible with Blake's ideas. Duff's and Young's convictions 
about the originality, particularity, and inspirational 
nature of genius are also similar to Blake's ideas.
Thus the ideas of genius characteristic of the creator- 
oriented mode were drawn from numerous sources. We will 
examine these ideas which are central to the creator orien­
tation after a look at Shaftebusy, Blake, and Duff in the 
context of the submodes defined in chapter two. The sub­
modes are distinguished by two distinct ideas of genius: 
one of kind, one of degree. In one mode represented by 
Shaftesbury, the genius is believed to have characteristics 
held to some degree by all men; in the other mode represented 
by Blake, the genius is believed to be entirely unique.
II
The differencesbe tween Shaftesbury and Blake are so 
vast that it would seem strange to place them in the same 
critical system. Indeed, they exemplify two extremes of 
the creator-oriented attitude, while both Duff and Young 
represent a moderate position. The artist in Shaftesbury's 
mind was an archetype for the whole human race; for Blake the
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artist was an eccentric who was apparently of a different 
kind, not just a different degree, from the rest of
humanity. Shaftesbury, Blake, and Duff and Young, then, have
ideas about genius which represent three degrees on a 
continuira from an archetype of humans as a class, to an 
eccentric and irratic creative vehicle. Let us look at these 
ideas of genius and creativity.
To see the artist as an archetype of the race we have
to follow Shaftesbury through a lengthy reasoning process,
for the proofs of his theory are to be found in his moral
system, his epistemology, and his aesthetic theory. The
theory briefly stated is that nature is a symbol of the
supreme creator's mind, and art is similarily a symbol of
the artist-creator's mind. As the artist is an analogy to
God, a "creator of smaller worlds" on a lower plane and
is a "just Promethus under Jove," so is man in general
an analogy of the artist on yet a lower plane. We can
call man a v irtuoso, for as we shall see, the concept makes
ordinary men understand the artist, just as the artist
understands God. Shaftesbury compared the artist with
the ultimate creator, saying.
But for the man who truly and in a just sense 
deserves the name of poet, and who as a real master, 
or architect in the kind, can describe both man 
and manners, and give to an action its just body 
and porportions, he will be found, if I mistake 
not, a very different creature [form those poets 
who possess merely a facility of language]. Such 
a poet is indeed a second Maker ; a just Prometheus
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under Jove. . . . The moral artist who can
thus imitate the Creator, and is thus knowing 
in the inward form and structure of his fellow 
creature, etc..........
The artist who imitates the universal mind in the act
of creating, is understood by the virtuoso who is simply a
person who looks inward in order to be able to understand
poetical and moral truth. The sense which forms the basis
20of a vir tuoso is essential to the making of an artist.
In order to define this sense we must examine Shaftesbury's 
idea of the foundation of knowledge. Shaftesbury's episte- 
mology is a deinal of his teacher Locke's empiricism, al­
though he went to great pains to avoid direct confutation of 
the tabula rasa theory and Locke's censure of innate ideas.
He wrote to his friend Stanhope,
Thus I have ventured to make you the greatest
confidence in the world, which is that of my 
philosophy, even against my old tutor and gover­
nor, whose name is so established in the world, but 
with whom I ever concealed my differences as much 
as possible.21
Indeed, we have recourse only to his private letters for a 
direct disavowal of the innate principles. Shaftesbury 
felt that Locke was playing into the hands of the Hobbesists
in founding his theory of knowledge completely on experience.
In the same letter to Stanhope he said that "innate principles" 
was one of the "chi Idishest" disputes and that Hobbes "had 
already gathered laurels enough, and at an easy rate, from 
this field . "22
In the place of innate ideas, however, Shaftesbury
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proposed an inherent capacity to understand more than what
is received through the senses. He wrote in a letter to
Michael Ainsworth,
Twas Mr. Locke that struck all fundamentals, 
threw all order and v irtue out of the world, and 
made the very ideas of these (which are the same 
as those of God) unnatural, and without founda­
tion in our minds. Innate is a word he poorly 
plays upon: the right word, tho’ less used is
conna tural, for what had birth or progress o f 
the foetus out of the womb to do in this case? 
the question is not about the time the ideas 
enter'd, or the moment that one body came out 
of the other; but whether the constitution of 
man be such, that sooner or later (no matter when) 
the idea and sense of order, administration, and a 
God will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily 
spring up in h i m . 23
It is this connatural capacity which Shaftesbury referred
to in other places as an internal sense of right and wrong,
a moral sense.
The moral sense--which as vre have seen is not an
innate idea, but a connatural capacity--is formed when the
mind reflects upon the sense impressions. By means of
this reflected sense the mind naturally forms ideas about
actions and makes moral judgments upon them.
So in behavior and actions, when presented to our 
understanding, there must be found, of necessity, 
an apparent difference, according to the regularity 
or irregularity of the subjects. . . .
Thus the several motions, inclinations, passions, 
dispositions, and consequent carriage and behavior 
of creatures in the various parts of life, which 
readily discerns the good and ill Cowards the 
species or public, there arises a new trial or 
exercise of the heart, which must either rightly 
and soundly affect what is just and right, and 
disaffect what is contrary, or corruptly affect what 
is ill and disaffect what is worthy and g o o d . 24
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It is the same inner sense that makes judgments on
beauty. We will see later than one and the same sense is
responsible for both judgments because moral qualities (the
good) is the same as beauty.
No sooner the eye opens upon figures, the ear to 
sounds, than straight the beautiful results and 
grace and harmony are known and acknowledged. No 
sooner are actions viewed, no sooner the human af­
fections and passions discerned (and they are most
of them as soon discerned as felt) than straight an 
inward eye distinguishes, and sees the fair and 
shapely, the amiable and the admirable, apart from 
the deformed, the foul, the odious, or the dispicable.
Now, the mind is not passive in the Lockean sense as 
a vehicle which receives sense data and makes combinations 
of ideas; rather, it is an active principle which is creative 
in that it can make judgments upon the good and the beauti­
ful independently of the empirically based associations of 
ideas. One does not, for example, judge something good
because it gives pleasure in the Lockean sense, or because
it is useful to selfish goals in the Hobbesian sense. This 
creative, active principle of the connatural is universal.
The artist makes use of the creative capacity to make art; 
the virtuoso makes use of the creative capacity to appreciate 
art, and to acknowledge the good. The difference between 
the two is a matter of degree and application as well as of 
circumstance .
Shaftesbury recognized a difference of degree of
capability among men:
There are some persons indeed so hapily formed by 
Nature herself, that with the greatest simplicity
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or rudeness of education they have still some­
thing of a natural grace and comeliness in their 
action; and there are others of a better education 
who, by a wrong aim and injudicious affection of 
grace are of all people the furtherest removed from
it. 26
He also acknowledged the value of application to art, viz,
knowing the good and beautiful through learning.
'Tis undeniable, however, that the perfection of 
grace and comeliness in action and behavior can 
be found only among the people of a liberal edu- 
cat ion.27
No more can a genius alone make a poet, or good 
parts a writer in any considerable kind. The skill 
and grace of writing is founded, as our wise poet 
[Horace] tells us, in knowledge and good sense;
. . . from those particular rules of art which
philosophy alone exhibits.28
Those rules of philosophy are learned by the ancient maxim
"know theyself."
No one who was ever so little a while an in­
spector, could fail of becoming acquainted with 
his own heart. . . .  by constant and long in­
spection, the parties accustomed to the practice 
would acquire a peculiar speculative habit, so 
as virtually to carry about with them a sort of 
pocket-mirror, always ready and in use. In this, 
there were two faces which would naturally present 
themselves to our view, one of them, like the 
commanding genius . . . the other like that rude,
undisciplined, and headstrong creature whom we 
ourselves in our natural capacity most exactly 
resembled.29
The self inspection, of course, makes one aware of the uni­
versal goodness which is inherent in all of nature.
It is obvious that there is a beauty, a good, in the 
guise of form and action, but this is not independent of 
man as was the case for Hogarth's "S" curve and Reynolds's 
"central form." For these latter two critics, the beauti­
ful existed whether or not man was there to appreciate it.
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For Shaftesbury, however, man is an integral part of the
natural order, and goodness and beauty are an expression
of his active mind force. Beauty and goodness, and their
discovery, are not based on reason, which power comes from
the empirical senses. Such recognition comes instead from
within by introspection with the internal eye.
Finally, Shaftesbury's theory included an historical
attitude toward the arts which accounted for the different
geniuses of different times and places. He felt that the
ancients, for example, were masters because they were not
afraid to look at the inner self and to reflect their own
character in their art.^^ Certain circumstances of a poli-
31tical nature also influence where the arts prosper. Other
conditions, such as appreciation by contemporaries and the
32state of criticism were also noted. Thus, the poet, or 
artist, in Shaftesbury's mind is creator in a divine sense; 
his connatural capacities are shared, however, by the whole 
race. His special degree of ability is a result of "good 
parts," application, and circumstance.
At first Blake's artist seems to be a world apart from 
Shaftesbury's. Let us look at the dissimilarities (the 
similarities, as we shall see, are a plastic imagination, 
the particularlyty of art and of genius, and the inadequacy 
of artistic symbols). While Shaftesbury's genius had a 
liberal education and was a man of the world, Blake's 
genius was wildly irratic and at times at the mercy of his
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inspirational daemon. The poem Milton, Blake wrote, was 
taken entirely "from immediate dictation, twelve or some­
times twenty or thirty lines at a time, without Premeditation
3 3and even against my Will." Europe (1794) was also dic-
34tated. Blake recognized, as had Shaftesbury, the per­
nicious effect of empiricism and associâtionalism upon 
inspiration. He wrote in the margins of his copy of Reynolds's 
Discourses,
I read Burke's Treatise when very Young, at the 
same Time I read Locke . . .  & Bacon . . . on Every
one of these Books I wrote my Opinions, & on look­
ing them over find that my Notes on Reynolds in this 
Book are exactly Similar. I felt the Same Contempt 
& Abhorrence then that I do now. They mock 
Inspiration & V i s i o n . 35
Inspiration and vision were Blake's own poetic method. He
con tinued,
Inspiration & Vision was then & now is, & I hope 
will always Remain, my Element, my Eternal Dwell­
ing place. . . .36
In an appeal for inspiration he poetically opened the First
Book o f Urizen with these words:
Eternals! I hear you call gladly.
Dictate swift winged words and fear not 
To unfold your dark visions of t o r m e n t . 37
While Shaftesbury's genius was, again, cultivated and
educated— a gentleman of society— Blake's genius was eccentric,
non-social, naturalistic, and primitistic in a Rousseaustic
sense. This set of qualities was reflected in Blake's own
behavior which was, as Brooks points out, typical of the 
3 8poete Maud i t . Blake's symptoms along with these lines were
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these: (1) a conviction of his own inspired genius., (2) his
rebellion against society, (3) ungoverned imagination,
) feelings of rejection by society, (5) conviction that
39genius must suffer, (6) melancholy, and other traits.
Since the poet and artist is to rely on the muses, he is not
in need of the imitation of others; thus, Blake despised
the Royal Academy and all that it stood for, training, polite
society, riches, and "Polite Art." He wrote of the Academy
and training:
Having spent the Vigour of my Youth & Genius under 
the Oppression of S^ Joshua & his Gange of Cunning
Hired Knaves Without Employment & as much as could
possibly be Without Bread, The Reader must Expect 
to Read in all my Remarks on these Books Nothing 
but Indignation & Resentment, While S^ Joshua was 
rolling in Riches, Barry was Poor & Unemployed except 
by his own Energy; Mortimer was call'd a Madman, &
Only Portrait Painting applauded & rewarded by the 
Rich & Great.40
While Shaftesbury respected the value of education, 
Blake's contempt for training, education— the whole regimin 
prescribed by Reynolds and generations of classicists--is 
easily demonstrated in the marginalia to the Discourses. His 
opinion on this matter was based on the conviction of inspira­
tion as the soul of art, and a theory of innate ideas. The
artist cannot add to his stock of artistic ideas and imitate 
in the sense Reynolds intended; he can only rely upon his 
own imagination.
Identities or Things are Neither Cause no Effect.
They are Eternal. Reynolds Thinks that Man Learns 
all that he knows. I say on the Contrary that Man 
Brings All that he has or can have Into the World
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How very anxious Reynolds is to Disprove &
Condemn Spiritual Pe r c e p t i o n ; 4 2
Here [Discourse VII] is a great deal to do to 
Prove that All Turth is Prejudice, for All that 
is Valuable in Knowledge is Superior to Demon­
strative Science, such as is Weighed or Measured.
Finally, genius for Blake is unique to the artist who
possesses it; it is not a quality which is spread among the
race, but rather it is granted to individuals. The genius of
Michelangelo and of Blake, for instance, is particular, and
theirs alone: "Genius dies with its Possessor & comes not
again till Another is Born with i t . Y e t ,  however unique
genius may be, Blake indicated that there is an element of
the universal in it, a sort of power or source which inspires
those who have it. The prophets of religions partake of
this genius, or spiritual inspiration; he wrote in 1798:
The Religions of All Nations are derived from each 
Nation's different reception of the Poetic Genius, 
which is every where called the Spirit of Pro­
phesy.45
The basic idea in Blake, however, is that genius is unique 
to the individual, even though it may be his personal inter­
pretation of the universal genius analogous to the prophetic 
genius.
Duff's ideas of genius were similar to Shaftesbury's 
in that genius is a matter of degree. Genius according to 
Duff was very much like the genius described by the subject- 
oriented Addison, and the object-oriented Reynolds and 
Pope. Like these earlier writers. Duff divided genius into 
two categories along the lines of judgment and feeling,
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training, and naturalness. These two kinds of genius, how­
ever, are philosophical and poetic, rather than the trained 
and natural which Addison recognized. This is a very 
important difference: using the sensationalist structure and 
the premise of sentiment, or feeling. Duff distinguished 
a scientific, controlled creativity which was based on 
judgment of the empirical data of the senses, from a sensi­
tive, enthusiastic and inspired genius. "Philosophers," 
he said,
have distinguished two general sources of our ideas; 
from which we draw all our knowledge, SENSATION and
REFLECTION.46
He described two kinds of genius, noting that the scientific
is marked by accuracy and the poetic by enthusiasm.
The kind of Imagination most property adapted to 
Original Philosphic Genius, is that which is dis­
tinguished by REGULARITY, CLEARNESS, and ACCURACY.
The kind peculiar to Original Genius in Poetry, 
is that whose essential properties are a noble 
IRREGULARITY, VEHEMENCE, and ENTHUSIASM.47
Duff's solid foundation of genius on sensationalism
places his theory in the same sub-mode as Shaftesbury's,
though for different reasons. Shaftesbury's genius becomes
aware of truth and beauty through introspection and insight;
he looks to an inner principle which is shared by the race.
4 8Although Duff's genius is fired by poetic inspiration, 
all imaginations are similarly dependent upon common faculties 
of the mind which Duff understands in an associationalist 
f ramework.
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Imagination is that faculty whereby the mind not 
only reflects on its own operations, but which 
assembles the various ideas conveyed to the under­
standing by the canal of sensation, and treasured 
up in the repository of the memory, compounding or 
disjoining them at pleasure; and which by its 
Plastic power of inventing new associations of 
ideas, and of combining them with infinite variety, 
is enabled to present a creation of its own, and 
to exhibit scenes and objects which never existed 
in nature.49
Thus all minds are similar. The differences are not of
kind, but of degree. By degree Duff understands a mixture,
a balance of faculties.
Genius discovers itself in a vast variety of forms, 
we have already observed, that those forms are dis­
tinguished and characterized by one quality common 
to all, possessed indeed in very different degrees, 
and exerted in very different capacities; this quality, 
it will be understood, is Imagination.50
Duff's idea of genius was analytical, and if his 
critical theory were to be based on a consideration of that 
analysis alone, it would be as subject-oriented as Addison's. 
However, he allowed the important elements of inspiration, 
originality, and plastic imagination to raise poetic genius 
to the creative capacities of Shaftesbury's and Blake's. Only 
the scientific genius is limited entirely by the empirical 
data and subjected to reason.
Ill
I have pointed out three ideas in particular which 
were held in common by the four eighteenth-century writers 
whose critical attitudes were basically creator-oriented: a 
plastic imagination and originality, the particularity of
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art, and the inexpras sib ility of the complete idea of the 
artist's mind in symbolic or material form. Each of these 
will be discussed in turn. As to the first, the most 
striking similarity among these critics was the use of the 
word "plastic" with reference to the imagination. In the 
arts plastic was used in two major senses, that of an active 
molding princple, and that which was itself passively mold­
ed. Shaftesbury used the word in its first sense as an 
active principle; he wrote about the artist.
Like that sovereign artist or universal plastic 
nature, he forms a whole, coherent and porportion- 
ed in itself, with due subjection and subordinancy 
of constituent parts.51
The universal plastic nature is an active principle— the
creator— aid the artist is equated with it in his powers: the
principle and its actualization are identical.
The plasticity of nature is the principle of the
animi mundi to which the Cambridge Platonists attributed the
vital principle of growth in the universe. Ralph Cudworth,
one of the Platonists, developed the plastic theory as a
creative process of vegetable nature, in terms that were
applied later to criticism by both Shaftesbury and Young.
Cudworth wrote that plastic nature is the principle
by which vegetables may be severally organized and 
framed, and all things performed which transcend 
the power of fortuitous m e c h a n i s m . 52
Young also compared the workings of genius with the 
vegetable world, an analogy which could have been drawn from 
Addison's concept of the great in natural vistas, but seems
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more likely to have come from Shaftesbury's identity of 
plastic nature and artistic creativity. "An Original," 
he said, "is of a vegetable nature."
Duff also referred to the plastic nature of imagina­
tion, saying that genius is composed of a "PLASTIC and 
COMPREHENSIVE IMAGINATION, an ACCUTE INTELLECT, and an 
exquisite SENSIBILITY and REFINEMENT of T A S T E , b u t  of 
all these
faculties of which Genius is composed, imagination 
bears the principal and most distinguishing part, 
so of course it will and ought to be the predominant 
one.54
Imagination, it will be remembered, is an associative power.
That power, however composed of compounding and associating
principles of memory, was described by Duff as divine fury
with, a force of inspiration.
A glowing ardor of Imagination is indeed (if we may 
be permitted the expression) the very soul of 
Poetry. It is the principal source of INSPIRATION; 
and the Poet who is possessed of it, like the Delphian 
Priestess, is animated with a kind of DIVINE FURY.55
All of these writers, then, referred to the imagina­
tion, or genius, in terms of plastic creativity, or as in the 
case of Young, as a vegetable nature. The particular mean­
ing of plasticity needs to be questioned at this point.
Abrams suggests that the eighteenth-century concept of 
plastic nature was a type of combination of parts; he offers 
a quote from John Ogilvie to substantiate this position. 
Olgivie's associative idea of plasticity and creativity does 
not clarify Shaftesbury's own idea, for Ogilvie fits into
292
the subject-oriented pattern of criticism with intrusions 
of creator-oriented i d e a s . S h a f c e s b u r y  himself was 
very clear on the matter of artistic creation: it is, he 
said, a creation analogous to the universe (and the universe 
was certainly not created from an association of ideas).
To investigate Shaftesbury's idea of plastic creativity 
as a realization of artistic method more closely, we need 
to look at his idea of nature. While we could outline his 
definition of nature in a format similar to those in chapter 
three, it would give a false impression of his concept of 
nature by breaking it into sets of modes which would fit 
certain critical needs. This is just what Reynolds and 
Johnson had done because they were more interested in the 
reflection of nature in art media than in the character of 
that nature as a symbol of creativity. As a moralist, 
Shafterbusy was interested first in the goodness of nature, 
next in the mind of man which could recognize and convey 
it, and finally in its representation in art. He thus saw 
nature as a whole system with various manifestations, all of 
which were natural to it and good as a total system. His 
ideas of nature are difficult, if not impossinle, to separate 
from beauty, virtue (the good), the particular, and most 
important, from an animated principle of creativity--the 
mind .
Nature in Shaftesbury's theory is comprised of three 
elements: the principle which makes it, that which appears to
the senses, and the mind itself. Each aspect of nature is a
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part of a whole; everything in the universe is interconnected
in an entirely interdependent system which extends even to
the invisible structure.
Neither man nor any other animal, though ever so 
complete a system of parts as to all within, can 
be allowed in the same manner complete as to all 
without, but must be considered as having a further 
relation abroad to the system of his kind. So even 
this system of his kind to the animal system, this 
to the world (our earth), and this again to the
higher world and to the u n i v e r s e . 58
This type of universal order which binds everything into a
whole is proof of an active principle.which unifies it.
Now having recognized this uniform consistent fabric, 
and owed the universal system, we must of consequence 
acknowledge a unversal mind, which no ingenious man 
can be tempted to disown, except through the imagina­
tion of disorder in the universe, its s e a t . 59
Shaftesbury's universe is a moral one that everything 
works in a way that is good for its own natural state; like­
wise the whole system works in a way that is good for the 
whole.
For we know that every particular nature certainly 
and constantly produces what is good to itself, un­
less something foreign disturbs or hinders it, 
either by overpowering and corrupting it within, 
or by violence from without. . . . If, therefore
every particular nature can be thus constantly and 
unerringly true to itself, and certain to produce 
only what is good for itself and conduction to its 
own right state, shall not the general one, the nature 
of the whole, do full as much?”^
Now, since the wlio 1 e is good, it is also beautiful.
Here Shaftesbury shows admiration for the irregular things
in nature as well as what most people considered the ugly
in nature, mountains, craggs, snakes, monsters.
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All ghastly and hideous as they appear, they 
want not their peculiar beauties. The wildness 
pleases. . . . We view her in her innermost
recesses, and contemplate her with more delight 
in these original wilds than in the artificial 
labyrinths and feigned wilderness of the palace.
The objects of the place, the scaly serpents, the 
savage beasts, and poisonous insects, how terrible 
soever, or how contrary to human nature, are beautious 
in th ems elves, and fit to raise our thoughts in admir­
ation of that devine wisdom, so far superior to 
our short views.^1
All of this that is laid to the eyes is beautiful and good.
It is also an emanation of the divine author of the universe;
6 2it is, he wrote, but a "faint shadow of that first beauty."
The individual is also a faint shadow, or part of that
original mind which made the universe. The self is
a real self drawn out and copied from another 
principle and original self (the Great One of the 
World), I endeavour to be really one with it, 
and comfortable to it so far as I am able. I con- 
consider that, as there is one general mass, one 
body of the whole, so to this body there is an 
order, to this order a mind. . .
It is this mind of the universe, and of the artist 
which is an active, creative force--a principle that realizes 
the good and beautiful. This force creates the universe, 
one of the larger world, and the other of a smaller world-- 
the world of art. The universal artist has the power to 
form the original of the universe; the artistic mind par­
takes of the same kind of originality in its creation of the 
arts. The active plastic mind of the artist contemplates 
its inner self in order to create the originals of art; it 
is limited only by the principle of its inner self, which 
is good and beautiful.
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The artist has the choice of copying after the one
self which is external, or creating from that which is
internal, thus making an original. And that plastic
principle of the mind is the most beautiful, it is superior
to the things it creates, just like the universal creator
is superior to the world it creates.
Of all forms, then . , . those . . . are the most
amiable, and in the first order of beauty, which 
have a power of making other forms t h e m s e l v e s . ^4
Following this line of reasoning we can see that the
superior beauty is the mind Cgoodness); next in order is the
life, the body which can create other life; finally the arts
and innert matter have a beauty which is inferior to the
former two,^^ It is then the innate, the creative, the
plastic imagination on which Shaftesbury's criticism is
centered.
Neither Young nor Duff was as systematic as Shaftes­
bury in his critical opinions, but each reflected the 
same attitude concerning the originality of the artistic 
imagination and focused upon it rather than that which was 
produced by it, or upon how one reacted to it. Young wrote, 
"I begin with Original composition," but he was actually 
concerned with original imagination. The "original" is of 
a vegetable nature. He turned to a discussion of the 
maker of that original rather than to the characteristics of 
art. He wrote that what we mean by genius is
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the Power of accomplishing great things without 
the means generally reputed necessary to that 
end. A Genius differs from a good Understanding, 
as a Magician from a good Architect; That raises 
his structure by means invisible; This by the 
skillful use of common tools. Hence Genius has 
ever been supposed to partake of something Divine.
Young's genius, like Shaftesbury's genius, draws upon
his own inner power of creativity. He does not need rules,
guides, for they "like Crutches are a needful Aid to the
Lame, tho' an Impediment to the S t r o n g . Y o u n g ,  like
Shaftesbury, advised the author to draw upon the inner self
for inspiration. Know and reverence thyself, he said so
6 8"as to prefer the native growth of thy own mind." The
force of the creative mind is the source of originality; he
worte in words which could have been inspired by Shaftesbury,
Therefore dive deep into thy bosom; learn the depth, 
extent, bias, and full fort of thy mind; contract 
full intimacy with the Stranger within thee; excite, 
and cherish every spark of Intellectual light and 
heat, however somothered under former negligence, or 
scattered through the dull, dark mass of common thoughts; 
and collecting them into a body, let they Genius rise 
(if a Genius thou hast) as the sun from Chaos; and 
if I should then say, like an Indian, worship i t . . . .
In the same vein as Shaftesbury and Young, Duff said,
"the artist must draw all his stores from h i m s e l f . T h e
knowledge or power from the self may be in the form of
inspiration, of which Duff said,
ORIGINAL GENIUS will naturally discover itself in 
visions. This is a species of fiction, to succeed 
in which with applause, requires as much poetic 
Inspiration as any other species of composition 
whatever. That Enthusiasm of Imagination, which 
we considered as an essential characteristic of 
original Genius, is indispensibly necessary to the 
enraptured Bard, who would make his Readers feel
29 7
those impetuous transports of passion which occupy 
and actuate his own mind.^l
Thus, Duff's genius, like Shaftesbury's and Young's, had to 
rely on the original creative force of his own mind, a 
force which was realized when he contemplated it in the 
language of Shaftesbury and Young, or when he relinquished 
himself to it in Duff's terms.
Blake referred to the imagination in the same meta­
phoric language as Young; he referred to the powers of 
artistic creativity as an innate capacity comparable to
vegetable life, "Man is Born like a Garden ready Planted 
7 26 Sown." The production of the artist's mind is also more
than the sum of everything that he knows. He is thus able 
to create from within to make things and ideas in an original 
fashion.
Man's perceptions are not bounded by organs of 
perception; he perceives more than sense (tho' 
ever so accute) can discover. Reason, or the 
ratio of all we have already known, is not the 
same as it shall be when we know more.73
Genius, then, for all of these creator-oriented critics 
depended on an inner quality which was derived from some­
thing other than the external senses. It did not depend 
on a study of nature or of past art; it did not depend on 
a superior ability to combine and contrast ideas. Rather, 




All of these creator-oriented writers emphatically 
denied the central issue of the object-oriented attitude 
that good art is a generalization, an abstract, or the 
non-particular. Shaftesbury and Blake especially brought 
up this issue again and again; they equated the sublime with 
the particular. The subject-oriented Burke had equated 
sublimity with obscurity. It must be noted, however, that 
neither Shaftesbury nor Blake recognized the sublime as a 
distinct aesthetic category; it was for them a superior 
form of b eauty .
Shaftesbury's philosophy was built upon the particular. 
The particular being is a special aspect of the mind of the 
creator; not only does it work toward its own good, toward 
the good of its species, and the good of the whole universe, 
it is beautiful in its own right. Its beauty arises from 
its innate goodness. The particular beauty of a thing, 
animate or inanimate, is exceed by the beauty of a particular 
being, and in turn by the particular mind. Shaftesbury's 
critical opinions were consistent with his philosophical 
opinions. Contrary to the generally accepted attitude of 
his time, he felt that the particular, rather than the 
general, should be the subject of art. This held true for 
painting as well as for literature.
In painting, Shaftesbury acknowledged that portraiture 
should represent the particular man. a position which he did
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not have to defend to his contemporaries. He disagreed 
with many on the issue of drapery; he believed that moderns 
should be represented as moderns in dress and in manners. 
Writing about the custom of painting men in general costume 
he said,
the poor pencil-man is put to a thousand shifts, 
whilst he strives to dress us in affected habits, 
such as we never wore; because should he paint us 
in those we really wear, they would of necessity 
make the piece to be so much more ridiculous as it 
was more natural and resembling.
We should not be afraid to look at ourselves as we are he
said. Then paint the moderns in modern dress. Also be not
afraid to depict modern habits of thought and action.
Our commerce and manner of conversation which we 
think the politest imaginable, is such, it seems, 
as we ourselves cannot endure to see represented 
to the l i f e . 75
As the painter should paint specific manners and habits of
dress, the modern writer,
whoever he be, amoung us moderns, who shall venture 
to bring his fellow-moderns into dialogue, must 
introduce them in their proper manners, genius,
behavior and m a n n e r . 76
Shaftesbury's idea of particular human nature is very 
different from Johnson's general nature, and Reynolds's cen­
tral form.
Since all of the parts of nature are good and beauti­
ful, each particular is deserving of aesthetic attention. He 
gives himself over to the appeal of the wild and rugged, and 
the particular on this philosophy.
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I shall no longer resist the passion growing in 
ir.e for things of a natural kind, where neither 
art nor the conceit or caprice of man has spoiled 
their genuine order by breaking in upon that 
primitive state. Even the rude rocks, the mossy 
caverns, the irregular unwrought grottos and 
broken falls of waters, with all the horrid graces 
of the wilderness itself, as representing Nature 
more, will be the more engaging, and appear with 
a magnificence beyond the formal mockery of princely 
gardens. . . .  ̂̂
Shaftesbury's taste for the naturalness of untamed vistas is
similar to Dennis's, Addison's, and Burke's, but it is
founded on a different principle, that is, on the innate
goodness of the particular.
Young made two short remarks about the ideas of the
general and the particular. His definition of originality,
like Duff's later, implied particularlity in both art and
in creative imagination. He wrote, "and as. for a general
Genius, there is no such thing in nature; A Genius implies
the rays of the mind concenter'd, and determined to some
particular p o i n t . I n  writing of imitation he reflected
some of Johnson's ideas on the matter, viz, that imitation
has ill effects (he named three), but he went much further
than Johnson in his emphasis on originality and countered
him on the issue of generality:
She [Nature] brings us into the world all Originals :
No two faces, no two minds, are just alike; but all 
bear Nature's evident mark of Separation on them. Born 
Originals, how comes it to pass that we die copies?
That medling Ape Imitation. . . .
Duff's emphasis on originality was similar to Young's, 
with the same implication that the products of originality
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are particular in nature. "That vivacity of description,"
he wrote, "which we have observed to be characteristica1
of a great Genius, will in the writings of an original
8 0one be of a kind peculiar and uncommon." This original
genius is characterized by "an IRREGULAR GREATNESS, WILDNESS,
81and ENTHUSIASM of Imagination." Upon an examination of 
these properties we see that all of these features of original 
genius are constituted of particularities. Wildness, for 
example, "an infallible proof of a fertile and luxuriant
p .,82 .fancy, is
formed by an arbitrary assemblage of the most extra­
vagant, uncommon, and romantic ideas, united in the 
most fanciful combinations; and is displayed in 
grotesque figures, in surprising sentiments, in 
picturesque and inchanting description.®^
Duff's own enthusiastic language describing original genius
is interesting.
Ordinary minds seldom rise above the dull uniform 
tenor of common sentiments, like those animals that 
are condemned to creep on the ground all the days 
of their life; but the most lawless excursions of 
an original Genius, like the flight of an eagle, 
are towering, though devious; its path, as the course 
of a comet, is blazing, though irregular; and its 
errors and excellencies are equally i n i m i t a b l e . 84
Blake was even more adamant about the particularity
of art and genius than Shaftesbury, Young, and Duff. In
his annotations to Reynolds he criticized the general and
the central form again and again. "To generalize," he
commented,
is to be an Idiot. To Particularize is the Alone 
Distinction of Merit. General Knowledges are those 
Knowledges that Idiots p o s s e s s . 85
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And again he wrote, "Minute Discrimination is not Accidental.
8 6All Sublimity is founded on Minute Discrimination." Where
Reynolds wrote that mere facility in neat imitations do
nothing more than amuse —  that the artist must endeavor to
improve the particularities of nature by the grandeur of
his imagination— Blake countered with, "Without Minute
Natness of Execution the Sublime cannot Exist! Grandeur
8 7of Ideas is founded on Precision of Ideas." Blake's con­
cept of the sublime as precision and clean out line was 
certainly different from Burke's obscurity.
As for Reynolds's idea that particularities are 
accidental deviations from the central form, the intent of 
nature, Blake said.
One Central Form composed of all other Forms being 
Granted, it does not therefore follow that all 
other Forms are Deformity. All Forms are Perfect in 
the Poet's Mind, but these are not Abstracted nor 
Compounded from Nature, but are for Imagination.
What is General Nature? is there such a Thing?
What is General Knowledge? is there such a Thing? 
Strictly Speaking all Knowledge is P a r t i c u l a r . 88
Blake then believed that genius, art, and ideas are parti­
cular, each, one of its kind. It was of course for this 
reason that the artist had to rely upon his own imagination 
for his materials. In his Annotations to Lavater he under­
lined the phrase W ho can produce what none else can, has 
99GENIUS, in apparent concurence with the idea. Shaftesbury, 
Duff, Young, and Blake all agreed upon the point of 
particularity although each drew upon a different tradition 
and used different language to express the point. Parti-
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cularity was for each of these critics an expression of
original and plastic genius
V
The inexpressibi1ity of art, witnessed to by all of 
these creator-oriented writers, was more than the je ne s cay 
quay so often used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
to indicate something in art which is appealing yet un­
identifiable. Shaftesbury himself used the term to indicate 
something in art which the viewer or reader could not identify, 
At the same time he had a theory that although the writer 
should be fully aware of his idea, he may have difficulty 
in cr 'ing its totality to the audience.
HcwC Tr difficult or desperate it may appear in any 
artist to endeavour to bring perfection into his 
own work, if he has not the least idea of perfection 
to give him aim he will be found very defensive and 
mean in his performance. Though his intention be 
to please the world, he must nevertheless be . . .
above i t .  . , the rest of mankind feeling only the
effect whilst ignorant of the cause, term the je ne 
scay quoy, the unte11igib 1e ; or the I know not what, 
and suppose to be kind of charm or enchantment of 
which the artist himself can give no account.90
This passage appears to indicate that even though the
artist is aware of his own clear ideas of beauty he may not
be able to fully express their totality in symbolic form.
This kind of interpretation is perfectly compatible with the
rest of Shaftesbury's philosophy. Nature, he said, is a
symbol of the creator's mind, yet the entirety of that mind
and of that idea is not clearly and completely understandable
in the symbolic form of material nature. By analogy, art is
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a symbol of the artist's mind, and that expression is 
likewise but a faint shadow of its own cause. Let us follow 
Shaftesbury through the arguments.
Shaftesbury discovered three types or orders of beauty,
thy highest form of which is the mind of God who fashioned
all things in nature— forms, as well as the mind of man.
The hierarchy of beauty from bottom to top is: (1) inert
matter including inaminate forms and art, (2) aninate forms
which can recreate their own kind, and in the case of man,
can make art, (3) the source of all things material and
of other formings mind, the mind of God.
Do you not see . . . that you have established three 
degrees or orders of beauty? And How? Why first, 
the dead forms, as you properly have called them, 
which bear a fashion, and are formed, whether by 
man or Nature, but have no forming power, action, 
or intelligence. Right. Next, and as the second 
kind, the forms which form, that is, which have 
intelligence, action, and operation . . . [You
have] discovered that third order of beauty, which 
forms not only such as we call mere forms but even 
the forms which f o r m . 91
The mind of God which makes all other minds and matter it­
self it not only the highest beauty, it is also the source 
of all beauty.
For we ourselves are notable architects in matter, 
and can show lifeless bodies wrought into form, 
and fashioned by our own hands, but that which 
fashions even minds themselves, contains in itself 
all the beauty fashioned by those minds, and is 
consequently the principle, source, and fountain 
of all beauty.92
All of these lower forms and minds of beauty which were
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fashioned by the mind of God are but faint shadows of the
original; "For if we may trust to what our reasoning has
taught us, whatever in Nature is beautiful or charming
93is only a faint shadow of that first beauty."
The same is true in art as in nature. Beauty is more 
than what is represented in material form, and its mani­
festations are but a faint shadow of their originals
represented in actions. Art, he said is of the lowest
94order of beauty, but there is a higher beauty which
can be discovered— sentiments--which are revealed in actions
There is a beauty superior to
those fabrics of architecture, sculpture, and the 
rest of the sort of the greatest beauties which 
man forms.
, , . you sentiments, your resolutions, principles,
determinations, actions; whatever is handsome and 
noble in the kind; whatever flows from your good 
understanding, sense, knowledge, and will; whatever 
is engendered in your heart . . .  or derives itself 
from your parent-mind, . . .95
This divine beauty of the inner self which is revealed in
action, sentiment, and resolution is not at first apparent
to the perceiving mind, nor is it ever fully realized in
symbolic form by its author. It is discovered by an inner
eye, through the method of dialogue, and realized in a life
style of the artist who is the "architect of his own life
and f o r t u n e . W e  can see here that the artist is not
only one who forms matter, but one who acts virtuously,
thinks virtuously, who is indeed a virtuoso. He said that
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9 7"Everyone is a virtuoso of a higher or lower degree." Thus,
although beauty may exist in the mind of its author, whether 
artist or virtuoso, it is never fully expressed in symbol, 
just as nature is not a full symbolic expression of the 
original Mind because the limitations of material and symbol 
are inadequate to the power of the forming principle of 
plastic creativity.
Young went much further than Shaftesbury on the matter 
of the unknown in art; he called it a "mystery" which even 
the artist might not understand. As we have seen. Young's 
idea of the artist as two persons was similar to Shaftes­
bury's distinction between the inner self and the material 
self. Young also drew upon this inner self for poetic 
inspiration. Whereas Shaftesbury's author was aware of the 
moral--the beautiful mind— Young's poet was likely as not 
unaware of his full powers.
There is something is poetry beyond Prose-reason ; 
there are Mysteries in it not to be explained, but 
admired.
Nor are we only ignorant of the dimentions of the 
human mind in general, but even of our own. .
A man may be scarce less ignorant of his own powers, 
than an Oyster of its pearl, or a rock of its 
diamond. . . . Few authors of distinction but have
experienced something of this nature. . . .9 8
Duff, like Shaftesbury before him, and Blake after him, 
felt that the artist was hampered by the limitations of his 
medium in the expression of his idea. It is for this reason, 
for example, that the artist will resort to figurative and
metaphorical speech,
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The ordinary modes of speech being unable to 
express the grandeur of the strength of his 
conceptions, appear FLAT and LANGUID to his 
ardent Imagination. In order therefore to 
supply the poverty of common language, he has 
recourse to METAPHORS and IMAGES; which, though 
they may sometimes occaion the want of percision, 
will always elevate his style, as well as give a 
peculiar dignity and energy to his sentiments.
This uncommon use of language may cause the reader to attri­
bute obscurity to the author's meaning.
An original Author indeed will frequently be apt 
to exceed in the use of his ornament, by pouring 
forth such a blaze of iraagry, as to dazzle and 
overpower the mental fight; the effect of which is, 
that his Writings become obscure, if not unin­
telligible to common Readers; just a s the eye is for 
some time rendered incapable of distinguishing the 
objects that are presented to it, after having 
steadfastly contemplated the sun.100
Thus, the poetic imagination is often even incapable of 
conveying its own ideas which are too powerful, too 
brilliant for expression. The artist often fails in his 
expressions, "Revolving these awful and magnifleant dcences 
in his musing mind, he labours to express in his composi­
tions the ideas which dilate and swell his Imagination; but 
is often unsuccessful in his efforts.
Blake's expression of this idea is rather less explicit 
than his predecessors' in this critical mode; his ideas seem 
more the frustrations of a misunderstood poet than a concept 
of the inexpressibility of great ideas. Blake indeed, had 
said that sublimity needs preciseness of execution; this idea 
as we have seen was his own interpretation of the particularity 
of art and creativity. However, Blake did have a notion that
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the idea in the artist's mind is larger than the capacity
of the common people to understand it. Typically this comes
out in the form of conflict with contemporary taste. He
wrote in a letter to Dr. Trusler for whom he was doing
some illustrations:
You say that I want somebody to Elucidate my Ideas.
But you ought to know that What is Great is 
necessarily obscure to Weak men. That which can 
be made Explicit to the Idiot is not worth my 
care. The wisest of the Ancients consider'd what 
is not too Explicit as the fittest for Instruction, 
because it rouses the faculties to act. I name 
Moses, Salomon, Esop, Homer, P l a t o . 102
Explaining the difference between his own imagination which
comprehends more than others, and Trussler's, which is
exemplary of common imaginations, he went on,
I see Every thing I paint in This World, but Every 
body does not see alike. . . . The tree which
move some to tears of joy is in the Eyes of others 
only a Green thing that stands in the way. Some 
See Nature all Ridicule & Deformity, & by these I 
shall not regular my porportions; & Some Scarce 
see Nature at a l l . 103
Duff expressed the same sentiment, writing, "objects or
events may be viewed in very different lights by different
persons, and admit of great variety in the presentation.
Blake further explained his own imagination, justifying
those ideas which were not clear to Trussler, in terms which
are similar to Shaftesbury's conviction that imagination
comes from an inner understanding rather than from a
knowledge of external forms.
But to the Eyes of the Man of Imagination, Nature 
is Imagination itself. As a man is. So he Sees. As
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the Eye is formed, such are its Powers. You cer­
tainly Mistake, when you say that the Visions of 
Fancy are not to be found in This World. To Me 
This World is all One continued Vision of Fancy 
or Imagination. . . .10^
There were of course specifics on which all four of 
these creator-oriented writers would have disagreed; but 
their definitions of a plastic, inner genius, of a creative 
imagination are similar to one another. Each had a con­
cept of art as an expression of this inner creative quality 
in theartist. Each felt that art was an expression of the 
particular rather than the general, and that genius itself 
was particular. The enthusiasm of creative genius, the 
personal character of art, and the particularity of expres­
sion are all ideas which were contrary to generally accepted 
traditional object-oriented interpretations, and to the 
eighteenth-century associationalistic subject-oriented 
aesthetic psychology.
V
The creator orientation was an attitude which was 
characteristic of one aspect of the eighteenth century. It 
grew out of the same traditional sources that helped frame 
the object and subject orientations; it also grew out of the 
tradition of Cambridge Platonism which was formulated to 
refute materialism and empiricism. Thus, creator-oriented 
criticism was at its root a struggle of contrary forces and 
trends. There was a very strong element of rebellion and 
rejection of traditional critical standards in it. The
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call for enthusiasm by Shaft esbury and Young, the appeal 
of the dark and mysterious of Young's original genius,
Blake's visions, and the soaring inspiration of Duff's 
irregular genius, all deny the regular, planned, and empiri­
cal genius and art recommended by Reynolds, Johnson,
Pope, Dennis, Blake, Hutcheson, Gerard, and Keynes. The 
denial of the particular was contrary to the ideas of Avison, 
Pope, Reynolds, Johnson, and other classicists.
The creator orientation can be detected from the 
earliest years of the century in the lone voice of 
Shaftesbury. By the middle to late years of the period 
Young and Duff expressed stronger, yet less systematic 
versions of the same ideas. At the same time, elements of 
the attitude were affecting even the criticism of Reynolds 
who expressed this intrusion as an admiration for the power­
ful, individual creative force of Michelango's mind. By 
the last years of the century several critics talked about 
the individual, the particular, and the inner creative force 
of the artist and his special relationship with beauty (or 
truth); the artist had to struggle to express his idea in
the limited materials of artistic symbol. Abrams refers
ef e
, ,107
to this tendency as a growth of the R o m a n t i c . B a t e  r rs
to it as the growing "premise of feeling and individualism.
We can see in the creator-oriented point of view, then 
ideas which ran counter to the main themes in the first part 
of the century, but which had a traditional foundation. The
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innate idea rejected by Locke was reintroduced by Shaftes­
bury as a connatural capacity, and spoken of by Blake and 
others as inspiration. The particularity and individuality 
of the genius and of art was also contrary to the generality 
of art and genius attested to by Johnson, Reynolds, and 
others. It was also more specific than the associationalistic 
definition of a trained and natural genius. This "natural 
genius" was reinterpreted by Duff who attributed to it a 
peotic inspiration. And finally, the limitations of a 
symbolic statement of the ideas of the genius was a parti­
cularly interesting issue since it questioned the 
freedom of artistic creativity within the traditional frame­
work of rules and genres.
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SUMMARY
There were three critical and aesthetic orientations 
which determined eighteenth-century British interpretations 
in the arts. All three were apparent in the opening years 
of the century. The object orientation was dominant in 
the early years because it was the traditional attitude 
which can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. The sub­
ject orientation was first articulated by Addison in the 
Spectator Papers; it was based ultimately on Hobbesian 
materialism and Lockean associationalism. This orientation 
came to have a major impact on critical and aesthetic 
systems by the middle of the century. The creator orienta­
tion appeared originally as Shaftesbury's application of 
Cambridge Platonism to the specific problems of aesthetics 
and morals. This last perspective became an important a 
attitude by the end of the century. Even though very fdw 
critics were predominantly creator oriented, the new per­
spective had an influence on criticism--elements of intuit­
ionalism, enthusiasm, and creative plastic genius can be 
detected in several works.
Each orientation had distinctive critical vocabularies
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definitions of terms, and methods. Definition of beauty 
and nature were important in the object-oriented mode of 
thought: criticisms tended to look at individual works
(Pope's and Johnson's criticisms of Shakespeare and Homer), 
and at genres (Reynolds's historical-mythological and his­
torical portraiture genres) in order to determine how 
closely they imitated nature. Psychological responses and 
characteristics of human nature were central to the 
subject-oriented perspective: analysis centered on the op­
erations of pain and pleasure as they related to aesthetics 
(Addison's Spectator Papers, Burke's Inquiry, and Hutcheson's 
Inquiry) . Intuition as an operation of a plastic imagination 
was important to the creator-oriented critics: expressions 
ran from Shaftesbury's system, to Duff's analysis, to Young's 
and Blake's enthusiastic opinions. Thus, each orientation 
was characterized by a specific approach to the materials.
The traditional object orientation used a critical method; 
the subject orientation used an analytical method; the 
creator orientation used both criticism and analysis, as 
well as an intuitive approach.
Each orientation had an influence upon the other 
two. The traditional orientation had a profound effect up 
on the others. Shaftesbury, for example, had to convey 
very radical ideas in a traditional vocabulary. His 
je ne scais quoi suggested a quality of the artist's mind 
which was too large, too close to the goodness of the
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creator, to be expressed in the mateiial form of art.
For him, as for Blake much later, the material in which the 
artistic idea must be expressed is too limiting to convey 
the total creative power of the artist's conception.
Burke's system showed considerable influence of the ob­
ject orientation; he defined various qualities which must 
lead to certain aesthetic reactions in the subject. Rey­
nolds incorporated influences of both of the new attitudes 
in his traditional criticism. It is especially for this 
reason that he seems to be a spokesman for eighteenth- 
century ideas in general. It is also for this reason 
that his critical ideas are subject to a number of 
interpretations, and that his work is very controversial. 
Johnson also seems to have been strongly influenced by 
the subject orientation. He was primarily interested in 
human nature, but he did not interpret it in association­
alistic terms; his emphasis was on the reflection of 
human nature in art, rather than on man's reaction to what 
he sees in the arts. Hutcheson is particularly interesting; 
he used an associationalistic, subject-oriented framework 
and incorporated into it Shaftesbury's intuitive sense, 
calling it internal sense. His particular adaptation 
influenced many of his later contemporaries and eventually 
led to a school of "common sense."
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II
From the historical perspective of the twentieth 
century it is possible to impose a kind of order upon 
the idea's of the eighteenth century; it is much more 
difficult to understand these ideas in the same sense they 
were intended. Our concept of associationalism and 
stimulus-response has been refined by schools of psy­
chology and sociology. Our concepts of creative genius 
has been influenced by Coleridge and Dewey. And our pre­
judice agains.t the absolute turths of classicism has been 
fed by relativism in all of the sciences.
Becker has written that although we use the same words 
as the men of the eighteenth century, our frame of refer­
ence is historical, while theirs was absolute. We are 
relativists, and want to know the past in these terms; 
thus, we tend to impose our frame of reference on the past 
Becker has said that t he shift in frame of reference was 
the "most important event in the intellectual history of 
modern t i m e s . W e  have lost the faith in absolute truths 
and have substituted "facts" for logic; the eighteenth- 
century intellectuals imposed their rational faith upon 
their interpretation of the arts. Thus, we see Reynolds 
and Johnson searching for a standard of art, and Hume and 
Blake for a standard of taste, while Shaftesbury and Blake 
search for a foundation of intuitive knowledge in the 
creative process. In writing about the past, then, we
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must always remember that it is from an historical per­
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